THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM : WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DETERMINISM

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at the
University of St Andrews



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The present Thesis is an attempt to examine the more important aspects of Kant's exposition of Freedom; and its principal feature consists in the argument that Kant's view of Freedom is really what he stated it to be, that is, a Defence of Freedom. It is argued that such a Defence of Freedom can be understood only by an examination of the background of Deterministic thought against which Kant wrote his exposition of Freedom. It is believed that the Eighteenth century provides ample scope for an examination of Determinism; moreso, because it contains the most impressive theory of Determinism in the history of philosophical thought, namely that given by Jonathan Edwards.

It is not claimed that any full and final conclusion can be reached upon this ancient debate of Liberty and Necessity, but it is hoped that the present Thesis will give some insight into its continuing importance.

This Thesis has never been presented for any degree before this occasion; and, apart from the usual guidance given by the University, it is the result of my own, unaided work.

STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC CAREER OF CANDIDATE.

The candidate was educated in County School in Wales, and then received Private tuition for entry to Cliff College, Derbyshire. Entered University College of Wales (Cardiff) 1921, and followed a course in Arts. Later, entered Brecon Theological College and followed course in Theology. He was ordained to The Christian Ministry in 1925, and left Britain for Jamaica 1927. He returned in 1946, and entered Bristol University. He graduated Master of Arts in 1949, and was accepted as Research student in the University of St Andrews in 1950.

The candidate is, at the present time, Parish Minister at St Fothad's, Cardenden, Fife.

CERTIFICATE

I certify that WALTER. L. LEWIS has spent eight terms at Research work in St Andrews University; that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No, 16 (ST ANDREWS); and that he is qualified to submit the accompanying Thesis in application for the degree of Ph. D.

Supervisor.

Principal Abbreviations.

GD.-----"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals".
(T.K.Abbott). 1873 . 1948 .
Also consulted---
"The Moral Law". H.J.Paton. 1947.

K.p.V.- "Critique of Practical Reason."
(T.K.Abbott). 1873. 1948.

K.r.V.--"Critique of Pure Reason"
(Norman Kemp Smith). 1950.
Also consulted----
J.M.D.Meiklejohn.1854. F.Max Muller. 1896.

Religion. --"Religion within the limits of Reason alone".
(Abbott).
And fuller Translations by----
J.W.Semple. 1838.
T.M.Greene & H.H.Hudson. 1946

C.O.N.T.E.N.T.S.

"This law (so far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of nature, without interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of nature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically conditioned, which, from the point of view of reason, is heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition, and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, is nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason."

Kant. K. p. V. 158.

"Most of Kant's theory of freedom consists of a rapid shuffle between one and the other horn of this dilemma, and resembles an unskilful performance of the three-card trick rather than a serious philosophical argument."

Dr. C.D. Broad. Five Types of Ethical Theory. Page 135.

"It was the merit of Kant to see these two factors of knowledge have meaning only in unity. ..... By this essential insight he was led to a new intergration of thought. ..... So much has this fertile idea changed the aspects of the intellectual world, that there is not a single problem of philosophy that does not meet us with a new face; and it is perhaps not unfair to say, that the speculations of all those who have not learned the lesson of Kant are besides the point."

Dr. Edward Caird. The Critical Philosophy of Kant. Vol.I. Page 120.

"The defence of freedom is necessary for the defence of morality, and if Kant's defence is not to be regarded as successful, at least he has shown us the character of the problem and perhaps even suggested some of the lines on which it may be solved."

Dr. H.J. Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Page 278.

The problem involved in the discussion of Liberty and Necessity is one of the oldest, and still continues to be one of the most complicated problems which has confronted the human mind. However, there are some thinkers, of whom Paulsen might be taken as typical, who are assured that philosophy has misdirected its energy and attention by making this problem central to its discussion.

> "The problem of the metaphysical freedom of the will is still regarded by some as one of the greatest and most difficult problems of philosophy. I do not regard it as such. It is a problem which owes its origin to certain conditions, and will disappear with these conditions; it belongs to philosophizing theology, or scholasticism."(1)

Whether Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume and Kant belong to that type of thought which is known as "Scholasticism" is a matter which is open to considerable doubt; yet there can be no doubt about the very important place given by these thinkers to the "metaphysical freedom of the will". Further, even such modern thinkers as Berdyaev,(2) Eddington,(3) Bergson,(4) and Maritain,(5) to mention only a few, find it quite impossible to discuss the world and society without involving such a discussion in this ancient problem of Liberty and Necessity. Again, in much of the "Psychological" literature of the modern world there is a concealed bias in favour of either Liberty or Necessity, which, whether it is intended or not, gives distinctive colouring to the psychological evidence available.

William James is typical of this tendency when he writes:...

> "My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds ..... We can therefore leave the free-will question altogether out of our account." (6)

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(1) A System of Ethics. Page 454.
(2) Slavery and Freedom.
(3) The Nature of the Physical World.
(4) Time and Free Will.
(5) Freedom in the Modern World.
(6) Selected Papers on Philosophy. Ch. 5.

Yet, James leaves the free-will question out of account only for a few pages of this work, then, he concludes with considerable eloquence that man can over-come all the difficulties of life and the Universe by the fact of "Pure inward willingness". Therefore, James does not leave out of account free-will, but he does ignore the problem of how this "pure inward willingness" is possible in a creature which is subject to sensuous impulse and endless desire. The plain and simple fact appears to be that the problem of Liberty and Necessity does not belong to any particular period of thought, but is involved in the very texture of thought which is concerned with God, man, moral effort and failure, causation, evolution and everything related to human and cosmic destiny. Of course, it is not argued that all works relevant to the above-mentioned subjects should be prefaced by a discussion of Liberty and Necessity, but it is urged that this problem is still central and basic to all such discussions and ought to receive far more serious attention than is generally available in modern philosophy. Even a Political crusade which builds its ideology upon "Four" freedoms cannot be granted complete exemption from the serious, and perhaps tedious task of providing adequate grounds for its political point of view. The present effort is concerned with Kant's Defence of Freedom, and this Introductory Section is concerned with discussing some of the reasons which made such a defence necessary, and some of the preliminary difficulties in such a defence of freedom. However, such matters can be discussed only within very rigid limitations, at this early stage of the examination, and the whole treatment must be tentative until it is possible to indicate the outlines of Kant's defence as that defence lies scattered throughout

the Critical Philosophy. Yet, in spite of the inconclusive nature of this Introductory Section, it is necessary. For, without such a general and tentative statement of the problems involved, it might not be possible to justify Kant's somewhat ponderous and often circuitous analysis of this important concept, Freedom. Further, it might be argued that, if careful attention had been given to certain objections to Kant's view of Freedom, the whole treatment would have been different, or it would never have been attempted. Therefore, it is hoped that this very limited treatment of Kant's Defence of Freedom in this Introductory Section will lessen, if not remove some of the principal objections to his analysis of Freedom, and provide reasonable grounds for proceeding with an examination of his Defence of Freedom.

(1) The element of Determinism in human thought.

Kant's contribution to the analysis of Freedom can receive adequate appreciation only as that contribution is viewed against the background of Determinism as an important factor in philosophical thought. As a "positive" statement on human Freedom, Kant's analysis of the concept has grave defects. Yet, if his exposition of Freedom is regarded as a "Defence" against an aggressive and all-pervading Determinism, there is more hope of a just appraisal of what he has attempted and what he has accomplished. It is for this reason that so much violent and eloquent criticism of Kant on this point of human Freedom becomes utterly irrelevant. For, in the last analysis, all that really matters is not the symmetry, or the beauty, or even the ideality of the completed structure of ~~human~~ Kantian Freedom, but its utility as a habitation, and its inviolability against a resourceful and relentless enemy. Maritain sees the value

of this argument, without any special reference to Kant, when he indicates the weaknesses of the "abstract" freedom of Rousseau, and the "dynamic" freedom of Hegel.(1) However, the main point of the present argument is that any exposition of Freedom must have a positive and a negative character in the sense that it must expound the basic fact of human spontaneity and it must resist every conceivable insinuation of human bondage. It is believed that Kant has attempted to blend these two factors, and that his most valuable contribution lies in the negative phase of his work; that is, in his "Defence"of Freedom against the intrusions of any form of Determinism.
In order to state fully and correctly this "negative" contribution made by Kant another work different from the present would be required. Yet, a few hints upon the Deterministic background can here and now be made available.
(A) It is significant that the ancient world of thought appears to be everywhere dominated by some form of Fatalism which is only a crude and immature form of Determinism. The terms "Moira" (Greek), "Simtu" (Babylonian), "Shai" (Egyptian), "Karma" (Indian), and "Kismet" (Mohammedan), all suggest some type and degree of Fate which was NOT only related to human existence, but dominated and decreed its course and destiny. Even the "gods" of the ancient world, who lived above the struggle of human beings, were, in the final analysis, only "secondary" deities. For, behind and above them all, there was Fate to whose finality all must bow. Further, the Old Testament, while giving an exalted view of God and Man, and denying the existence of Fate external to its God, made it perfectly obvious that the Divine will was bound to prevail in the earth.

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(1) Freedom in the Modern World. Page 41.

It is true that Christianity further exalted the conceptions of God and Man, and substituted the idea of Fatherhood in God for mere Sovereignty, but its exalted view of morality also deepened the concept of human "Inability", and its emphasis upon the Grace of God was easily perverted into a rigid form of Determinism. The Stoics made a valiant attempt to expound real human freedom, but it had no real cure for the inherent Fatalism of its thought, and, as Dr. W.L. Davidson observes, Stoicism's contribution to human freedom consisted in a rational recognition of the inflexibility of the cosmic order and a brave and cheerful submission to the facts of life.(1)

In the Fifth century A.D., Pelagius made a genuine effort to combat the spirit of his age and the Determinism of the Church by urging that the human will was free to accept or reject the will of God. However, he failed to roll back the tide of Deterministic thought because he lacked the psychological insight of his opponent, Augustine; he had very imperfect training in basic principles of morality; and he could not lift the fact of human freedom from its "Theological" context.

Therefore, it was quite reasonable for Luther to say in the sixteenth century:.....

> "The very name, Free-will, was odious to all the Fathers. ..... Hence, we conclude in general. That man, without the Holy Ghost, and God's Grace, can do nothing but sin ..... and from one sin falls into another."(2)

Luther stressed the devastating effects of "Original" sin, and Calvin emphasised the fore-knowledge of God issuing in the doctrine of Predestination, but both felt that they were expressing the correct teaching of the Church, Tradition and the Scriptures in resisting any attempt to state that human

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(1) The Stoic Creed. Page 213.
(2) Table Talk. Chapter on Freewill.

free-will and Christian doctrine could belong to the same orbit of thought. Dr. James Martineau thinks that the "Roman" aspect of Christian witness put up a reasonable fight for human freedom in that it "alone saved any ability in man to obey the will of God."(1) Yet, the continued emphasis upon the Grace of God and the Means of Grace makes it doubtful whether the Roman interpretation of Free-will was vastly superior to that offered by Pelagius. Both Protestant and Roman theologians would have agreed that without the Grace of God man was incapable of freedom in any real sense. It was the awareness of this common ground that prompted Erasmus to make an excursion into Theology in his work "De Libero Arbitrio", and it was undertaken with the hope that both Protestant and Roman theologians would see how much they had in common upon an important question, and thereby assist in healing their divisions. The following extract is typical of all that Erasmus wrote upon the Freedom of the will:....

> "Pelagius seems to have attributed more than enough to free will, Scotus rather abundantly. Luther began by mutilating it, but not content with this, erelong strangled it and rejected it entirely. For my part, I prefer the opinion of those who attribute something to free will, but most to the Grace of God."(2)

The above quotation is important because it indicates how deeply and widely the implications of Determinism had fixed themselves in human thought. Erasmus is not a theologian, but he had his finger on the pulse of his very thoughtful age, and, as a very astute spokesman, he indicates the very limited progress made in the concept of human freedom. However, Luther, with all the weight of Christian tradition behind him, makes the position of Erasmus appear little short of ludicrous.

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(1) A Study of Religion. Vol.2. Page 186.
(2) Mackinnon. Luther and the Reformation. Vol.3. Page 249

The revolt of James Arminius (1560-1609), against this bondage of the human will was doomed to failure because he could not conceive of human freedom apart from the pre-suppositions of contemporary theology. He appears to be convinced that he can solve every problem of human freedom by repeating the text ... "Without Me, ye can do nothing", which was all that Luther ism and Calvin ism required to make their positions still more secure. Pietism, which was directly derived from the Mystics of the thirteenth century, might have said something worth while for human freedom if it had paid more attention to Christian doctrine and less to Christian "feeling". However, its pre-occupation with piety of conduct rather than clarity of thought left it on a side-line as far as Theological reconstruction was concerned. Thus Kant found himself confronted with a type of Theological Determinism which had all the prestige of Christian thought and tradition, and which had coloured the very texture of philosophy and metaphysics.

(B). Along side of this Theological Determinism, there was gradually evolving what might be termed a type of "Scientific" Determinism. The scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo had important implications for contemporary philosophy, and there are clear indications that Hobbes was impressed with the laws of motion intimated by Galileo.(1) In fact, he was the first to attempt to transfer such physical phenomena to psychology, and, upon the basis of such a transference, he expounded a new and challenging type of "Psychological" Determinism. He is not fully emancipated from the "Theological" presuppositions of his generation, but he set in motion a world of ideas which only reached maturity in Jonathan Edwards..... Hobbes writes:-

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(1) Encyl. of Religion and Ethics. Vol. 6. Page 729.

> "Liberty and necessity are consistent: ..... which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from Liberty, and yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes, proceed from necessity."(1)

This is a new approach to the question of Determinism and impressed itself upon Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke, except that Spinoza had a special contribution to make to the question of Determinism and it might be said to be a mixture of mathematical genius and religious penetration quite beyond the capacity of Hobbes.

The contribution of Locke to Determinism must be examined in greater detail at a later period; yet, here and now, it is possible to indicate how deeply he was impressed with the arguments of Theological Determinism. His difficulty is stated in a letter to Molyneux, a few years after he had completed his work "Essay on Human Understanding". Locke writes:-

> "I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence or omniscience in God; though I am fully persuaded of both as of any truths I must freely assent to. And therefore I have long left off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion -- that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."(2)

Here, Locke is expressing the position of a host of thinkers of his generation who had discovered that Theological Determinism had received further confirmation from "Scientific or Psychological" Determinism. Bishop Butler (1692-1752), placed all the power of his position and learning on the side of human freedom, but his effort was ineffective because he declined to take time to understand Determinism in either its Theological or Psychological form, and dismissed the whole under the charge of Fatalism. Dr. Richard Price (1723-91), made a very remarkable stand for the

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(1) Leviathan. Pt.2. Ch. 21.
(2) Essay on Human Understanding. Fraser, Vol.I. Page 316.

reality of freedom, and, with still greater attention to his central theme, might have anticipated Kant. However, he failed to follow up his important discovery of the Moral law and the Rational nature of man; and his debate with Dr. Priestley upon Freedom and Determinism can only be described in terms of a well-ordered and dignified retreat for the cause of human freedom. Later, in an examination of the Determinism of Jonathan Edwards, it will be observed that many voices were raised on behalf of human freedom, but not one possessed the ability to call a halt to the bold and cavalier Determinism apparent in Collins and Hume. It is no exaggeration to say that Collins and Hume simply rode through the ranks of the few fighters for human freedom with a disdain which was impossible for them to conceal. Edwards was far more capable on this question of Liberty and Necessity than Collins or Hume, and his system of Determinism is completely free from contempt for his opponents. Yet, the publication of his work in 1754 seemed to settle the issue for all time, and Determinism was triumphant.

This was the state of affairs when Kant turned his attention to the problem. Theological Determinism had been buttressed by "Scientific" Determinism, and this formidable alliance seemed incapable of defeat. So deep was this conviction that, many years after Kant's Defence of Freedom had been expounded, Ernst Haeckel could write:-

> "The great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist, between the opponent and sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day, after more than 2,000 years, completely in favour of the determinist. The human will has no more freedom than that of the higher animals. .... In the last century, the dogma of liberty was fought with general philosophic and cosmological arguments. The nineteenth century has given us very different weapons for its effective destruction ..... the powerful weapons which we find in the arsenal of comparative physiology and evolution."(1)

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(1) The Riddle of the Universe. Ch.7.

As already stated, it is only against this background of Deterministic thought that Kant's contribution to Freedom can be understood. His exposition of Freedom stands directly related and opposed to this tide in contemporary thought. If such opposition to Determinism must be defined in terms of "Negative" Freedom, and if his exposition of "Positive" Freedom appears unrelated to life and experience, then, these facts must be accepted as inevitable. However, of some things Kant is convinced, and these are that this Deterministic tide must be faced and resisted; and that the best way in which it can be faced and resisted is to create a "Defence for human freedom. He writes:-

> "Nothing remains but defence, the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible." (1)

(2) The approach to Kant's interpretation of human freedom.

It is difficult to choose among the multitude of passages available in Kant an extract which sums up his opposition to Determinism in plain and simple terms. Perhaps the following will serve the purpose:-

> "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself. Both must be the effect of his free elective will, otherwise it could not be imputed to him, and, consequently, he would be morally neither good nor bad." (2)

As the continuing passage indicates, Kant is here defying the tenets of Theological Determinism which taught that man had been created "moral" by God, and, further, that by means of "irresistible" Grace, "saved" man was the recipient of "Necessitated" goodness.

The type of Theological Determinism which made such a doctrine possible might appear remote if not obsolete, and

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(1) Gd. 95.
(2) Religion. 51.

Kant's Defence of Freedom against such ideology might appear antiquated. Yet, it must be insisted that it is quite impossible to understand Kant's view of Freedom without due regard to this type of Deterministic environment. Further, it will be made clear at a later stage of the discussion that only those who have a very superficial knowledge of the problems inherent in Liberty and Necessity can afford to ignore the supposed antiquated notions of Theological Determinism. Be this as it may, Kant, having grounded Freedom upon Self-Determination and related these two concepts to Morality, is perfectly aware that such a bald statement is no sure defence against Theological Determinism. He cannot ignore the central concept of such Determinism, that is, God; and he is compelled to take into account the implications of such a concept for Freedom and Morality. Kant sees this need very early in his exposition of Freedom, and says something which must have come as a shock to Theological Determinists and even to Theological Libertarians .....

> "To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom."(1)

Here, Kant is making reference to the destructive tendencies inherent in what he terms "Heteronomy", and later he makes it quite clear that even the Will of God directed to man can be a form of this heteronomy.(2) It will become obvious as the examination of Kant's view of Freedom proceeds that he has entered upon an extremely difficult task when he tackled this central problem of Theological Determinism. Frequently his argument is inconsistent, but the main point is that he is concerned with resisting the implications of

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(1) K.p.V. 152.
(2) K.p.V. 185.

this type of Determinism, and, right to the very end of his exposition of Freedom, he attempts to state his position in clearer language. Perhaps the following extract gives the most adequate interpretation of his point of view:-

> "Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to God, is mere false worship of the Deity."(1)

Further, it must be noted that Kant's attack upon the "Speculative" arguments for the existence of God set forth in "The Critique of Pure Reason" constitute an indirect attack upon Theological Determinism. The conception of God which is here criticised is the conception which is conducive to such Determinism. It is not suggested that Kant succeeded in this task as is generally supposed, but his main purpose is to postulate a God whose operation and character shall be consistent with the fundamental values of Morality and Freedom. Kant has been charged with making God a mere appendage to an already existing system of human morality, and there are ample grounds for such a charge. Further, if the logical consequences of Kant's statements upon God had been worked out, there can be little doubt that Kant's deity could be shown to be "limited", if not impotent, and this in spite of all the "metaphysical" attributes Kant ascribes to God upon grounds of morality. Yet, the important fact is that Kant deliberately "conditions" God in this new moral sense, because he sees quite clearly that the God of traditional Theology is the sure foundation of Theological Determinism; and Kant's implacable opposition to such a type of Determinism is great enough to compel him to re-create even God. This relentless opposition to Theological Determinism drives Kant into extremely awkward situations. For, having postulated God upon moral grounds,

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(1) Religion. Semple's Trans: Bk.4. Apotome 2. Sect.2.

and thereby making Him the very core and citadel of moral values, Kant sees another grave danger in such a postulation. If God is fully and finally a "Moral" being, then it follows that all moral laws must flow from His will. However, it is the "Divine" will that Kant has regarded as a source of heteronomy, and even a "morally" Divine will can be a danger to man's essential autonomy. Therefore, this dread of "determinism" in God makes Kant perform some rather dubious feats in Theology. Having postulated God as a moral Being, he declines to postulate Him as the "Giver" of moral Laws.

> "For it is these very laws that have led us, in virtue of their inner practical necessity, to the postulate of a self-sufficient cause, or of a wise Ruler of the world, in order that through such agency effect may be given to them. We may not, therefore, in reversal of such procedure, regard them as accidental and as derived from the mere will of the Ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to serve as our guide, we shall not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them." (1)

To say the very least, this is a remarkable and clever illustration of special pleading or even question-begging argument. However, it is impossible to deal with this important matter at this early stage, and, later, it will be observed that Kant is compelled to modify this dubious argument when he attempts to postulate the existence of God as the "judge" of the correct relation between Happiness and Virtue. Here and now, this point is raised to indicate Kant's opposition to every conceivable intrusion of Theological Determinism, and to indicate that, in the absence of an adequate grasp of such opposition, his Defence of Freedom becomes almost unintelligible.

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(1) K.r.V. A. 818.

His opposition to "Scientific" or Psychological Determinism is equally marked. In fact, it is one of the main strands in his Defence of Freedom. This type of Determinism had much support from Empiricism, and the whole of The Critical Philosophy can be said to be a reply to the challenge of Empiricism.(1) It is not possible to enter upon a detailed account of Kant's reply to "Scientific" Determinism, for this is the major task of the present work, and must be dealt with at a later period of this examination of Kant's Defence of Freedom. Yet, it is possible to give a few hints upon the manner in which Kant approaches this task. First, Kant accepts the argument for the inflexibility of the causal series, but he attempts to prove that if the so-called causal series constitute the only interpretation of causality, then, the concept becomes involved in contradiction.

Second, there must be a type of causality which is consistent with the concept of Freedom, and which makes it possible to regard Freedom and "natural" causation as existing side by side.

Third, if man is solely and simply Determined by the causal series, then it becomes impossible to give an adequate account of desert, guilt, even empirical rewards and punishments, and the reality of the Moral Law vanishes under the deluge of sense impressions.

As the preceeding examination will indicate, Kant involves his Defence of Freedom in almost endless ramifications of these basic facts, but it will become clear that all that he has to say is more inclined to be directed against all forms of Determinism than for a positive statement upon human freedom.

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(1) Dr. H.J. Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Page 30.

This decisive, uncompromising opposition to Determinism is found in a variety of forms in Kant. It is the foundation upon which he erects his noumenal and phenomenal worlds, the pivot from which he attempts to interpret natural and freedom causality, and the reason why he rejects "Happiness", in the accepted sense, as compatible with real virtue. Therefore, those critics of Kant who find a fatal defect in his exposition of Freedom because it is largely a "Negative" Freedom, overlook this important fact that, in the main, Kant could not help being negative because the greater part of his exposition is concerned with opposition to Determinism. Further, they fail to understand the depth of the hold Determinism had upon all forms of thought, and the depth of its continuing challenge to all forms of Freedom. Kant denies that he is able to justify and "explain" human Freedom, and, if his own words are to have any weight, the whole of The Critique of Pure Reason was taken up with the task of proving the "possibility" or "thinkability" of Freedom.(1)
Further, he declined to enter upon a "Refutation" of Determinism but purposely termed his exposition a "Defence" of Freedom. Again, his pre-occupation with Freedom compelled him to make it one of the main, if not the principal object of metaphysical thought,(2) but he is careful to point out that Freedom is only an Idea.(3) Thus, Kant has expressed his opposition to Theological and Scientific Determinism, and it is insisted that his exposition of Freedom cannot be understood unless due regard is paid to such opposition.

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(1) Preface to K.p.V.
(2) Preface to K.p.V.
(3) Gd. 94.

(3) An analysis of Eighteenth-Century Determinism.

The leading exponents of Determinism in the eighteenth century are Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Lord Kames (1696-1782), David Hartley (1705-1757), Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), David Hume (1711-1776) and Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). It is important to observe that the above-mentioned persons do not constitute what might be termed a "School" of Determinism. It is true that they had one thing in common and that was a profound conviction that the debate concerning Liberty and Necessity could, and ought to be, settled upon strictly Empirical grounds. Yet few of the exponents of Determinism would have been prepared to accept the rigid and exhaustive Empiricism of Hume. For instance, Jonathan Edwards, the dominant figure of eighteenth-century Determinism, had much in common with the Idealism of Berkeley,(1) and, although his Determinism stands related to that of Hume, he deplores any attempt by his contemporaries to associate his system with that of Hume.(2) Further, Lord Kames, while admiring much of Hume's philosophy, felt it imperative to differ from him upon vital questions in Morals and Religion, and his work -- "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion" (1751) -- was written to correct, if not to rebuke Hume's handling of these subjects.(3) Again, on broad philosophical grounds, Priestley had more in common with his "Free-Will" opponent, Richard Price (1723-1791), than with Hartley whose "Observations on Man" (1749) was written to support, on physiological grounds, the Determinism in which Priestley was so deeply interested. Anthony Collins can be termed a Deist, but it is doubtful whether any of the above-mentioned exponents of Determinism

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(1) W.R. Sorley. A History of Enligsh Philosophy. Page 135.
(2) Edward's Letter to Dr. John Erskine, Edinburgh, 1755.
(3) James McCosh. The Scottish Philosophy. Page 175.

can be classified under such a term, and it would be grossly inaccurate to suggest that Deism could be identified with Determinism.

(1) The Determinism of Lord Kames is built, to a very large degree, upon that expounded by Anthony Collins (1717), except in one perhaps rather novel feature. Lord Kames argues that man has a real consciousness of Freedom. That is, man has a profound "feeling" that he is free in his choice and actions. Lord Kames argues that this feeling of Freedom must not be ignored by Determinists, for it is a feeling which is implanted by God to save man from despair. In other words, man is Determined in the most exact manner in all his willing and acting, but this feeling of Freedom is important in that it is a kind of divine deception which promotes morality and prevents despair. Lord Kames has little support for such an explanation of Liberty and Necessity from any writer on Determinism. Jonathan Edwards repudiates such an explanation of Freedom as being inconsistent with morality in God and man. Therefore, it is felt that a reasonable exposition of Determinism by Collins will justify the neglect of Lord Kames.

(2) The contribution of Hartley to Determinism is largely upon physiological grounds. He has little to say of any importance upon the central problem of "Choice", and he deliberately ignores all contemporary expositions of Freedom and Necessity. His handling of the subject of Determinism indicates that he has never read Hume, and his theological interpretation of Determinism is too antiquated to receive serious attention. Therefore, consideration of Hume's contribution to Determinism will more than compensate for the neglect of Hartley.

(3) The Determinism of Priestley consists of a very limited interpretation of that expounded by Jonathan Edwards. Priestley had more interest in chemistry than in theology, and he fails to reproduce large sections of Edwards' argument for Determinism while his metaphysical analysis of Determinism is elementary. Therefore, it is felt that a discussion of the expositions of Determinism offered by Collins, Hume and Edwards will provide the basic principles necessary to understand the Determinism of the eighteenth century.

However, before proceeding to an analysis of the expositions of Collins, Hume and Edwards, there are two important points which must be noted:-

First: It is impossible to proceed to the analysing of eighteenth-century Determinism without a limited discussion of Locke. As already stated, the common factor which underlies such Determinism is the whole-hearted acceptance of Empiricism, and the Empiricism of eighteenth-century Determinism is the Empiricism of Locke, which had been inherited from Hobbes. Collins, a faithful disciple of Locke, is convinced that his master was against the acceptance of the Freedom of the Will.(1) Yet, it will become clear in an examination of Locke that Collins was viewing only one aspect of his master's exposition on Freedom. Be this as it may, Locke must receive some amount of attention because of two very important reasons. (a) Locke lifts the problem of Liberty and Necessity out of its age-long Theological context, and, whether he willed or not, Locke is one of the builders of what might be termed "Psychological Determinism". (b) Locke also makes a real attempt to relate the debate upon Liberty and Necessity with concepts of Morality.

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(1) A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty. Page 41

Collins grasped these two important contributions of Locke, and writes:-

> "I have undertaken to shew that the notions I advance are, so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality ....
> "I have instituted my discourse, a Philosophical Inquiry etc., because I propose only to prove my point by experience and reason, omitting all considerations strictly Theological." (1)

Collins does not keep to this last resolution in a strict manner, for he does make some reference to Theology in his discussion of Determinism, but his references are auxiliary not fundamental to his thesis.

Second: in selecting Collins, Hume and Edwards as truly representative of eighteenth-century Deterministic thought, it is inevitable that the emphasis must be upon the contribution made by Edwards for it is felt that he alone grasped the concept of Determinism with all its essential facts and implications. There can be little doubt that Edwards is the greatest exponent of Determinism in the history of philosophy, and, in the final analysis, the Kantian Defence of Freedom must be a defence of Freedom against the agressive and massive interpretation of Determinism offered by Edwards. Such a statement must appear dogmatic at this early stage of the discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and, to reduce this element of dogmatism, the following points may be of value.

(a) Tradition has longed marked Jonathan Edwards as the greatest Theologian and Metaphysician produced by America.(2) However, his influence has not been confined to America, and British scholars have recognised his genius in no uncertain terms. Sir James Mackintosh, a contemporary of Edwards wrote that "his power of subtle argument is perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men." Dugald Stewart thought

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(1) A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty. Preface.
(2) Woodbridge Riley, American Thought. Page 28.

he ought to be ranked with Leibniz and Kant, and Sir Leslie Stephen appears to confirm this view.(1) Dr. I.A. Dorner thought that Edwards had written the most acute work on the Freedom of the Will,(2) and James McCosh says: "His Freedom of the Will is the acutest work ever written on this perplexing subject."(3) Thomas Huxley has paid a merited tribute to Edwards when he writes:-

> "In 1754, the famous Calvinistic divine, Jonathan Edwards .... produced in the interests of the strictest orthodoxy, a demonstration of the necessarian thesis, which has never been equalled in power, and certainly has never been refuted." (4)

(B) Edwards is almost the perfect exponent of what has been termed "Psychological Determinism", but he is also the master of the richest heritage of " Theological Determinism", and here he is fit to be ranked with Augustine and Calvin, and appears vastly superior to Luther. He does not make this aspect of Determinism fundamental to his work, but he loses no opportunity of making it a formidable buttress.

(C) Before producing his work on the Freedom of the Will, Edwards had given very serious consideration to the contribution of Hume on Determinism, and, although he repudiates the conclusions of Hume in morality and kindred questions, he stands greatly indebted to Hume in his treatment of Causation. Edwards declines to accept the major premise of Hume upon this important subject, but he refrains from charging Hume with the denial of belief in Causation which was hurled at Hume by Reid.(5) Rather, Edwards uses the implications of Hume's essential view of Causation to create a system of Philosophical Necessity which is a real contribution to his system of Determinism.

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(1) Hours in a Library. Vol.I. Page 404.
(2) A System of Christian Ethics. Page 254.
(3) Scottish Philosophy. Page 183.
(4) Essay on Hume. Page 224.
(5) The Active Powers of the Human Mind. Essay I. Chapter 4.

(D) Edwards is saturated with the Empiricism of Locke, but the inherent mysticism of his nature and experience takes the form of an Idealism which saved him from the Scepticism of Hume, and gave him an insight into real Morality which is almost Kantian in its form and passion. Further, his repeated emphasis upon Reason makes it impossible for him to accept the dictum of Hume that the Reason was the slave of the passions. Yet, his rationalism has nothing of the over-confidence so apparent in the Determinism of Collins.

(E) In addition to the Metaphysical skill of Edwards, he is one of the greatest experimental psychologists of modern times. His work -- "A Narrative of Surprising Conversions" (1736) -- is the careful record of first-hand observations, and can be ranked with that work of William James -- "Varieties of Religious Experience" -- excepting that Edwards made actual personal contact with the subjects of such religious experiences. Therefore, his penetrating observations on such philosophical concepts as "Motivation" are based upon what may be termed "Clinical" data, and accordingly become impressive.

The above-mentioned features of the Determinism of Edwards indicate and merit a special treatment of his exposition, and it is hoped that further analysis of eighteenth-century Determinism will confirm this point of view.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER ONE

The Determinism of Locke and Collins

"Empiricism and idealism alike are faced with a problem to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution. This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind. Locke considers this problem, but what he says is obviously unsatisfactory. ... ... Locke states that liberty depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the government of our passions. This opinion he derives from his doctrine that private and public interests are identical in the long run ...."

(Bertrand Russell. History of Western Philosophy., Pages, 635, 638.)

"And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills, we are not within the sphere of its activity, our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses which are present to us, which (whilst we have any) are always soliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination. .. .. For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to <u>suspend</u> the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others."

(Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding. "Power". 47-48.)

"Free agency with Locke thus consists at last in "power to suspend" volition. But unless in this man rises above a merely natural causation of motives, he is no more ethically free in suspending the voluntary execution of a desire than in any other exercise of will. A power to suspend volition necessarily thus dependent, leaves man still a part of the mechanism of nature."

(Dr. A.C. Fraser: Foot-note to Locke's Essay. Vol. I, page 345.)

"Mr. Locke says:- "The will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose" ... ... But the instance he mentions, does not prove that there is anything else in <u>willing</u>, but merely <u>preferring</u>; .... so that if we carefully <u>distinguish</u> the <u>proper</u> objects of the several acts of the will, it will not appear by this, and such-like instances, that there is any difference between <u>volition</u> and <u>preference</u>."

(Edwards, The Freedom of the Will: Part 1, Sect. 1.)

LOCKE - (1632-1704)

There can be little doubt that Locke set out to expound a system of Determinism. As already observed, his intimate friend and disciple, Collins, had no doubt that Locke was a Determinist, and there is a very interesting observation by Locke upon the ability of Collins to grasp his real meaning. It is quoted by Dr. A.C. Fraser in his introduction to Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. Writing to Collins, Locke says: ... "You have a comprehensive knowledge of it, and do not stick in the incidents, which I find many people do."(1) However, it is possible to ask whether the system of Determinism expounded by Locke in this work is consistent with itself. He raises a host of problems, which, if pressed to their logical conclusion, would have compelled him to modify the system of Determinism he was set upon expounding. His letter to Molyneux, already quoted, indicates the very deep uncertainty, if not inconsistency of his views upon Liberty and Necessity, and his elaboration of these views in the Essay does not decrease the uncertainty.

In the chapter entitled "Power", he sets forth upon the troubled waters of this vast and complicated subject, and it is obvious that by the term "Power" he means the causal process. He does not use this latter term in any direct and full meaning, but it is clear that it is the causal process which leads him to the discussion of the will. Further, when he comes to discuss the "Ideas of Relation of Cause and Effect", in a later chapter, he has very little to say because he has exhausted the theme under the heading

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(1) The Essay on the Human Understanding; Intro. page 55.

of "Power". He begins by observing that the mind comes to the knowledge of the causal process or "Power" by "reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice."(1) Locke would have his readers believe that "Power" is thus a "simple" idea which is the result of many other ideas. This is a theory of the causal process inherited by Hume, but modified in a very considerable manner. However, to Locke, the causal process has a positive and a negative aspect, that is, Power to "make" a change and Power to "receive" a change, or, as he terms it, Active and Passive Power.

The scepticism of Hume is apparent in Locke upon this question of insight into the causal process. We have a very imperfect idea of this "active" power, still, he does not press such scepticism on the abstract idea of power, but goes on to focus attention upon the power observed in the will. Now, it is just at this point that Locke begins to get his discussion of Determinism into real difficulties. He gives the impression that he has a wealth of ideas on this subject at his disposal, but he is not quite sure as to the outcome of the discussion of these ideas. He appears to be finding his way among a vast array of data without any decisive idea of the end towards which he moves. It is obvious that he is most anxious to avoid dogmatism upon this issue of Liberty and Necessity, and he conveys the impression that he is permitting the facts to speak for themselves, that is, to his readers and even to himself. This painstaking groping for truth, this deliberate testing of the texture of arguments for value is very commendable. Yet, this permitting the facts to speak for themselves often

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(1) Power. Sect.1.

results in Locke raising problems which are unanswered, and making statements which, if allowed to speak fully for themselves, would involve his central argument in endless twistings and turnings, and even contradiction, or, at least, grave modification of the previous statement. Locke appears to look at the problem of Liberty and Necessity from, at least, four distinctive points of view. These points of view are all highly relevant to the question under discussion, but the basic question is, how can these respective points of view be united in one central theme and doctrine of Determinism? What does Locke really teach upon Human Freedom? Perhaps the best way to see the value of such a question is to allow Locke to put his points of view in the following order. The titles used are not Locke's, but it is felt that they sum up what he is saying upon each of these aspects.

(1) Freedom means Liberty of Action

Perhaps the most emphatic extract of this point of view is the following:-

> "So that the idea of Liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity." (1)

Inanimate objects cannot be said to possess Freedom, for such Freedom is intimately related to "Thought", and, therefore, such objects cannot be capable of preference. Locke is always rather ambiguous about this question of preferring and willing. Later, it will be observed, that Edwards declines to allow Locke's distinction between preferring and willing. Here and now, it is of interest to see how Locke compares these two ideas.

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(1) Power. Sect. 8.

> "So that Liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring, but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct." (1)

Dr. Fraser raises the question, in a footnote. "But how does this choice originate?" This is a reasonable question for the whole of Locke's treatment of the Will, but its relevance here is questionable. The prior question is, why does Locke distinguish between the act of the mind in choosing and directing, and "preferring"? Edwards cannot accept such a distinction, and Locke's rather mistaken views upon this point lead him to make a distinction and difference between "Choice" and Desire. However, Locke's point of view on the difference between preferring and choosing seems to be backed up by his insistence that there are many instances when the body acts without any consultation of Choice. The heart beats, the blood circulates, the limbs move convulsively etc., all indicate that many human acts are apart from Choice. A man may "prefer" a state different from that in which he finds himself, but circumstances, over which he has no control, prevent his preference from being actualised. Locke, now, seems to modify this distinction between Choice and Preference by saying:-

> "Where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at Liberty." (2)

Further, he asserts that compulsion is "contrary to that preference of the mind." (3)

When these ambiguities are allowed to pass, Locke is seen making a very clear distinction about the difference of the Will being Free, and the man being Free.
This is an important contribution to Liberty and Necessity, and it is confirmed and exploited by Edwards in a very far-

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(1) Power. Sect. 10.
(2) " " 12.
(3) " " 13.

reaching manner. Yet, right to the very end of this particular point of view of Liberty and Necessity, Locke persists in being far from satisfied that preferring and choosing are one and the same act of the Mind. He tries to emphasise this distinction by saying that a man may "prefer" flying to walking, yet, who can say that he ever wills to fly. In spite of these rather dubious distinctions between preference and choice, Locke makes three important contributions to the question of Liberty and Necessity. They are (a), this question must stand related to the man or the agent, not to a supposed faculty or property of man; (b), Essential Liberty consists in the power to do or not to do certain actions; (c), Man is at liberty to do as he "pleases" -

> "For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do as what he will ... So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for Freedom to make him." (1)

These contributions to the solution to the problem of Liberty and Necessity are by no means insignificant, even if they are marred by the above-mentioned ambiguities.

(2) Freedom means the fulfilment of the Good

With these three points made secure, there are indications that Locke would have liked to have ended his discussion of human Liberty, but he has to proceed to further questions, for which he blames the "inquisitive" mind of man wanting to put off from himself the facts of guilt as this stands related to Necessity. He thinks that there is a school of thought, or class of opinion which argues that this above-mentioned view of Freedom is most inadequate, and press

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(1) Power. Sect. 21.

deeper to state the difficult, if not absurd doctrine:-

> "That a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills." (1)

Locke is obviously impatient with this type of question, yet, he takes considerable time and space to reply to it. He first makes it very clear that the act of Will is a necessary act. Once an act is proposed to THE mind of acting or not acting, the Will must come to some decision, and this decision is an act of the Will, and therefore, that particular act of the Will is a necessary act. Locke says:-

> "He cannot avoid willing the existence, or non-existence of that action."

If he had pondered his own words, he would have seen that although there may be the existence or non-existence of an action, this does not make "the act of the Will" negative and positive, as the actions are, but, as Edwards points out, this really means a "positive" act of the Will. However, this is not the main point at this stage. The important thing is that Locke teaches that the act of the Will is a "necessary" act. Now, this means that the Will cannot be free in the sense that some persons are prepared to define Freedom, that is, as the ability of the Will to act or not to act according to its own inherent power. Locke points out that such a kind of Freedom of Will would involve a prior act of Will, and so on "in infinitum". (2) Locke tries to strengthen this argument with a reference to "Impulsive" actions, and he re-affirms his dictum that Liberty is do as one pleases. Much of what Locke says here will be put in more emphatic terms by Edwards, and this indicates how deeply Edwards stood indebted to Locke.

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(1) Power. Sect. 22.
(2) " " 25.

Under this section, Locke asks the question, "What determines the Will?" and his immediate reply is "The Mind". Yet, Locke knows this short reply is not enough to justify his point of view, so, he enters upon a rather novel idea of motivation. He argues that the mind is determined by "uneasiness". (1) It seems that his purpose in saying this is to avoid the statement that the Will is determined by the Good, that is, in the full and final meaning of that term. Again, Edwards will find adequate reasons to doubt Locke's explanation of motivation in the above terms, and he cannot grant what Locke is led to conclude that "the Will is perfectly distinguished from desire".(2) Even Locke has doubts concerning this kind of motivation, and he is far from consistent when he says:-

> "that which immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of Desire, fixed on some absent Good".(3)

If Locke is asked to define the Good, he replies "happiness".(4)

> "Therefore, what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call Good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call Evil". (5)

(3) Freedom as the Act of Suspension.

After Locke has "felt" his way to the view that the Will is determined by a fulfilment of the Good based upon uneasiness, and as it is conceived as "pleasure", he finds that this is far from a complete definition of the Determination of the Will because different persons have different ideas of what is this type of Good.(6) Further, he is of the opinion that the absolute Good ought to determine the Will,(7) but this "is not visible in experience", and the mind often pursues trifles. This attention to man's higher or rational nature

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(1) Power. Sect. 29.
(2) " " 30.
(3) " " 33.
(4) " " 43.
(5) " " 43.
(6) " " 44.
(7) " " 38, 39.

provides Locke with some more difficulties concerning Liberty and Necessity. Again, it is obvious that he is feeling his way along this line of argument, and trying to find every element of truth available from the facts of experience. Further, he is inclined to give a slightly different meaning to the term "Mind", and includes an element of judgment which was not so evident in his previous analysis of that concept.

> "And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that Good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the Will, and be pursued." (1)

Here, is a modification of the teaching that the Will is determined directly by that which is pleasurable. Further, here is included that element of judgment or deliberation which leads Locke to a new view of Freedom. This third aspect of his view of Human Freedom is put in these terms:-

> "For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident from experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others."(2)

Locke is now convinced that this power of suspension of desires is the very core of Human Freedom. Now, as Locke states "suspension" of desire, he is coming very near to contradicting his dictum that the act of the Will is a necessary act, and going a long way to under-mine his system of Determinism. Mere suspension of execution of desires is not in itself a contradiction of Determinism, but it is the ambiguity of Locke upon this important point which endangers his previous exposition that the act of the Will is anecessary act. Here is an indication of his rather loose expression:--

> "For during this suspension of any desire, before the Will is determined to action, and the action (which follows that Determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the Good and the Evil of what we are going to do."

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(1) Power. Sect. 46.
(2) " " 47.

This type of argument will be used by many advocates of Freedom who repudiate the basic tenets of Determinism, and it will be observed that Edwards will have to go to great trouble to define this power of suspension with greater care. However, Locke does not appear to realise how near he has come to a repudiation of his fundamental notions, but passes on to observe that this element of judgment in the Determination of the Will is a valuable argument against the "Indifferency" of the Will. Locke believes that there are certain actions about which men are "indifferent", but even here, on this small point, Edwards cannot find himself in full agreement with Locke. Yet, says Locke, there are some actions about which man cannot be indifferent. Man must be determined "by the last result of our minds". In one passage, he becomes almost Kantian in his appreciation of "understanding" as an element in the Determination of the Will.

> "And, therefore, every man is put under a necessity, by his constitution as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of Liberty." (1)

Here, is an instance of a statement which, if allowed to be pressed to its full logical conclusion, would seriously modify Locke's previous system of Determinism. In fact, much of the following elaboration of this particular statement is Kantian in structure and tone. At one place, he and Kant use almost the exact illustration. (2) However, it is only fair to Locke to say that, although he goes very near the complete repudiation of his own system of Determinism, he is careful to refrain from saying anything which is in flat contradiction to that system. It is his ambiguity, rather than his inconsistency, which creates the difficulties for his reader. He discusses the "summum bonum" and decides

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(1) Power. Sect. 49.
(2) " " 54, and K.p.V. Sect. 141.

that he cannot grant that experience gives any instances of men choosing the supreme Good.

(4) Freedom is the last dictate of the Understanding.
This is not quite a new point of view upon Human Freedom in Locke, but rather a logical extension of his belief that Freedom is centred in the power which the human Mind has of suspending the execution of Desire. However, it receives sufficient place and emphasis in Locke to merit separate consideration. Locke appears to suggest that when a man considers only "present" Good, the act of the Will is a necessary act; but when he considers a "remote" Good, he has the power to suspend the Desire which makes the act of the Will necessary. Here is his opinion concerning "remote" Good:--

> "Here a man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, in itself and consequences, to make him happy or not. For, when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happiness, it raises Desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his Will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer."(1)

To say the least concerning such a statement, it raises a host of problems for Locke's system of Determinism. For, he appears to teach that there are occasions and cases when the understanding is the supreme determiner of the Will. It is this because it has a view of the Good, and, having this view of the Good, it not only controls or suspends Desire, but can "create" Desire, which, in turn, now determines the Will. This is another argument which the exponents of Human Freedom will use to oppose Determinism, and Edwards will again be compelled to point out that such a view of Human Freedom cannot make any difference to the dictum that the act of Will is a "necessary" act. In other words, by endless ambiguities upon the subject of his own system of

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(1) Power. Sect. 56.

Determinism, Locke is providing arguments for his opponents whichhis great and ardent disciple, Edwards, will be forced to repudiate.

Locke is quite sure that although, in many instances, the last dictate of the understanding does not determine the Will, it ought to do this, and it is only when it is done that man can claim real Freedom.

> "That they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest Good." (1)

Later, he writes:—

> "The principle exercise of Freedom is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequences of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires."(2)

He also admits that this is the ideal state of affairs, and requires something like a "new" birth to bring it into activity.(3)

It would be unjust to Locke to say that he just rambles on without any aim or purpose in this treatment of Human Liberty, but it is true to say that he often fails to see the wood because of his attention to the trees. Yet, he makes a very sincere effort to avoid dogmatism, and he never hesitates about modifying his point of view to suit the facts of experience. As already stated, Locke is almost Kantian at times in his demand that men use their "understanding" to determine their Wills. He insists that God always chooses that which the highest Good and yet He is also a Being of perfect Freedom. (4) It is this shadow of the "ought" in Locke which provides the greatest difficulty in his system of Determinism. Experience convinces him that men often choose that which is Evil, thinking it is their Good, but they ought

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(1) Power. Sect. 52.
(2) " " 69.
(3) " " 62.
(4) " " 50.

to choose that which is the greatest Good. In fact, they have the power to hold back, or suspend Desires for the imperfect Good, and deliberate upon the remote or ultimate Good. In other words, experience provides him with the facts that willing is a necessary act, but experience also provides him with the fact that it ought not to be so. That men can interrupt, suspend this necessary act, and make their acts of Will to be determined by the "understanding", and only as they do this are they really Free. All this confusion may appear a sheer waste of time and space, but it must be borne in mind that Locke is trying to make sense of the facts of experience, and trying to be just to every conceivable point of view. For instance, when he is discussing the implications of this act of "suspension" he says:--

> "For it is pretty hard to state it between them, i.e. immediately after the judgment of the understanding, and before the Determination of the Will; because the Determination of the Will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding; and to place Liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, seems to me to place Liberty in a state of darkness." (1)

In other words, he suspects that this act of suspension will be interpreted as a state of the "indifferency" of the Will, but he wants to keep it free from such associations; yet, he can see how hard this is going to be, and challenges his readers to try and find a place for it in the process of Human Willing. However, it is obvious that he has no clear solution to offer on this very complicated aspect of human volition, but he has looked at it, and noted its difficulties, and this sums up his contribution to the problem of Liberty and Necessity. It cannot be said that Locke expounded a system of Determinism in any real sense, and, sometimes, it is difficult to say whether he is the advocate of Determinism based upon Desire, or the exponent of Freedom based upon the Understanding. These two conflicting points of view

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(1) Power. Sect. 73.

find expression and support in his analysis of "Power", and it is only as the one is taken and the other left that a dogmatic statement can be made concerning his basic teaching upon Liberty and Necessity.

Perhaps the best way to sum up Locke's contribution to this difficult question is to allow him to state, in his own words, his aim and his achievement in this direction. Writing to Molyneux in 1693, he says:--

> "I do not wonder you think my discourse about Liberty a little too fine spun. ..... When the connection of the parts of my subject brought me to the consideration of Power, I had no desire to meddle with the question of Liberty, but barely pursued my thoughts in the contemplation of that power in man of choosing or preferring, which we call Will, as far as they would lead me, without any the least bias to one side or the other; or if there was any leaning in my mind, it was rather to the contrary side of that where I found myself at the end of my pursuit. But doubting that it bore a little too hard on man's Liberty, I showed it to a very ingenius and professed Arminian, and desired him, after he had considered it, to tell me his objections, if he had any; who frankly confessed he could carry it no further."(1)

Was Locke a Determinist? The above extract indicates that his system of Determinism passed the careful censorship of an Arminian who was satisfied that it went as far as it was possible in the direction of Human Freedom. Such a compromise is hardly the basis for a forceful and convincing exposition of Determinism.

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(1) The Essay of the Human Understanding. Fraser, Vol.I, page 369.

ANTHONY COLLINS

"The vulgar, who are bred up to believe liberty or freedom, think themselves secure of success, confidently appealing to experience for a proof of their freedom, and being persuaded that they feel themselves free on a thousand occasions. And the sources of their mistake seems to be as follows. They either attend not to, or see not, the causes of their actions, especially in matters of little moment, and thence conclude, they are free, or not moved by causes to do what they do. They also frequently do actions whereof they repent; and because in the repenting humour, they find no present motive to do those actions, they conclude, that they might have not done them at the time they did them, and that they were free from necessity in doing them."

Anthony Collins.

"A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty",
Introduction.

ANTHONY COLLINS - (1676-1729)

Locke leaves the question of Free Will and Determinism in a most unsatisfactory condition. His passion for toleration enabled him to see both sides of the issue, but it did not permit him to give a clear lead in any direction. Collins was an ardent disciple of Locke and he is convinced that he is interpreting the real teaching of Locke when he expounds a rigid system of Determinism. There can be little doubt that Edwards was indebted to Collins, and therefore a survey of the Determinism of Collins is indispensable to an appreciation of Edwards. Collins expressed the essence of his system of Determinism in a work - "A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Liberty and Necessity" published in 1717. He begins by observing that it is a common assumption in Philosophy that there are certain ideas about which it is quite impossible to speak clearly and distinctly. One such idea is this idea of Liberty and Necessity. Men have written upon the subject with hesitation and ambiguity. The time has come to destroy this covering of mystery and examine the question in a thoroughly rational manner. He is convinced that Locke's definition of an "Idea" is adequate, but he would point out that ideas must be brought to a new and uncompromising test of rationality. It matters not whether such ideas are "Practical" or "Theoretical", they must be rational. To have an idea which is impossible to put in clear and distinct terms is quite inadequate for philosophical discussion. If such ideas cannot be put into precise terms there is grave doubt about their validity. For instance, there is no real reason why the idea of God should not be as clear and distinct as the idea of a triangle.

If God is an idea, the very fact that it is an idea about a Divine person cannot save such an idea from standing the test of clarity and intelligibility. Even the idea of God must make sense, and to make sense it must be expressed in clear and precise terms. Collins is quite willing to admit that there are certain ideas which cannot be exhausted by the language in which they are expressed, but, as far as they go, they should be in plain and simple terms. He admits that there are great difficulties in giving a full and final expression to the idea of God, but he insists that the definition and difficulties of the idea of God should be expressed in fearless and clear terms. Ambiguity and mystery may be necessary to superstition, but to philosophical discussion they are dangerous and profitless. Collins goes on to give three reasons for this thesis upon Rationality in ideas. (1) An inadequate idea is no less "Distinct" than an adequate one, that is, as far as it goes, and this measure of clarity is the measure of its validity. (2) If certain ideas, such as God, contain difficulties this is no real cause for mystery, but rather a spur to industry. (3) The only way in which an idea can be saved from being lost in the bogs of mystery is to state its inadequacy in clear and precise terms. All ideas, in themselves, are clear and distinct, the fault is not in our ideas but in ourselves. Philosophy has made headway only by some few thinkers declining to be put off with mystery as a substitute for clarity. Collins is convinced that there are real reasons for Humility in the discussion of ideas, but there is no need for Obscurity.

Having given clear expression to an uncompromising Rationalism, Collins turns his attention to the matter under discussion, and he believes that the vexed question of Free Will and Determinism can be settled once and for all by giving a clear

answer to two questions:- (1) Does man come within the universal system of Causation? (2) Can man, at any point or any time, break through this universal system of Causation? Here, says Collins, is the real crux of the whole controversy, and here there is no need for ambiguity or evasion. Let thinkers be honest, clear and simple in their treatment of these pivotal questions, and the philosophical conflict will be at an end.

Now, there is only one way in which these questions can be answered, and that is by viewing these questions from the solid ground of "Experience". He says that the defenders of the Freedom of the Will have always appealed to experience and common-sense, and to common-sense experience they must go.

First, Collins insists that the very act of Perception is a "necessary" act. The perception of an idea cannot be a "free" act, because ideas whether the result of sensation or reflection are presented to the mind. Thought is a necessary process. Consciousness is not "voluntary"; it is inevitable. "We must think about something", in fact, ideas appear to have a power of dictatorship over the human mind. The human mind is given the materials, and the pattern of thought is fixed.

Second, Collins examines the "feeling" of Freedom which is experienced by all human beings, but he charges the whole "Feeling" with ambiguity and lack of reasonable inspection. He admits we are conscious of this feeling of Freedom, but we deceive ourselves into thinking that it is "real" Freedom of the Will. If a rigid inspection of motives is carried out, it will be discovered that this feeling of Freedom is under-mined. For instance, how many persons who boast of this feeling of Freedom ever take the trouble to ask (a) whether they have the power to refrain from a simple act of volition; (b) whether they are capable of real choice between

a number of objects. Volition is a necessary act. We cannot fail to will in the presence of objects, and the volition is always a preponderance of the self in the act of volition. We have this feeling of Freedom because we do what we "please", but the real question is whether doing what we please is the same as real Freedom.

Third, Collins examines the fact of "Repentance", which is a fact of experience. He admits that it is a common thing to feel sorry for what has been done, and we imagine that we could have acted differently, but this is an instance of over-simplification. We could have acted differently if we had thought differently. This act of Repentance is no real foundation for an argument of real Freedom because it assumes what it ought to prove. Man is, by his very constitution, compelled to seek his "Good", he cannot will his "Evil" or Misery; even in the most difficult positions, he always wills the lesser "Evil". Animals have the appearance of Freedom, that is, they appear to do what pleases them, but no intelligent person would say that they were capable of an act of Free Volition.

Fourth, Collins will grant no exceptions to universal Causation, and he insists that Universal Causation is Necessary Causation. The opposite of Causation is Chance, and Collins dismisses with contempt the idea that Chance could be the cause of existence and behaviour. If Liberty must be based on the absence of Causation then it must be based on Chance, and this is unthinkable. Reason is a human perfection. It would be imperfection to choose anything without a Reason, and it would be unreasonable to choose the Evil rather than the Good.

Fifth, Collins turns to an examination of the moral claims for Freedom. He insists that Pleasure and Pain rule the whole conduct of man. He cannot find any other basis for

morality. Rewards and Punishments are built upon this Pleasure-Pain foundation, and this is the only way in which man can be educated in an appreciation of the Good. The sole purpose of Punishment is the prevention of Crime. No reasonable society permits Freedom to do Evil, but all this does not mean that man is Free, otherwise it would be immoral to punish animals. We do not punish people because they were Free to do otherwise than they did, but because what they did was Evil to the society in which they lived.

Sixth, when Collins attempts to deal with God and Human Freedom, he uses the usual arguments of the Calvinists which had been almost exhausted by Hobbes. Collins has very little to say about Conscience. He defines it as the feeling of self-approval, and insists that it must be educated by experience.

The above analysis of the system of Determinism by Collins had a considerable effect upon the Deistic position which he supported. Collins gives the impression that he is over-confident of the solution he has offered upon the question of Freedom and Determinism. He speaks of the need of Humility, but there are few indications in the above-mentioned work of a careful attention to this virtue. He leaves the impression that the whole matter is clear and simple, and there is a dogmatism and impatience of investigation somewhat inconsistent with a plea for Toleration. However, Collins has given a very short but challenging exposition of a system of Determinism which is built upon Psychological grounds rather than on Theological tenets. His treatment is hurried and somewhat cavalier, but he has raised important points which the quiet and patient mind of Edwards will press home with penetrating insight and imperturbable logic. It will be seen

that Hume failed to follow up the points raised by Collins, and his treatment of Freedom and Necessity is less vivid. Edwards is the logical successor of Collins, but he brings to the study of the question a deliberation and profundity of which Collins was incapable because of his over-confident Rationalism.

CHAPTER TWO

The Determinism of HUME

"The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who have imagined that they have sufficiently disposed of all such questions by setting them outside the horizon of human reason, -- a horizon which yet he was not able to determine. Hume dwelt in particular upon the principle of causality, and quite rightly observed that its truth, and even the objective validity of the concept of efficient cause in general, is based on no insight, that is, on no a priori knowledge, and that its authority cannot therefore be ascribed to its necessity, but merely to its general utility in the course of experience, and to a certain subjective necessity which it thereby acquires, and which he entitles custom. From the incapacity of our reason to make use of this principle in any manner that transcends experience, he inferred the nullity of all pretensions of reason to advance beyond the empirical".

(Kant. Kr.V. A.760.)

"Hume was the interpreter of a philosophy the first principle of which was that all that is true in our ideas must be traced back to that which is given to the passive mind, and that all merely subjective additions to the facts presented must be fictitious and illusory. Hence, when he had shown that in the impressions or immediate experiences of the outer and the inner life there is no trace of that necessary connexion of antecedent and consequent, which is supposed to be involved in the idea of causality, he conceived himself at once entitled to treat such necessity as an illegitimate product of custom, a confusion of subjective association with objective reality".

(Caird. The Critical Philosophy of Kant. Vol.I. Page 130.)

"I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations ..... It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding".

(Hume. The Enquiries, I. Sect.5. Pt.2. (45)

"I think perhaps the strongest argument on Hume's side is to be derived from the character of causal laws in physics. It appears that simple rules of the form "A causes B" are never to be admitted in science, except as crude suggestions in early stages. The causal laws by which such simple rules are replaced in well-developed sciences are so complex that no one can suppose them given in perception; they are all, obviously, elaborate inferences from the observed course of nature. .... So far as the physical sciences are concerned, Hume is <u>wholly</u> in the right; such propositions as "A causes B" are never to be accepted, and our inclination to accept them is to be explained by the laws of habit and association".

(Russell. History of Western Philosophy. Page 695.)

DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

The present work is concerned with the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and there is a sense in which such a defence is intimately and vitally related to Hume. For, in the full and final analysis of such a Defence it must be borne in mind that it was the extreme implications of Hume's Empiricism which awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. However, great caution must be exercised not to involve the present discussion of Hume in the intricate and far-reaching conflict between Empiricism and Transcendentalism. Adequate treatment of such a conflict would involve another, and perhaps more extended thesis than is here contemplated. Further, this conflict is the continuing problem of all philosophical thought, and the present analysis of the Kantian Defence of Freedom must restrict its attention to a more limited area of thought; namely, of Hume's contribution to Eighteenth-century Determinism.

There can be little doubt concerning the fact that Hume's unique contribution to philosophical thought was his rather novel interpretation of the causal series. Of course, it can be argued that his view of causality was a logical conclusion of his extreme Empiricism, and that the really novel feature of Hume's thought is this extreme Empiricism. There are ample grounds in Kant's Defence of Freedom to support such a contention. However, the main point is that it is Hume's view of causality which is the important factor in Eighteenth-century Determinism, and it is this point which must receive immediate attention, and perhaps the following points of discussion will bring this vital factor into correct perspective.

(1) The problem of causality is the central theme of "The Treatise" and "The Enquiries", and it is not easy to select a passage which gives Hume's point of view with clarity and exactness. Perhaps the following is most suitable to the purpose in hand. Hume writes:-

> "It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by the utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connection between it and its supposed effect" (1)

Hume goes on to argue that the same absence of positive, demonstrative proof of causal power or force is found in the study of the relation between Mind and Body, and "the authority of the Will over its faculties is not a whit more comprehensible". Now, it is vital to the present study of Hume to define in clear and exact terms what he is arguing, and this might be done by saying (a) he is not denying the actual existence of causality in the physical and mental spheres, but (b) he is saying that this supposed force or power in causality cannot be proved by any empirical or metaphysical arguments. Further, he grants, what he could not possibly deny, that there is succession in causality, that is, the thing called "effect" always follows the thing called "cause", but he insists that it is quite impossible to postulate a "necessary" connection between cause and effect, that is, in the generally accepted meaning of the term "necessary". For instance, in examining a supposed "causal" object, it is quite impossible "from the first appearance of that object" to deduce what its necessary effect might be.(2) Again, all that can be said about causality is that this follows that, but the secret connection which binds them together is inscrutible.(3) This sceptical or agnostic attitude to causality was to have far-reaching implications.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.7. Pt.2. (58.)
(2) " " " " 7. (50)
(3) " " " " 7. (52)

(2) Many of his contemporary "theological"-minded critics came to the conclusion that Hume was denying the existence of causality. Typical of this class was Thomas Reid (1710-1796), who wrote concerning Hume:-

> "Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not one more shocking to the human understanding than this. That things may begin to exist without a cause. This would put an end to all speculation, as well as to all the business of life". (1)

Now, it is significant that, although Edwards had carefully studied Hume's interpretation of causality, he does not join in this general abuse, and misunderstanding of his point of view. Edwards thinks that Hume is a writer of "corrupt" books, but he does not single out Hume for any special criticism as he did Lord Kames. Kant was quite convinced that the critics of Hume, on this vital matter, had missed the whole point of his discussion.

> "He (Hume) was understood by none. It is painful to see how his opponents Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and at last even Priestley, so entirely miss the point of his problem, and while they always take that, which he doubts of for granted, but, on the other hand, prove with vehemence, and for the most part with great petulance or insolence that, which never entered into his mind to doubt of".(2)

The error which Kant sought to correct still persists, and a recent writer upon philosophy might well come under the condemnation uttered by Kant.(3) However, it is important to observe that, although Kant vindicated Hume from misunderstanding upon this vital fact, he did not agree with Hume concerning this sceptical conclusion upon causality. This discussion of Kant's contribution to this matter must await a later stage of the present discussion.

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(1) The Active Powers of the Human Mind. Essay 4.

(2) Preface to the Prolegomena of Metaphysics.

(3) Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy. Page 156.

(3) Another important factor to be noted in the study of Hume is that when he comes to a discussion of Liberty and Necessity he goes a long way to justify Kant's analysis of the inherent weakness of his philosophy, and expresses an almost orthodox interpretation of Causality. That is, if such an exposition is judged by its use of certain statements; yet, beneath this apparent orthodoxy, Hume is still trying to hold together a sceptical interpretation of causality, and a dogmatic view of Determinism. The following analysis will make this point obvious.

(a) Hume, in "The Treatise" and "The Enquiries" is what might be termed a rabid Determinist. Also, he is an impatient Determinist. He seems so sure of his thesis that he is almost cavalier in his treatment of its finer points, and of the possible objections of his opponents. Here, there is little of the patient probing of Locke, or the deliberate and careful analysis of Edwards. It might not be just to the whole of his view of such questions to say that he has the over-confident "rationalism" of Collins, yet, his dogmatism upon this matter is akin to Collins, and it is doubtful whether Hume saw all the implications of his system of Determinism. There are clear indications of impatience as he begins the discussion of Liberty and Necessity, and, as he says, that the whole problem is basically one about words. He is aware of the antiquity of the problem but says its continuance is based upon verbal ambiguity. However, he makes one important concession to its discussion when he says, or rather implies that this problem of Liberty and Necessity is not "beyond the reach of human capacity". (1) This is a point which will be discussed by Kant, and there is little doubt concerning Kant's view of the "Antinomy" created by any "rational" discussion of Liberty and Necessity.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect. 8. (62)

(B) Hume goes on to give an analysis of Causality:-

> "It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it".(1)

This statement upon the causal series is almost identical with that given in "The Treatise", and the main question is, what is Hume trying to say in making such a statement? Is he guilty of one of those paradoxes with which he was charged by Reid? That is, of viewing Causality in a sceptical manner in one part of his works, and then asserting it dogmatically in another? On the surface, this appears to be the case, but it is important to observe that, even in the above extract, Hume is not going over to the side of orthodoxy in this matter of causal interpretation; for, the vital term in the above quotation is the term "necessary". In other words, Hume has never denied the actual existence or causal power or force, but he has denied that this causal force can be demonstrated upon grounds of Empiricism or Metaphysics. Yet, his scepticism upon this orthodox view of Causality led him to deny any "necessary" connection in the causal series, and, in the above extract, he appears to contradict this denial of "necessary" connection. Yet, such a denial is only on the surface of the extract, for Hume goes on to define in careful terms what he means by "necessary". Of course, Hume is not perfectly clear in his handling of this conception of Causation. For instance, he argues that if no two causal events were similar to each other, it would be impossible to arrive at any idea of Necessity. All that could be said about events would be that they succeeded each other, not that they "produced" each other, and the relation of cause and effect would be utterly "unknown" to mankind. Even "Inference" would be at

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. (64)

an end, and the only avenues to knowledge would be memory and the senses. All this seems very much like the argument Hume used to deny the orthodox view of Causation, yet, in this particular section, he used this argument to indicate that such an argument is opposed to his own view.

> "Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter".(1)

Therefore, according to Hume in this section, the idea of Necessity has two roots. (a) The observed "uniformity" in nature; (b) The "Inference" of the mind from one thing to another. Or, as he says, "Conjunction and Inference". This conception of Necessity might be termed "Empirical Necessity", which Kant condemns as self-contradictory.

> "If we accept his conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and under the influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of necessity. If he had envisaged our problem in all its universality, he would never have been guilty of this statement, so destructive of all pure philosophy." (2)

However, the main problem before this present appraisal of Hume is not the fundamental basis of Necessity, but the analysis of his exposition of Liberty and Necessity as these terms stand related to his view of Determinism. Therefore, this argument between Kant and Hume can be properly set aside, and it is enough for the present purpose that Hume believed in the "actuality" of Causation, and gave reasons for a similar belief in Necessity. Further exposition of his system of Determinism will indicate that this question of "universality" was not altogether absent from his mind.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. (64)

(2) K. r. V. B.20.

(C) Hume has argued that there is "uniformity" observable in nature, and he goes on to say that this same uniformity is observable in the conduct of persons, "were there no uniformity in human actions ..... it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind."(1) Yet, this argument for uniformity in human conduct must not be carried to an extreme, says Hume; although he had previously made a most extreme statement when he said that "the same motives always produce the same actions". Yet, the main point of his argument is that persons do behave in a manner which is capable of classification and generalization. Hume feels that this argument is strengthened by saying that Medical Science, Economics and Politics are all erected upon this ability to make generalizations about the behaviour of mankind. Yet, his real purpose in this main argument is far more important. It is:-

> "Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature, but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life". (2)

Now, at this point it is vital to stress the unique contribution made by Hume to Deterministic thought. From a superficial point of view, his system of Determinism runs along the usual lines made clear by Hobbes, Locke and Collins. In fact, he is less detailed than these writers, and gives the impression that he has missed out whole areas of their arguments. However, this judgment upon Hume must be balanced by giving adequate attention to the new and important direction he gave to the problem of Determinism; which is the new, and, what he thinks, a more convincing way of demonstrating the concept of Necessity.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. (65).
(2) " " " " 8. (69).

In other words, it is in his system of Determinism that he makes the best and most effective use of his rather novel interpretation of Causation. Or, to put his case in a paraphrase of his argument, it might be said that Hume argued, "The whole metaphysical foundation of Determinism hinges upon the interpretation of Causation." In the past, it has been thought that this concept of Causation was clear and simple. Men have argued for a "necessary" connection of Cause and Effect. In fact, they have assumed that they could discern "causality", that is, as some force or power in that object which they termed cause, and the result of such causality in that thing which they termed effect. This assumption has been erected into a metaphysical doctrine, and it has obtained all the prestige of an indisputable fact. This metaphysical doctrine has had all the support of Empirical investigation, and thus the circle has become complete. Now, says Hume, this assumption is without the slightest amount of actual support. I do not deny that there is such a thing as Causality which operates in nature and in man, but I do deny that there is simple, clear and demonstrable "proof" of such a Causality. In fact, I assert that there are only two methods whereby such Causality can be assumed. One is custom of seeing one thing following another, and the other is the inference of the mind at such a succession ....."This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion". (1)

Now, says Hume, if this indisputable fact is granted (that we have no direct insight into the necessary connection of Cause and Effect) Determinism is confirmed.

The usual conception of Causation must be put aside. It had too many unsolved problems lying within its orbit.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.7. (59)

For instance, it involved the idea of a God who is the "cause" of everything (1) and this "assumption" has had, at least, two painful consequences upon philosophical thought. (a) The "known" tends to be explained by the Unknown. (b) God has frequently been involved in material things. These, and a host of similar problems can be solved if thinkers will only see the absurdity of the old conception of Causation, and adopt the more reasonable explanation that we know nothing of Causation but by custom and inference. This is the only type of "Necessity" conceivable to the mind of man, and therefore, Determinism is beyond dispute, because it is the mind itself which "creates" for itself the very idea of Necessity. Men begin at the wrong end of the investigation of Necessity when they begin by trying to examine such abstract doctrine of the faculties of the soul. Let them be more reasonable and start with nature, and there they will find that they cannot form any idea of Causation and Necessity except "that of a constant conjuction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another".(2) The false and groundless idea of Causality has hindered any possible solution of Liberty and Necessity --

> "But as long as we rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in the operation of external objects; at the same time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind, there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition."(3)

It is in "The Treatise" rather than "The Enquiries" that Hume brings out this point best, that is, as it stands related to Determinism.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.7. (56).
(2) " " " " 8. (72).
(3) " " " " 8. (72).

> "I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is supposed to lie in matter; but I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the received systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects". (1)

In other words, our idea of Necessity and Causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together and the mind being determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances alone form the whole of the idea of "Necessity" which we ascribe to phenomena.

(B) The rigid limitations of the present thesis prevent further discussion of the implications of Hume's view of belief in the concept of Causation. However, it is important to observe that both Kant and Edwards give ample evidence of the profound effect of Hume's discussion of the subject. In "The Treatise" Hume comes very near anticipating Edwards' discussion of "Philosophical" Necessity when he says:-

> "Thus though causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet, ''tis only so far as it is a natural' relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, and draw any inference from it". (2)

Later, it will be noted that Edwards was to draw certain, careful implications from his doctrine of "philosophical" Necessity. The important feature of which is the absence of some power or force, or compulsion inherent in such a type of Necessity. There can be little doubt that Hume's discussions upon the causal process had great influence upon Edwards, although there are no indications of such an influence from the pen of Edwards. Yet, the important thing

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.2. Pt.3. Sect.2.
(2) " " " 1. " 3. " 6.

at this stage of the discussion of Determinism is to register the very novel, but none the less important interpretation given by Hume to Determinism. Hume believes in Determinism because of many reasons, but his basic argument lies in his peculiar interpretation of Causation. The mind is determined by custom and inference to postulate the causal process, but, and this is vitally important, by the term "mind", Hume most certainly does not mean the "reason" as commonly accepted. He argues in fact for the very opposite of Reason being the "ground" for the idea of Necessity. Efficacy, agency, power, energy are all synonymous terms, therefore, they cannot be used to define each other. In fact, Causality is not capable of a real definition because it is an "Impression", it is, as Hume so often repeats, "Felt" rather than perceived by the mind. Reason can have very little, or nothing to do with this "impression" of Causality. First, because Reason can never give rise to an "original"idea. Second, Reason, apart from experience, can never give rise to the conclusion that a cause, or productive quality, is "absolute necessary" to every beginning of existence.

Hume is far from clear, and perhaps not always consistent in his deduction of this idea of Necessity, but one of his main arguments is formed in the following manner. The idea of Necessity arises from some "Impression". Yet, there is no impression conveyed to our senses which can give rise to such an idea. Therefore, it must be derived from some "Impression" which is the product of reflection. However, there is no possibility of such an "internal" impression arising merely by reflection, but it can arise from that "propensity" of the mind, which is produced by "custom", and which enables the mind to pass from one thing to another. Therefore, Hume concludes:-

> "Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in the objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union." (1)

To a certain degree, this type of Necessity is an Empirical Necessity already condemned by Kant, but it is also what might be termed a "Subjective" Necessity, and with this type of Necessity Kant would agree, but he would insist that such a "subjective" type of Necessity must have "objective" Validity. (2) This is a vital point which Hume would deny. Yet, the main thing is that Hume is expounding a doctrine of Necessity which is consistent with his Empirical philosophy, and which is great enough to provide an adequate foundation for the type of Determinism which he is advocating. Further, it must be borne in mind that Kant, in spite of his insistence upon the "a priori" nature of the concept of Causation, gives the distinct impression that the concept of Necessity is applicable only to phenomena, and not to the thing-in-itself.

> "We thus know the necessity only of those <u>effects</u> in nature the causes of which are given to us, and the character of necessity in existence extends no further than the field of possible experience, and even in this field is not applicable to the existence of things as substances, since substances can never be viewed as empirical effects ..... Necessity concerns only the relations of appearances in conformity with the dynamical law of causality and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring <u>a priori</u> from a given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect)." (3)

The above extract is typical of Kant's teaching upon the concept of Necessity, and indicates the very great influence made upon his thinking by Hume, and cannot be considered a very convincing reply to Hume.

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.1. Pt.3. Sect.14.

(2) K. r. V. A.91.

(3) K. r. V. B.280.

(E) It can be argued that the Determinism of Hume is grounded upon his particular interpretation of Causality, and that this, in turn, is built upon his extreme Empiricism. However, the important fact is that Hume has drawn from Empiricism the logical inferences and implications which were missed by Locke and Collins, and therefore, in this sense, his system of Determinism is superior to, and perhaps more consistent than their's. All this might be argued as justifying the impatience with which he opens the discussion of Liberty and Necessity. Hume gives the following argument why persons reject Determinism.

Men still entertain the idea that they can penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive a "necessary" relation between Cause and Effect. If only they would accept his interpretation of the causal process, and put the right meaning on the term "Necessity" their difficulties would be at an end. Constant union and mental inference are the only grounds of a belief in Necessity.

Of course, persons are apt to argue that they cannot always discern a connection between their motives and their actions. Further, they will persist in the antiquated notion that there must be a vital difference between Causality in nature and the Causality which is caused by thought and intelligence.

Here, Hume has attempted to make clear his position beyond any shadow of ambiguity. Of course, there is a difference between material things and relations of the mind, but this difference is not the important thing. Both relations are necessary, but the term "necessary" is the same in both instances, and, after all, it only means observable succession and habitual inference. Why read into such a term all the absurd metaphysical meanings given by former philosophical systems?

In a foot-note in "The Enquiries", Hume repeats an argument which he had used in "The Treatise". Persons object to the doctrine of Determinism because they have some vague idea that real Liberty consists in some type of "Indifference". He argues that the necessity of an action is not really a quality in the thing or agent, but consists in "the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceeding objects". Now, if the mind does not proceed in this "necessary" manner, then looseness from this type of inherent necessity must be nothing more or less than Chance.

Hume admits that there is a "feeling" of Liberty in this sense, that is, persons feel that they can pass at will from one idea to another. Yet, this feeling is allowed to develop into an erroneous idea of Liberty which consists in the following statement:-

> "We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing; because when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle."(1)

This feeling of Indifference is purely imaginary, and is the result of imperfect introspection concerning motives and actions. An impartial "spectator" can commonly infer our actions from our motives. Even when this is not possible, Hume would argue (and here he is joined by Kant as far as the empirical character of a person is concerned) -- "were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition" he would be able to do so. (2)

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.2. Pt.3. Sect. 2.

(2) " " " " " " ". See also K. r. V. A.550.

(4) Hume is convinced that "Theology" has had a considerable influence upon the opposition of Determinism. Men think that real morality is in danger if they agree to such "necessary" principles. Yet, Hume thinks that only Determinism gives real meaning for religion and morality.

> "'Tis impossible, without the necessary connexion of cause and effect in human actions, that punishment could be inflicted compatible with justice and moral equity." (1)

Further, actions, by their very nature, are temporary and perishing if they do not proceed from some cause in the character and disposition of the person performing such actions. "'Tis only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires merit or demerit from his actions". Before concluding his exposition of Determinism, Hume will again turn to this question of Religion as related to Necessity, but it is enough to observe here that he can find no worth-while argument in the whole of his knowledge of Religion for concluding that his type of Determinism stands opposed to moral values. Hume has an additional and very interesting argument for Determinism when he says that "Repentance" is a clear instance that motives are of primary importance in morality.

However, Hume does not develop this idea of "Repentance", and it would be still more interesting to discover how such a state of Repentance could be inaugurated in such a close-fitting system of Determinism as he advocates. For, in spite of the rather "empirical" doctrine of morals accompanying his system of Determinism, there are indications of a deeper view of human virtue and failure. Hume speaks of such things as "iniquity and infidelity" and "pernicious maxims" which pervert human minds and conduct. He is not

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.2. Pt.3. Sect.2.

altogether unsympathetic to the Kantian view of human conduct when he writes:-

> "Who can dispute that a mind, which supports a perpetual serenity and cheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted spirit, a tender affection and good-will to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, is also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle than if dejected with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated by rage, or sunk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy."(1)

Further, he insists that the man, who has lost the capacity to rebel against pernicious maxims of self-interest, and feels no reluctance for thoughts of villainy and baseness, has lost a considerable motive for real virtue. In other words, Hume had, in his principles of morality, the seeds of a doctrine of "radical evil", but it was left undeveloped, and therefore, he does not really face this great problem of human repentance and regeneration.

These observations upon the Determinism of Hume lead to the general criticism of his system which might be stated in the following terms. Hume gives the impression that he has fastened upon one important aspect of Determinism, which is his rather novel interpretation of Causation and Necessity; and that he has neglected, or treated whole areas of Deterministic doctrine with somewhat impatient superficiality. His special contribution upon Causation and Necessity is of vital importance to all forms of Determinism, but he leaves his readers with the distinct impression that even this contribution might have been subject to great modification if only he had surveyed the whole field of Deterministic doctrine with greater care and profundity. For instance, there appear to be, at least, two aspects of Determinism which Hume treated with rather scant attention, which, if viewed more seriously, might have led to modification of his central theme.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.9. (226)

First, his view of Chance as it stands related to Determinism. The above discussion of Hume's interpretation of Causation gives ample extracts of what he said upon this important subject. However, in order to bring the whole matter into focus again, the following is important:-

> "I say, it has been shown, in treating of the understanding, that there is no connexion of cause and effect, such as this supposed to be, which is discoverable otherwise than by experience, and of which we can pretend to have any security by the simple consideration of the objects. All beings in the universe, considered in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other. It is only by experience we learn their influence and connexion; and this influence we ought never to extend beyond experience". (1)

Now, this is the interpretation of Causation which Hume advocates throughout the whole exposition of his system of Determinism, and, as already indicated, it is a contribution which is of great importance. In fairness to Hume, it must be said that he works at this theme with real skill and consistency, and he gives his system of Determinism a very valuable place in the thought of the Eighteenth Century by the skilful application of this central doctrine. However, there appears to be one great weakness in his chain of argument, and that is his discussion of Chance. In order to make this point clear, it must be remembered that any system of Determinism is built upon a belief in Causation. Kant sees this truth in his discussion of the Third Antinomy, and indeed it is self-evident. Now, Hume is the only writer in the history of Deterministic thought who attempts to erect a firm and rigid system of Determinism upon a "precarious" interpretation of the causal series. In the above extract, he puts his point of view clearly. Apart from actual experience of the causal series, the human mind has no right to infer connection, least of all, "necessary" connection of cause and effect. Further, the human mind must not think

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.3. Pt.1. Sect.1.

of extending this "supposed" connection beyond actual experience. Now, the almost inevitable logical result of this scepticism or agnosticism concerning Causality is that, beyond all actual experience, "all beings in the universe, considered in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other". In other words, no statement is possible concerning Causation beyond experience, and it seems that Hume saw this logical sequence, but refused to submit to it.

Of course, as already stated, Hume did not deny in any positive terms the "actuality" of the causal series, but he did insist that knowledge of such causal series is limited to actual experience, and, even in this experience there is no such thing as "necessary" connection except the type of "necessity" imposed upon the causal series by the mind which is experiencing the causal series. Now, the obvious deduction from such a doctrine is that, beyond actual experience of the causal series, no belief, no conclusion, and not even a guess is permissible. That is, all might be chaos, or chance or order, but no opinion upon such a subject is at all possible. This seems to be the logical result of such a view of Causation as is held by Hume. However, he will have nothing to do with such a deduction, and repudiates the "possibility" of Chance in the strongest possible terms. In "The Treatise", he is most emphatic upon this point. Chance is excluded by constant conjunction. It is the negation of Cause. There is no middle course between Chance and Necessity. All these points are laboured in the above work, but it is significant that when he comes to "The Enquiries", Hume says very little about Chance. However, there is one thing he says in both "The Treatise" and "The Enquiries", and this is:-

> "The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence, though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that, almost every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes ..... From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes".(1)

Therefore, for Hume, Chance has no existence, and, what is more important, Chance has no meaning, and is incapable of becoming a "possible" concept of the human mind, and this "impossibility" of Chance holds good for experience, and that which is "beyond" experience. In other words, Hume's universe is governed throughout by cause and effect, and "necessity", in its full and final analysis, is an objective and universal concept. Therefore, there are grounds for thinking that, had Hume seen all the implications of his teaching concerning Chance, he might have been compelled to modify his teaching upon Causation and Necessity.

Of course, it might be argued that Hume's discussion of Chance is limited to that part of existence which is actually experienced; and his relating of Chance and Probability could be used to support such an argument. Yet, the operative clause in the above extract is that the seeming uncertainty proceeds "from the secret opposition of contrary causes". In other words, Hume is not, on this point, speaking of actual experience, because he admits that the secret opposition of contrary causes must be accepted as a fact to rule out the existence or possibility of Chance even in that sphere of Causation which is beyond that which is actually experienced.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. (67).
See also "The Treatise", Bk.1. Pt.3. Sect.12.

Further, in the previous extract concerning Causation, Hume insisted that it was only experience which provided any grounds for assuming "influence and connexion" in the causal series, and that such "influence and connexion" must never be extended to explain Causation which might lie beyond actual experience. Yet, his discussion of Chance reveals the fact that he is now prepared to assert that Chance is impossible, because what is mostly ascribed to Chance is nothing more or less than the "secret" opposition of contrary causes. In other words, if the contrary causes are <u>secret</u>, then, by the very fact of their being secret, they do not come within the orbit of that which is actually experienced, and Hume appears to be denying his own statement by insisting upon extending the influence and connexion of the causal series beyond experience.

Hume is perfectly aware that his system of Determinism does not lie too securely upon the precarious foundation of his novel interpretation of Causation, but, with commendable skill, he makes a good job of keeping the whole structure within some reasonable measure of alignment. However, he sees that if he superimposes upon such a structure the uncertain and wavering weight of Chance, the whole structure of Determinism will collapse in ruins. He rightly observes that there can be no compromise with Chance. That there can be no middle course between Necessity and Chance. So, he denies the existence of Chance, and, what is more vital, he denies the existence of Chance not only in that which is actually experienced, but in the whole course of nature, which lies beyond all experience. This is the weak link in his system of Determinism, and it might prove that Empiricism can never be a basis for Determinism.

Second, his view of God in relation to his system of Determinism. In fairness to Hume, much of the following criticism is applicable to Locke and Collins as well as to Hume; and it consists of their disinclination to take the concept of God seriously into their systems of Determinism. Locke has an exalted idea of the person and power of God, but he makes little use of this concept in his exposition of Determinism. Collins is a little more consistent in that he makes it quite clear at the beginning of his exposition that he intends saying little or nothing about the "Theological" grounds or implications of Determinism. Hume makes no such limitation in his exposition, and he enters upon a discussion of Theology in relation to Determinism. However, he does not proceed very far in such a discussion, and closes it with expressions of rather doubtful modesty. The simple fact appears to be that Locke, Collins and Hume have been somewhat overwhelmed by the impressive evidence available in Empiricism for their views of Determinism that they did not feel the need for any additional support from theological sources. This statement attempts the fairest possible explanation of their "neglect" of the support of "theological" Determinism, a support of which Hobbes was most happy and wise to avail himself. Yet, with all reasonable attempts at justice for these expositions of "Psychological" Determinism, it is felt that Hume had rather a sinister motive in not pressing forward with the acknowledged implications of his system of Determinism, and must, therefore, to a degree, be exempted from this excuse afforded to Locke and Collins.

(1) There can be little doubt that Hume desired to be known as a real believer in God. His theological expressions, though marked by a strong tendency to rationalism, can be classified as Deistic if not Theistic.

> "The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom". (1)

Now, this is the view of God which Hume maintains throughout his works. (2) Therefore, whatever modifications Hume felt necessary to make in Christian dogmatics, this belief in God remained unaltered.

(2) It is significant also that Hume takes considerable time and care to refute the "theological " implications of the system of Determinism expounded by Spinoza. In a very real sense, it was Spinoza, and he alone of "secular" thinkers, who took the idea of God seriously with reference to their systems of Determinism. Hume terms Spinoza an "Atheist", and declares that"his system leads inevitably to a system of Atheism".(3) Of course, it might be argued that Hume was dependent upon Bayle for his interpretation of Spinoza(4). Yet, Hume is too careful a thinker to take his convictions second-hand, and his opposition to Spinoza carries real, personal conviction. The obvious fact is that Hume had real, rational grounds for avoiding the "theological" implications of Determinism, and, again, it is his special interpretation of Causation which he seeks to protect.

(3) Hume's deals with the "theological" implications of Determinism in the following manner.

First, he examines the idea of God as the sole cause of all existing things .... not only as the ultimate and original cause of things, "but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature"(5). Here, he combines the

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(1) The Enquiries. Sect.2. (14)
(2) The Treatise. Appendix.
(3) " " Bk.1. Pt.4. Sect.5.
(4) See Kemp-Smith. Hume. Page 506.
(5) The Enquiries,I. Sect.7. (55)

systems of Descartes and Spinoza, and concludes that these ideas of Causality .... "rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate". He goes on to argue that it does not exalt the idea of God to conceive of Him as being unable or unwilling to "delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures", and to be ever involved in keeping the universe upon a working basis.

Second, he suggests two ways out of this "theological" dilemma.

(a) The human reason is attempting an impossible task when it he seeks to penetrate into a "fairy" land which is beyond its faculties. "Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses".

(b) The human mind is ignorant of how bodies act upon each other even in experience, much less can it attempt the task of discovering how God acts upon nature and events. "Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible".

(4) Later, Hume returns to this theological discussion when he observes that his system of Determinism is likely to be mis-interpreted by his critics as a system which believes in "No contingency anywhere in the universe, no indifference, no liberty".(1) Further, his critics might charge him with teaching a rigid form of Determinism which is identical with that expounded by some theological schools. Hume appears most anxious to escape this latter charge, and takes time to examine its implications. He imagines his opponent as saying that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity as the operations of matter, then it must be assumed that there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. This reference to a chain of Causation is an indirect reference to Hobbes who did not hesitate to use such bold language.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. Pt.2. (78)

Hume infers that if this basic assumption is granted, it is easy to suggest that all real human morality is at an end, and God must be held responsible for human conduct, good and bad. However, Hume is convinced that such a line of argument is guilty of over-simplification, and he attempts to look at it in greater detail.

First, if human actions can be traced by a necessary chain to God, what does this prove? Does it prove that all human actions are good because they flow of necessity from the fount of all Goodness? Well, there are some optimistic theologians who find comfort in such a view of the universe. "Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this benevolent system". Yet, Hume feels that the optimism of such a view of life is unjustified in face of the real facts of human existence. However, even if it be granted that from the purely "physical" aspect the whole of life is indicative of supreme Goodness and Benevolence; there still remains the "Moral" aspect. Men are constituted to feel the sentiment of approbation and blame. Some persons might argue that everything is right with regard to the "Whole", but again such "Moral" optimism shuts its eyes to the real facts of life. Right and wrong, like beauty and deformity, are rooted in the human mind, and no abstract philosophical system can ignore these distinctions.

Second, how can God be the cause of all human actions without also being the author of sin and moral turpitude? Here, says Hume, is a question which "mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle".(1) Hume thinks that the task of philosophy is far less ambitious:-

> "Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction." (2)

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. Pt.2. (81)
(2) " " " " " " " (81)

The question is why did Hume make any attempt to discuss the "theological" implications of his system of Determinism? For, it is perfectly obvious that his heart was not in such a discussion, and it is extremely doubtful whether he was qualified to discuss such implications. Further, his view of God has little to justify such a discussion, and, what is much more important, his system of Determinism does not lend itself to the raising of such questions.

To put the best possible construction upon his motives in discussing the theological implications of Determinism it might be said that Hume had the following purposes in view:-

(a) He wanted to make it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that he had not the least intention of lending support to the prevailing dogma of Theology, that is, the dogma of "Predestination"; and, to a very great degree, Hume was quite consistent in rejecting the notion that his system of Determinism had anything in common with that of Theology.

(b) Hume wanted to go beyond this repudiation, and make it perfectly clear that Empiricism offered the only consistent and reasonable view of human existence. He is quite convinced that this rather limited entry into the realm of Theology proves beyond doubt the wisdom of confining attention to the examination of common life. He is not quite fair when he says:-

> "To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy". (1)

For most theological systems of Determinism believe in "Necessity" even in human actions. Be this as it may, there are two observations which can be made concerning Hume and his theological views.

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(1) The Enquiries, I. Sect.8. Pt.2. (81)

First, it is perfectly obvious that Hume has set a very limited universe of discourse for the discussion of Liberty and Necessity. He has rejected the wider context of the theme apparent in Hobbes, narrowed the general Empiricism of Locke, and repudiated the "rationalism" of Collins. These increasing limitations of the orbit of discussion provide Hume with a very tidy, but, at the same time, extraordinary system of Determinism. If these limiting, major premises of his argument are granted, then, there is very little which can be said in denial of his conclusions. However, in the above extract, Hume goes on to say that the examination of "common life" will provide philosophy with problems enough without "launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction". This is undoubtedly true, but the main point is, can any of these "difficulties" within the bounds of common life be considered adequately, or settled finally by an appeal to the data available in common life? As already remarked, Hume will have nothing to do with Chance as a possible explanation of common life.

> "It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature". (1)

Chance is indeed a difficulty which is found in common life, but Hume knows that Chance is a difficulty which extends beyond common life, and philosophy must try and say something about this extension. Hume has not hesitated in saying something dogmatic about Chance in its relation to common life and the ultimate basis of all existence. Yet, having secured his system of Determinism by a denial of Chance, he cannot, with any show of logic, deny the right of philosophy to attempt to fill the vacuum existing beyond experience with some more positive content than the absence of Chance, or

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(1) The Enquiries. Sect.8. Pt.1. (74)

the presence of "subjective" necessity, which only functions within the realm of experience, and, as Kant remarks, has no objective validity. Edwards is quite right when he says:- "These things will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance"; (1) and Hume admits that there can be no compromise between a view of life based upon Chance and a view of life based upon Necessity. Therefore, Hume's attempt to erect a rigid system of Determinism upon the foundations of narrow Empiricism and "subjective" Necessity provides insoluble difficulties.

Second, the idea of God, in any discussion of Liberty and Necessity, creates many and far-reaching problems. Hume has discussed some of these problems, and a careful survey of the Theological implications of Determinism provides a vast array of such problems. Indeed it would be "happy" for philosophy if she could justifiably turn away from this boundless ocean of doubt, uncertainty and contradiction, and return to the facts of common life. Yet, to ask this of philosophy is as impossible as to ask of "Physics" that it confines its study to the earth, and avoid the boundless ocean of inter-stellar space, and, as Kant remarks, the difficulty is even greater than mere space.(2) It is for this cause, and similar reasons, that Kant re-opens the problem of Liberty and Necessity within a far more extensive context than was permitted by Hume. He ignores the boundaries or horizons artificially created by Hume, and sets the problem in its age-old environment of thought by stating that he intends linking together God, Freedom and Immortality as the three major problems of metaphysics. The very least which can be said concerning such a purpose is that it is being true to the well-established terms of reference ob-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.9.
(2) K. r. V. Intro. B.17.

served in the discussion of this problem. In other words, Kant is much more loyal to the method of philosophy in the handling of this problem than Hume. Further, such an extension of the universe of discourse indicates that Kant grasped in a far profounder manner than Hume the real foundations and implications of Determinism.

Whether Kant does keep faith with all the factors involved in this more extensive context of thought, that is, as such a context stands related to the problem of Liberty and Necessity, remains to be examined in later sections of the present discussion. Anyhow, Kant took Hume very seriously, and he certainly declined any easy way out of the problem.

> "If we accept his (Hume's) conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in actual fact, is borrowed sorely from experience, and under the influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of necessity". (1)

This is the greatest tribute which can be paid to Hume's discussion of Liberty and Necessity, and, perhaps, its greatest condemnation.

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(1) K. r. V. Intro. B.20.

CHAPTER THREE

The Determinism of JONATHAN EDWARDS

JONATHAN EDWARDS

"There are few names of the eighteenth-century which have obtained such celebrity as that of Jonathan Edwards. Critics and historians down to our own day have praised in dithyrambic terms the logical vigour and the constructive powers of a writer whom they hold ..... to be the greatest metaphysician America has yet produced. Who knows, they have asked themselves, to what heights this original genius might have risen, if, instead of being born in a half-savage country, far from the traditions of philosophy and science, he had appeared rather in our old world, and there received the direct impulse of the modern world. Perhaps he would have taken a place between Leibniz and Kant among the founders of immortal systems, instead of the work he has left reducing itself to a sublime and barbarous theology, which astonishes our reason and outrages our heart, the object of at once our horror and admiration."

(Georges Lyon, quoted from "The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics"., Vol. 5. Page 221.)

JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703-1758)

Jonathan Edwards was born in 1703 at Windsor on the banks of the Connecticut, New England, and he died in 1758. He served as a Minister of Religion from 1727 until his death, and his status and influence in the limited sphere of New England can be said to be similar to that of John Wesley in Britain, except that Edwards was by far the greater theologian. In 1736, he published a work -- "Narrative of Surprising Conversions" -- which may be said to be an anticipation of William James' "Varieties of Religious Experience", and which had an effect upon the promotion of the Evangelical Revival in England. Edwards wrote extensively on a wide range of theological subjects. His works on the "Religious Affections", "Original Sin" and "God's Last End in Creation" are of a very high quality and won him considerable fame. His ethical treatise on -- "The Nature of Virtue" -- indicates a profound grasp of moral doctrine and is worthy to be ranked with Francis Hutcheson's work on -- "An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue". However, his real fame rests upon his work on the Freedom of the Will, the correct title of which is -- "A careful and strict Inquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame".

Some attempt must be made to account for the neglect of Edwards during the last two hundred years. This neglect cannot be explained by suggesting that Edwards has made an insignificant contribution to philosophical thought.

There can be little doubt that his thesis upon "The Freedom of the Will" is the most important contribution ever made on that subject. Further, no system of Determinism since his day has been able to ignore his work, and there can be little doubt that Freedom and Necessity are still very important issues in modern philosophy. Perhaps the following points may suggest a reasonable explanation to the neglect of the contribution made by Edwards.

First, the Theological Reason. Georges Lyon speaks of the Theology of Edwards as "sublime and barbarous which astonishes our reason and outrages our heart". There is an element of truth in such a statement. Edwards made a valiant effort to keep his Philosophical contribution free from over-much Theological dogmatism, and, in his Preface to "The Freedom of the Will", he says:-

"I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin".,

and any one who has examined the Determinism of Calvin and Edwards will not doubt the validity of such a statement. However, it was inevitable that Edwards should be regarded as the greatest Calvinist since the Reformation, and his Theological works bear out such a description. The nineteenth-century saw a very strong re-action to Calvinism, and Edwards undoubtedly suffered an eclipse in this re-action. His outstanding sermon -- "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God", has been quoted with considerable horror by modern exponents of the Christian Religion. There is little doubt that it is one of the most terrible utterances ever made from a Christian pulpit, but it is often forgotten that Edwards concluded this sermon with these words:-

> "Now God stands ready to pity you; this is the day of mercy, you may cry now with some encouragement of obtaining mercy; ..... Christ has thrown the door of mercy wide open and is crying with a loud voice to poor sinners ..... How awful it is to be left behind at such a day?"

However, there can be no doubt about the general horror with which the Theology of Edwards was regarded. His cold, pitiless logic linked to a majestic view of God's sovereign power brought a chill to the stoutest heart, and men were glad to turn away to a more benevolent and kindly view of the workings of Providence. With the rejection of this Theology went the rejection of the greater part of his work and this accounts in some way for the neglect of his contribution to philosophical thought.

Second, the Literary Reason. Edwards is one of the most painful writers in literature. His thesis on -- "The Freedom of the Will" — is one of the most difficult works in Philosophy.

One of his most ardent admirers and devoted disciples puts the literary ability of Edwards in these words:-

> "The style of Jonathan Edwards is, in general, perhaps the most repulsive which even metaphysics ever assumed ..... Probably there never was a man who was so characterized by such a wide range of intellect and such a narrow range of language ..... Without boundless elasticity and buoyancy of thought, his works, so fearfully laden with redundances of language, would long since have sunk like lead in the mighty waters of oblivion". (1)

Edwards has the power of holding a thought in pure abstraction, and refining it until the ordinary mind begins to reel and stagger under the strain of this rarified intellectual atmosphere. Then, he marches forward to another position without the slightest regard to syntax or making clear his universe of discourse. For instance, it is very difficult to keep up with Edwards in the following typical expression on the Freedom of the Will:-

> "And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives; every effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence.

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(1) An Essay on Jonathan Edwards by Henry Rodgers.

> Thus it is manifest that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the will; the volition, which is caused by previous motive and inducement, is not caused by the will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This is not consistent with the will's acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference; for the way in which motives operate, is by biassing the will and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way". (1)

Such involved arguments, joined to the suspicion that Edwards was making way for his "barbarous" Theology to triumph did not constitute any real attraction for his writings, and thus they lost their hold upon men's minds.

Third, the Historical Reason. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that in consideration of these important issues in Philosophy such as Liberty and Necessity there is a kind of cyclic movement. There seems to be grounds for holding that the human mind views these questions with approval or disapproval according to the particular set of circumstances which may be present at any particular time in history. The ancient philosophy was prepared to hold these questions together without making any attempt to be too emphatic upon Liberty or Necessity. Further, there are indications that the first four centuries of Christianity did not witness any marked emphasis on either side. With the coming of Augustine, there was an introduction of a Determinism which moulded the philosophy and theology for the next nine hundred years. Of course, there were revolts and oppositions against the position of Augustine during this period, but, on the whole, the period was largely Deterministic in out-look. The coming of Thomas Aquinas, with a revival of the Aristotlian view-point, inaugurated a decided reaction against Determinism, and this continued to the sixteenth-century when Luther and Calvin, later helped by Spinoza, created a reaction in favour of Determinism. This reaction continued until the close of

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Part 2. Sect.10.

the eighteenth-century, when a movement led by Kant, succeeded in putting considerable emphasis upon Liberty. Jonathan Edwards lived at the end of the Determinist period of thought. He gathers into himself all that was rich and fruitful in the history of Determinism, and presents the case for Determinism with a skill which is superior to Augustine, Luther, Calvin or even Spinoza, but it is to little purpose. The pendulum of man's intellectual interest is swinging back to Freedom, and the work of Edwards holds little attraction for minds which have had centuries of Deterministic philosophy. This may be a reasonable explanation of the neglect with which his great work on Volition has been treated. In any case, the neglect cannot be explained in terms which suggest that Edwards' treatment of the subject is antiquated and obsolete. Ample evidence will be produced in the course of this exposition of the system of Determinism of Edwards which will indicate that such a system is capable of challenging the most modern theories on the Freedom of the Will. It may be that the cyclic movement in philosophy will return to an appreciation of the Deterministic view-point. If this happens, there can be little doubt that Edwards will arrive at the status of fame which he deserves.

(1) <u>The Nature of the Will</u>.

Edwards is of the opinion that considerable confusion has taken place in discussions concerning Liberty and Necessity because there has been an absence of a clear and simple understanding of what the Will really is: and he attempts to remedy this obscurity by saying that the Will is nothing more or less than that faculty or principle of the mind by which it chooses something. Therefore, an act of the Will is simply an act of Choice. On the surface this is simple and direct, but it is important to remember that Edwards is here insisting upon something which is calculated to have

very far reaching influence upon his whole exposition of Determinism. First, it is clear that Edwards will have no desire to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the Will and the mind. That is, he is no advocate of what might be termed a "faculty" psychology. The Will is a principle or aspect of the mind, or better still, it is that by which the mind chooses something. Second, Edwards is concerned with the Freedom of the man rather than with the Freedom of the Will. It is here that he heartily agrees with Locke that any discussion of Liberty and Necessity must stand related to the whole personality and not to what is a supposed faculty. He will have much more to say about this fact at a later period, but his definition of Will is made with this point clearly in view. Third, it is obvious that the above definition of Will is intended to make it difficult if not impossible for any of his opponents to argue that the Will can choose its own Volitions. This is a vital link in the exposition of Determinism by Edwards, but it is far too important to be discussed at this early stage.

Edwards now passes on to discuss whether there is a negative as well as a positive aspect to the act of Willing. He observes that it is often said that the Will chooses or "refuses", but he points out that even this apparent negative act of Will is actually "positive" ... "for in every act of will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another". (1) The point of such an insistance is that Edwards wishes to stress that every act of the Will is voluntary. That is, the Willing subject is personal, positive, and therefore Choice is a voluntary act of the real self. Such preliminary observations are necessary because Edwards, in his exposition of Determinism, makes frequent reference to the metaphor of a "chain"; and his exposition is in itself

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(1) Freedom of the Will. Part 1. Sect.1.

a carefully constructed chain of arguments. It is only as careful attention is given to the links in this chain that it is possible to appreciate the weight and force of his exposition.

Having forged the above-mentioned links, Edwards slips in another link which is highly important to his point of view. He examines Locke's distinction between "preferring" and choosing, and is far from satisfied with Locke's finding upon this important point. Locke appears to think that the act of Volition is best expressed by the term "preferring", but Locke hesitates about making this identical with Choice because he thinks that a man could prefer flying to walking but cannot will such an act. However, Edwards thinks there is confusion here, and insists that "preference" is Choice because a man is always concerned about the next and immediate object of the Will. Of course, man can have a remote preference to fly, but such ideas or ideals have very little to do with actual "willing". Edwards says:-

> "The thing nextly chosen or preferred when a man wills to walk, is, not his being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet etc., in order to do it"(1)

This seems a small matter to dispute, but actually it is vitally important to the chain of Determinism expounded by Edwards. He is keen upon getting this matter settled because, First, such an argument indirectly strengthens his insistance upon Volition being a positive act of Choice; Second, because he wants to make the important point that all willing is directed to "external" action. Later, he will argue for a real kind of Liberty in his Determinism, and this Liberty will find its basis in "external" action. Or, as he puts it at this early stage:-

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(1) Freedom of the Will. Part 1. 1.

> "Thus, an act of the will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus and thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same thing in common speech". (1)

Having corrected Locke upon this supposed difference between preferring and choosing, Edwards passes on to consider a still more important confusion which he has detected in Locke's discussion of the Will.

Locke had said "that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire", but he had said other things which modified this rather dogmatic distinction between the Will and Desire. However, there is sufficient ambiguity in Locke's handling of this point to justify Edwards drawing attention to it. Edwards makes a statement in reply to Locke's hesitant description of Will and Desire which appears to go to the other extreme:-

> "A man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will". (2)

Later, Edwards will go to considerable trouble to justify this statement, and it will become clear that he is not making a point by mere dogmatism. However, here and now, it is enough to point out that he is using the term "desire" in the sense of effective preference, or basic desire. Perhaps it is only just to Edwards to allow him to state this particular point in his own words:-

> "So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination one way rather than another; and the soul had rather <u>have</u> or <u>do</u> one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing, and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition." (3)

Edwards had no intention of saying that there was never an instance when a desire might not clash with the Will, but his point is that such a desire never really issues in

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Part 1. 1.
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(3) " " " " " " " 1.

effective preference. It is often vague and fleeting, and generally has reference to some remote end with which the immediate action of the Will is not concerned. The act of the Will is always the act of the real self expressed in some preference for that particular act at that particular time. Of course, there are many instances where the mind acts after a period of conflict, and this is an experience which Edwards is willing to examine in the light of the facts which are available, but, whatever clash of desires might be illustrated, Edwards insists that when the Will acts, it acts from a certain preponderation of the self. In other words, man never does one thing and intends another, that is, as an act of the Will. His basic and real desires all find expression in the act of Volition. In other words, he always does what really and finally "pleases" him. Before concluding this limited discussion on the nature of the Will, it is important to observe how Edwards views the Will as related to the Understanding. In an earlier work, he makes the following points:-

(a) God has endued the soul with two principal faculties which are Perception and what might be termed "Affection".

(b) Perception is termed the Understanding which discerns and judges things in a speculative sense.

(c) The other principal faculty is Affection or Inclination, that is, liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting.

(d) It is here, in Inclination, that the Will is really centred, or as Edwards says:-

> "The will and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties: the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination ..... In some sense, the affection of the soul differs nothing at all from the will and the inclination, and the will never is in any exercise further than it is affected".(1)

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(1) A Treatise concerning Religious Affections. Pt.1. Sect.1.

He will make these points clearer in his discussion of motivation of the Will, but it is obvious that he views the Understanding as not having the principal part in any particular act of Volition. It would be unjust to his analysis to conclude that he agreed with Hume that Reason was the slave of the passions; yet, his frequent reference to "Taste" in the above-mentioned work has strong affinities with Hume. Whether this identification of the Will with the Inclination is fatal to his system cannot be decided at this early stage of the discussion.

It must be borne in mind that Edwards is a Rationalist of a very high order, and further, he is attempting to describe how the Will operates in empirical man, and not how it "ought" to operate in ideal man. Again, this might be considered a fatal defect in his system, but before any such conclusion is reached it must be observed that Edwards has a remedy for Empirical man. In other words, he is not only a psychologist, he is a Christian teacher. He is not completely oblivious to the "Ought" in human life, but he thinks it is necessary to examine how people behave before entering upon a discussion of how they "ought" to behave.

(2) The Determination of the Will

Edwards sees that one of the principal problems of any discussion of Liberty and Necessity is the question -- "What Determines the Will?" This question must be raised even by the advocates of Freedom who insist that the Will determines itself, or, as is sometimes termed the self-determination of the Will. Before attempting a reply to this kind of Determination, Edwards tries to secure a measure of agreement upon the question of Determination in itself, and suggests that it might be defined as "causing that the act of the Will or Choice should be thus, and not otherwise". This appears to be a reasonable definition of Determination, and Edwards

uses it to indicate that, whatever the kind of Determination insisted upon, the fact of cause cannot be ignored. There must be a cause why the act of the Will or Choice is thus, and not otherwise. He also points out that those who insist upon the self-determination of the Will are insisting that the Will is both the determiner and the determined, that is, in a sense, it is both Cause and Effect. Edwards does not mark this fact for special criticism, but it is perfectly obvious what he has in mind. Such interpretations of human Freedom are granting to the Will the action and power which really belong to the man , and such an interpretation of the Will cuts right across the dictum of Edwards that all discussion of Liberty and Necessity must be concerned with the man, and not with a property of the man. However, Edwards reserves to a later period the full implications of this argument, and plunges into the heart of the conflict by saying:-

> "It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will."(1)

In this sentence is contained a host of problems, but it is quite impossible to say anything decisive on many of those problems until Edwards has had opportunity of making clear his point of view. However, it is important to observe that when Edwards uses the phrase -- "in the view of the mind" -- he is using the term "mind" in a very limited sense. He certainly does not mean "mind" to be taken as meaning "reason" or understanding. Yet, he is not excluding the aspect of Reason from the term, rather he is thinking of the whole of Perception and Emotion as contained in the term "Soul". Be this as it may, the vital point in the above extract is the understanding of what Edwards means by the term 'Motive"; and here he is not lacking in clarity:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.

> "By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition..."(1)

A relevant question is whether Edwards should have used the term "motive" to describe this actuating of the Will. Ought he not to have used the term "Inclination" rather than "Motive"? Is there not a real distinction between a "psychological" motive and a natural "want" or Inclination. A natural want exists for all non-rational creatures, and can be the basis of a psychological motive in man, but the essential difference is that motive is a "perceived" want. It is "an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise".

Edwards would agree that the mind must be "aware" of the motive, for he writes:-

> "Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something which is extant in the view or the apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view". (2)

Now, it is perfectly obvious that Edwards is anxious that the term "Motive" shall include that kind of intellectual recognition which has been emphasised as marking off a motive from a mere natural "want". Yet, the important point is, can Edwards have the best of both worlds, and can he have the argument both ways? That is, can he have the "impulsive" and the "rational" elements in Motive which his system appears to demand? Is there such a thing as a rational impulse? Again, these questions cannot be decided within the limited survey of the exposition now available. However, Edwards

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.
(2) " " " " " " 1. " 2.

does make a real attempt to come to grips with the problems inherent in his view of motivation and the mind. He is careful to explain the relation of motive and the mind when he writes:-

> "It appears from these things that in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding; but then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment". (1)

Edwards follows up this extract by insisting that if this dictate of the Understanding means what "reason declares to be best", then, it is not true to say that the Will always follows the last dictate of the Understanding. Further, he makes it perfectly clear that Reason has a real part to play in motivating the Will, but it must be given its proper place and influence. It may be one element in the compound influence which moves and induces the Will to action; and there the matter must rest for the time being while the discussion follows the main of argument.

With some idea of what Edwards now means by the term "Mind", it is to be observed that he argues that Motive and Mind are mutually suited to each other. That is, there appears to be an inherent tendency in Motive to influence Mind, and he calls such a tendency the strength of the Motive. Now, prior to all Motives, there exists a state of Mind which might be termed a view of the "apparent" Good. Edwards is most anxious that the adjective "apparent" shall be appreciated. The view of the Mind is not the Good, complete, final or true, but it is the apparent Good; that is, the Good viewed in a limited, restricted, and perhaps even perverted sense. He cannot grant that empirical man seeks the Good in the full and complete meaning of that term; rather, he seeks what seems to him the good, therefore, his

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.

mind is pursuing the "apparent"Good. Further, because of this inherent tendency in mind, certain motives will have more influence than others in swaying the mind to any particular course of action. In fact, Edwards insists that "the Will always is as the greatest apparent good is". Again, the full implications of such a statement cannot be dealt with at this point, but it is obvious that Edwards is leaving no place for freedom between the Motive and the Will. The argument of Edwards proceeds to the identification of the apparent Good with the "agreeable" --- "To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind".(1) Further, this term agreeable includes the removal or avoiding of "evil". Here, of course, the term "evil" must be accepted in a very limited sense -- uneasiness, displeasing, and disagreeable. Edwards goes on to say that his main concern at this time is the direct and immediate objects of the Will. He is quite aware that the mind can look ahead and frame for itself certain remote acts of the Will, that is, what it intends to do in the future, but these intentions must be viewed in the light of actual happenings and must not be confused with real acts of the Will. It may be that a future, or remote benefit can be brought before the mind with such force that it issues in an immediate act of the Will, but, says Edwards, this is due to the fact that the future benefit appears at the present time the most "agreeable" to the mind, and therefore some immediate pleasure is put aside for a future benefit or pleasure.

Edwards now proceeds to make explicit one of the important points of his argument for Determinism. Here are his words:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.

> "I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is, than to say that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable, because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct".(1)

The language is tactfully chosen, and the point made with studied ease, but these things cannot cloud the vital importance of the link inserted by Edwards. In other words, he is insisting that there can be no "gap" between recognition of the agreeable and the act of Will. In his own words, "the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable". It is true that he has used the word "choice", but this term is not used in the commonly accepted meaning. In fact, there appears to be very little "deliberate" Choice in this act of Will. The mind finds that which is most agreeable, and then the Will acts immediately. Of course, Edwards would argue that "Choice" really is that which is most agreeable to the Mind, but, with Mind already constituted to follow the greatest apparent Good, the meaning of the term Choice in such a relation of action and reaction must be given a different meaning than is commonly assumed.

In this term "agreeable to the mind", Edwards feels that he has a comprehensive concept which covers all possible avenues of motivation. He certainly means by the term the view of "happiness" in the generally accepted sense, and it is of interest to observe how far Kant would agree with Edwards that the empirical man is influenced by such a concept. When Kant is describing happiness, he writes:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.

> "Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively, in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration." (1)

Edwards would agree with this description to a very great degree, but, when Kant goes on to contrast the law of Happiness with the law of Morality, there would be grounds for a sharp difference of opinion. This is another vital factor in the present discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, but there is not enough evidence available to make any useful comment of this important matter. However, Edwards is convinced that the term -- "agreeable to the mind" -- covers a greater area of meaning than that afforded by the term "Happiness", that is, in usual interpretation. He thinks that his term covers every possible ground of motivation available to the human personality, and he would argue that even the Moral Law comes within that which is most agreeable to the Mind. This point is not put forth as the essential teaching of Edwards, but it is felt that the statement is a reasonable inference from the following extract:-

> "It is most agreeable to some men to follow their reason, and to others to follow their appetites; to some men it is most agreeable to deny a vicious inclination than to gratify it, others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites ..... In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times".(2)

Further, and this is very important for the opponents of Edwards who appear to argue that no real progress is possible under such a system, he indicates that education, example, custom and natural endowment all play their part in making up the sum of what is agreeable to the Mind. Again, Edwards would agree that, even after a great religious experience, such as Conversion, the same law operates in man, except

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(1) K. r. V. A.806.

(2) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.2.

that now he has come much nearer to the Good, but it is still that which is most agreeable to the mind which governs his willing and doing.

(3) The relation of Necessity to the Will.

In a sense, the doctrine of Necessity is the central concept of the Determinism of Edwards; therefore, he gives considerable care to its statement. He observes thatthe terms Necessity, Impossibility, Irresistibility, etc., have been used in a manner that is highly prejudicial to the discussion of Freedom, and unless some reasonable meaning is given to such terms, no progress can be possible. He begins this task of clarification by saying that for a thing to be necessary simply means that it is what it is and cannot be otherwise. However, he explains that this is a most imperfect definition of Necessity because it uses terms such as "cannot" without explaining them. Therefore, Edwards thinks that the problem is much deeper than mere verbal definitions. It is one which enters into the very structure of human thought. In other words, he must get behind the terms, and view the matter from the point of view of thought itself.

It is customary in all discussions about Necessity to assume that it is a "relative" term. That is, common people and thinkers alike tend to think of something existing and standing over against this term Necessity. Therefore, the term Necessity is conceived of in terms of opposition or even compulsion. Necessity is something which overcomes the Will, and forces it to be something quite different from what it intended to be. Now, this view of Necessity results in a new and different meaning being given to the term -- "Impossibility". For this term "Impossibility" is, in its original meaning, a "relative" term. It always means being thus because it cannot be otherwise. It always suggests some force or compulsion which resists or compels. Therefore,

the whole debate about Liberty and Necessity becomes bogged down in an ambiguity of terms which makes solution quite unthinkable.

When these terms are used with reference to the Will of man, then, the confusion is endless and devastating. For instance, when the term Necessity is used with regard to human beings, it is at once supposed that certain things will be regardless of any opposition from such human beings. The whole picture presented to human thought is perverted because it is assumed that when a thing is said to be Necessary it stands over against some positive, personal desire to be otherwise than what is conceived as Necessary. It presupposes that the very term Necessary must be "relative" and opposed to Voluntary, that is, it can have no meaning or existence other than that it stands opposed to a state of affairs or mind that would be different from that which is conceived in the term Necessary.

> "Things are said to be what must be, or <u>necessarily</u> are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence; but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our wills". (1)

When this picture of Necessity is presented to the human Mind, it is quite easy to slip into the further assumption that a thing is Necessary "when we cannot help it, let us do what we will". Thus, the whole concept of Necessity becomes involved in its "relative" meaning, and soon ceases to have any meaning unless that meaning involves some supposed, positive and personal opposition to its supposed force or compulsion. Edwards believes that this chain of groundless assumptions can easily lead in confusing a doctrine of Necessity with a doctrine of Fatalism, and can result in a great deal of nonsense being written even about moral questions For instance, on such an erroneous view of Necessity it is

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.3.

possible to say that a man could not help being virtuous or vicious at that particular time when he prefers virtue or vice, and therefore Necessity over-whelms his real Choice and makes him different from what he might have been although there is clear evidence that he chose at that particular time to be what he was. In other words, a man chose virtue or vice because he was under some compulsion which superimposed itself upon his apparent Choice and in real opposition to his supposed intended Choice.

Edwards will return to this problem later and give it more attention, but it is mentioned here to indicate its absurd consequences.

The only way out of this hopeless confusion in the discussion of Liberty and Necessity is to begin with as clear and simple a meaning of Necessity as is possible. Therefore, Edwards decides to call his view of Necessity by the term "Metaphysical or Philosophical Necessity". By this he means nothing more or less than "Certainty", and he does not mean certainty of knowledge, but rather the certainty which is in things themselves. He examines some definitions of "metaphysical" Necessity, and finds them inadequate because they do not explain Necessity as the thing really is in itself, but rather uses terms to explain which demand explanation in themselves. His own view of "Metaphysical" Necessity is set forth as:-

> "Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true". (1)

Now, says Edwards, "Metaphysical" Necessity can be said to exist when it is laid down that being, in its full and final meaning, exists and exists eternally. The human Mind cannot conceive of being in general having no existence, neither can

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.3.

it think of absolute and universal "nothing" as existant; for this is a gross contradiction within thought. Therefore, universal, positive, general being is a "necessary" concept of the human Mind. Further, once God is said to exist, it is impossible to separate such existence from infinity or eternity. So, it is quite impossible to say or think that two and two do not make four, or that all straight lines drawn from a centre of a circle to the circumference are not equal. Again, some things are said to be necessary because they are past, that is, their existence is a matter of fact. Further, some things are said to be necessary concerning the future and this must be used in a consequential meaning, that is, these things will come to pass in the future because their causes or roots are already in existence. However, these future things are not necessary in their own right but only necessary because they are dependent upon prior causes or conditions. Edwards also gives attention to particular and general "Metaphysical" Necessity, but this is only by way of illustrating the central theme, and need not be reviewed in detail. The vital point in all this discussion is that "Metaphysical" Necessity does exist, and further, its existence does not involve any compulsion in the generally accepted meaning of that term.

In other words, "Metaphysical" Necessity is an "Absolute" term. Its essential meaning is not dependent upon any other term, and it certainly does not stand "related" to some supposed opposition from the Will of man. Further, it is worthy of note that Edwards, having given this positive, absolute connotation to the term Necessity, is now quite willing to lift the term "Impossibility" to a new and different level of interpretation. He is willing to define this term as "Negative" Necessity, and this is important for his further development of his system of Determinism. Later, he will

drive home the implications of this concept of "Negative" Necessity, and it will become clear why he was willing to give a new interpretation to "Impossibility".

Here and now, it is important to observe the meaning he gives to the term "Contingent". His full teaching upon this term suggests it can be used in many different ways. (a) It can mean something which comes to pass by Chance or accident. (b) It can mean something coming to pass when its causes are not discerned. (c) It can mean something coming to pass which was not foreseen or counted upon. (d) It can mean something coming to pass without any previous ground or Reason for its existence.

The interpretations of the concept "Contingent" as contained in (a) and (d) are important for the exposition of Determinism by Edwards; for, it is perfectly clear from his writings that he always thinks of something being Contingent as being due to Chance. In fact, he identifies the word "Contingent" with "Chance". The interpretation of Contingent in (d) is important because it is here that Edwards makes his greatest attack upon what he thinks to be false theories of human Freedom.

Having made this remark upon Contingency, Edwards again turns his attention to a more detailed discussion of "Metaphysical" Necessity(1), and he thinks it will assist his exposition of this concept if he divides it into two aspects -- One, Moral Necessity, and Two, Natural Necessity. He is not committed to this division in any absolute sense, but he feels such a division will assist the task of interpretation of his central concept, that is "Metaphysical" Necessity. Now "Moral" Necessity is used in many ways. (a) It can mean moral obligation, that is, a man being under the bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.4.

Another meaning or illustration of Moral Necessity is (b) that apparent connection of things which is the ground of moral evidence. Here, Edwards is thinking of the Moral arguments for God etc., and he observes that such evidence can amount only to probability and not to infallible certainty which is the result or consequence of "Absolute" Necessity. These instances of "Moral" Necessity are neither accepted or rejected by Edwards. He merely states that these are ways in which the term has been used. However, his own use of the term is confined to a very rigid and limited connotation, and is put in these words:-

> "By moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions". (1)

Upon the first glance at this definition of "Moral" Necessity, there is a feeling that Edwards is using the term in a manner quite foreign to its real meaning, and that he would have served the cause of truth better if he had used the above extract to define "Psychological" Necessity". That is, the term "Moral" appears to be given a meaning which is quite different from any conceivable association with moral values. On the surface, it would appear that Edwards ought to have kept the term "Moral" Necessity for that state when a man is under the bonds of duty and conscience from which he discharged. Yet, it will become clear in the subsequent exposition of his system of Determinism that Edwards is quite ready to give the necessary weight to this type of interpretation of "moral" Necessity, and that his rather novel definition is of real value because inclinations and motives are given real moral worth. That is, his system of Determinism is not a system of Fatalism, nor is it a system of

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.4.

absolute Necessity which leaves no room for the exercise of human Liberty. Rather, Edwards is concerned with giving a new meaning to Liberty, and therefore a new interpretation of real Morality, and, until he has had opportunity to expound these concepts, it would be unjust to charge him with failing to give a reasonable definition of "Moral" Necessity. By "natural" Necessity, Edwards appears to mean all that which is the opposite of "moral" Necessity.(1) Yet, again great care is needed to guard against over-simplification of this important point.

It is significant that some of the illustrations used by Edwards in this particular section under discussion are similar to those used to illustrate "Metaphysical" or absolute Necessity. Further, it must be borne in mind that he has made it perfectly clear that "natural" Necessity is only a sub-division of "Metaphysical" Necessity. Therefore, perhaps the best definitions of "moral" Necessity and "natural" Necessity is that which states that the former is concerned with moral Causes and the latter with natural Causes. That is, for the time being, and with the clear understanding that the term "moral" is being used in a somewhat novel manner. Edwards confirms this precaution by saying that "moral" Necessity may be as Absolute as "Natural" Necessity. By this he means that Motive may be joined to an action of the Will by a "sure and perfect connection" as that conceived of in Cause and Effect in the natural world. He makes this still more emphatic by saying that the concept of Necessity is not modified by the terms connected. He admits that there is a distinction or difference in the concepts connected, that is, a Motive is different from a mere "natural" Cause, but the important point is that this difference is not great enough to affect the kind of connection, which is identical in all

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.3.

cases. Necessity, in its absolute connotation, "is only the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition". It matters not what things are contained in the subject and predicate, the only thing which matters is the full and fixed connection. Edwards sees that this explanation in itself is not enough; he must say something about the things connected, and the most important concept of such things is the concept of "Choice". In fact, he is ready to admit that it is "Choice" which makes necessary the division of "metaphysical" Necessity into "moral" and "natural" Necessity. However, he has already made it quite clear in his previous remarks on Motivation that the term "Choice" must be used in a very guarded sense. Here, he hints that "Choice", while different from mere "natural" Cause, is often brought about by natural causes. Of course, most people fail to trace the real causes of their Choice, and are inclined "to signify the manner of the event by another name".

However, the term "Choice" really seems to introduce a new principle of motion and action, different from the established law and order of things. It seems to interpose and interrupt and alter the chain of "natural" events. All this is for Edwards the commonly accepted point of view, but he is convinced that "Choice" is as necessary as any other Cause within the orbit of "metaphysical" Necessity. However, the time has not yet come for a full and final statement upon the nature of Choice. Edwards has something important to say about another matter which stands intimately related to Choice, and this is "Moral Inability". Now, it must be observed that he has defined "Impossibility" as the negative aspect of "metaphysical" Necessity, and the term "Moral Inability" carries with it all the implications of this interpretation of "Impossibility". If this is not kept in mind,

there is a danger of regarding his words on Moral Inability as out of place in the present chain of argument.

A careful distinction must be made between "natural" and "moral" Inability. When a man is under "natural" Inability it is quite clear that he cannot do a particular thing although he might "will" to do it. That is, an "extrinsic" Cause prevents the effect of his Volition, and this extrinsic Cause can be in some physical or even mental defect. However, the case is quite different with "moral" Inability. It is not something extrinsic to the Will which now prevents action, but something "intrinsic", or, in the words of Edwards:-

> "Moral inability consists ..... either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary".(1)

Moral Inability can be seen in that quality of character which finds itself quite "unable" to commit acts of vice, and also in that type of character, being evil, cannot perform acts of virtue. A great deal of habitual wickedness may make it quite impossible for a man to chose holiness. Edwards is not, in this section, expounding the doctrine of total depravity. He is simply saying that a person's habits and character condition Choice. Neither is he saying that one bad act must forever decide the character of the person so acting. His purpose is clear and simple. He desires to make it very clear that Choice, although it might appear to interrupt and alter natural events, is not something that arises out of nothing, or descends from the sky, it is intimately related to the character of the person making the Choice. Further, a careful distinction must be made between "natural" and "moral" Inability. The word "Inability" is

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.4.

likely to cover a multitude of sins. If Edwards had said out bluntly that a wicked man was "unable" to choose the Good, many would have charged him with Fatalism, or would have declared the man guiltless because he was "unable" to do or will different from what he was doing. That is, the mere term "Inability" would be used in its "natural" meaning as resulting from such physical or mental defect, or prevented by some "extrinsic" Cause. Edwards will not allow such confusion to hold concerning the "acts of the will".

> "It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour kindness, or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth". (1)

That is, these vicious acts cannot be excused by mere "natural" Inability. "A man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice". Therefore, although many acts of Choice may arise from "natural" Causes, finally and fundamentally, Choice is a moral fact. It has to do with inclination, motive, character and personal and positive willing. This is the justification of the rather novel interpretation given by Edwards of "moral" Necessity.

Edwards would agree that "willing" was really doing -- "when once he has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing else remains to be done". Therefore, when an act of Will is not done, the question of "Inability" ought not to be raised as an excuse. For, the thing wanting is not being <u>able</u>, but a being <u>willing</u>.

Of course, all this may appear as begging the most vital question, but it is only being just to Edwards to say that, up to this present stage of his exposition, he has not hesitated to see as many points of view as possible, and to face the difficulties as they arise. The justification of his system must await further analysis.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.4.

(4) Determinism and Morality.

So far, Edwards has been concerned with proving that the Will is determined. He has done this by arguing that the Will is that aspect or principle of the Mind which chooses. Further, that Choice is that preponderating influence of the Mind; or that effective preference of the Mind which has a view of the Good which is termed that which is agreeable. Again, motive is what causes something to appear most agreeable, and this constitutes effective preference which is a combination of affection and understanding, and therefore the Will is determined by the Mind's view of what is agreeable. In fact, the Will is as the apparent Good, and there is no gap, or, as he says, vacancy, between the act of the Mind deciding upon what is agreeable and the decision of the Will to act on what is agreeable. Assuming that he has made out a case for this type of Determinism, the next vital question is, how does such a system of Determinism stand related to recognised moral values?

Edwards is perfectly aware that the supreme charge brought against all forms of Determinism is that they destroy real Morality. So, he makes a considerable effort to justify his system of Determinism on grounds of Morality. The present exposition of this attempt will involve joining together arguments which Edwards has left scattered throughout his system of Determinism, but it is the only method whereby a comprehensive picture of his attempt is possible.

He begins this task of relating Determinism to Morality by saying that there is only one common-sense view of Freedom possible, and that is the one which makes Liberty "a power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases"(1). Or, if it will suit the purpose better, he is willing to define Liberty in negative terms as -- "his being free from

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.5.

hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting, in any respect, as he wills". The very opposite of Liberty, and this is important, is a person's being hindered or unable to ~~conduct~~ ACT as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise than he wills.

All this appears very clear, and quite convincing; and it is obvious that Edwards is not saying anything which conflicts with his previous exposition of Determinism.

He strengthens this argument for such Freedom by insisting upon his previous argument that such Freedom is concerned with the person and not with the mere Will. It is only that which possesses a Will which can be free or otherwise. It is not the Will, but the agent who has a Will that the discussion must concern. The Will is simply a property or attribute of man, and it is the whole man who is the doer, or the active agent. There are, at least, two things which can destroy Freedom; these are Constraint, that is, a person being compelled or necessitated doing something which he does not will to do; and Restraint, that is, a person being held back or hindered from doing what he wills to do. Now, says Edwards, there is a very grave error in the minds of certain persons who discuss Liberty and Necessity, and that is the error of thinking that doing what one wills is not a sufficient explanation of Freedom. They imagine that it is their task to trace out the causes why people will. In other words, they are not satisfied with Choice as a decision of the Mind, but try to find out the original Cause of such Choice.

Edwards is no opponent of what might be termed psychological investigation, but he warns against its dangers, that is, as an argument for real Freedom. The main thing is that the person wills, and, when he wills, does what he thinks agreeable to his mind. In other words, he does what he pleases, and that ought to be enough evidence of Freedom.

> "Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom"(1)

This is a very important statement, and it will be interesting to observe how Edwards works out its full and final implications.

Here and now, it must be observed that Edwards thinks that there are only three main arguments which can be directed against his system. They are (a) that the Will has a power of determining itself. (b) that the Will is Indifferent in the act of Volition, and (c) that the Freedom of the Will is built upon the Contingency of the Will. He will examine these points of view in turn, but the present exposition of his system must keep to the main line of argument.

In order to keep to the main argument of Determinism and Morality it will be necessary to put aside, for the time being, the replies of Edwards to what he thinks are erroneous ideas of human Freedom, and take up the main argument which comes much later in his exposition. Here, he comes to grips with the problem by quoting one of his opponents as saying:-

> "If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid". (2)

Now, in fairness to Edwards, this criticism, on the surface, is a parody of the system of Determinism which he has so far expounded. He would heartily agree that virtue and vice are empty names if a person is necessitated in actions which he could not help or avoid. So far, he has repudiated such necessary actions as consistent only with Fatalism, which he has condemned. However, in equal fairness to his opponent, it must be borne in mind that the above charge is

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.5.
(2) " " " " " " 3. " 1.

levelled against the full and final implications of the Calvinistic system as commonly understood, and there is no doubt that Edwards leaves himself open to such a charge when he has completely expounded his system. Yet, the important thing is that Edwards is willing to argue that his system of Determinism, even with all its implications, is the only system which makes real sense of all the facts which are available. Further, it must not be forgotten that his opponent is a "Theological" critic, and it will be necessary for Edwards to reply to this charge in terms which are partly philosophical and theological. There is ample evidence in the writings of Edwards that he would prefer to avoid theological arguments when discussing human Freedom, but his status as a leading exponent of Theology compelled him to take notice of these theological implications. Therefore, Edwards begins his reply to this charge by a reference to Theology. He sees that the pivot of the argument turns upon the supposed "non-moral" nature of necessary acts of the Will. His opponent, and he is representative of a great school of thought, cannot conceive of Liberty and Necessity as existing within the same orbit of thought. In the mind of his opponent, the very term "Necessary" is the logical opposite of "Liberty", and he reads into the term, "Necessary", all the fatalistic implications commonly associated with that term. Therefore, the first task before Edwards is to correct this loose use of the term "Necessary", and the following divisions of the main argument might not be without profit.

(1) It is argued that Necessity and Liberty are incompatible terms, and that if virtue and vice are necessary, then, they cease to be of any real meaning, and become empty names. Edwards declines to withdraw his statement that the acts of the Will are "necessary" acts, and he has given ample evidence to justify his point of view upon this important matter.

However, he has to convince his opponent of the justification of this point of view, and the task will be far from easy. So, Edwards begins by trying to prove that because an act of Will is necessary, it does not follow that it is non-moral. Take for instance, he says to his "theological" opponent, our view of God. We conceive Him as a Being of all possible virtue, in fact, we view Him as a Being who possesses in perfection and purity all the virtues. Now, says Edwards, it is obvious that God could not be otherwise than He is. He knows no Sin, in fact, we cannot conceive it "possible" for God to commit an act of Sin. Further, His acts of perfect Will flow necessarily from His perfect character. Therefore, all God's acts are "necessary", and they are also examples of perfect virtue. How can it be argued that the term "necessary" is inconsistent with Morality? Further, would his "theological" opponent dare to say that God was not perfectly Free? Yet, as far as we know, God's perfect Freedom is not inconsistent with the perfect Necessity of His conduct. He charges his critic with inconsistency, and worse:-

> "Virtue., when ascribed to him (God), is but an empty name, and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it". (1)

Surely, his critic will not deny that God's moral acts are good in themselves, and that he is truly a "Moral" agent. Yet, they cannot conceive of this perfect goodness and moral worth other than being necessary. How then can they say that Necessity is perfectly inconsistent with Morality and Liberty?

This "theological" argument for his system of Determinism, although outside the main stream of his exposition, and used sparingly, must be given its full value as it affected his

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.1.

system. There is considerable grounds for assuming that it was this perfect blending in God of Morality, Liberty and Necessity which constituted his particular leaning to Determinism. The "Sovereignty" of God always exercised a great influence over exponents of Calvinism but with Edwards it was more than a mere intellectual influence, it was a great mystical experience. In fact, the knowledge of this great truth can be said to have come upon him as a type of Conversion. He records that he had been brought up upon the doctrine of God's "sovereignty", but that such a doctrine had not meant much to him. However, there came a time when it burst upon him with all its ineffable glory:-

> "The appearance of everything was altered; there seemed to be, as it were, calm, sweet cast or appearance of divine glory, in almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity, and love, seemed to appear in everything ..... Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God". (1)

These things have been mentioned because it is important to have in mind the fact that Determinism for Edwards is not merely a philosophical interpretation of life and conduct. It is a great mystical experience. Further, that his system of Determinism differs from Hobbes, Locke, Collins and Hume in that it is more than what might be termed "Psychological" Determinism. It is a system of Determinism which combines Psychology and Theology as they have never been combined before or since his day. Therefore, although Edwards would much rather argue Determinism from itspsychological point of view, he does not discuss its theological implications with lack of conviction or skill.

(2) Edwards now turns to another problem inherent in Liberty and Necessity, that is, as presented by his opponent. It is the question of being able to perform God's commandments if human beings have not the Power, Ability or Will to do them.

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(1) The Memoirs of Jonathan Edwards. Ch.1.
(See also The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.7.

Again, the real problem is concealed from view by the words of the criticism. Edwards repeats the words:-

> "They strenuously maintain that it would be unjust in God to require anything of us beyond our present power, and ability to perform; and also hold, that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience ....." (1)

Again, this is a theological objection, and, in fairness to the critics of Edwards, it is directed against the full and final implications of Calvinistic Determinism. However, Edwards knows perfectly well that he has got to meet this criticism of his system at some period of its exposition, so, he decides to take it at this point, and use it as a peg upon which he can hang a further section of his exposition. Therefore, he attempts to reply to this second major criticism in the following terms:-

(A) "The will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command". This is a very important statement, and Edwards is anxious to put it in the most careful terms, so he repeats it with due emphasis upon the Will being the centre of human personality:-

> "For it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of precepts and commands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving commands". (2)

Edwards has two purposes in view in making the above observation. (i) He wishes to emphasise and confirm the previous statement that Freedom, and with it, Morality, belong to the man and not merely to the Will of man. (ii) He wishes to examine this question of Morality which has been raised as a possible objection to his system of Determinism. What does his opponent mean by Morality? Until there can be some general agreement upon what is real Morality, it is futile to condemn his system as immoral or non-moral.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.3.
(2) " " " " " " 3. " 4.

Therefore, Edwards insists upon having some clear idea of the essence of Morality, and he begins by saying that all commands concerning ethical behaviour must be addressed to the Will, and to the Will as he has defined it as being that aspect or principle of the Mind by which the act of Choice is made.

(B) Now, there is only one "moral" reaction to the command which is essentially Moral, and that reaction is "Obedience", and Obedience has no real meaning except that it is the "submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another". This definition of Obedience is note-worthy, for, it will constitute a problem of any thinker, such as Kant, who is tempted to think that man, himself, gives himself the Law. However, that is not the immediate problem, rather it is to see the full implications of the dictum of Edwards on this point of Will.

Real Morality, then, concerns the Will, and the correct attitude to the moral law is Obedience. Later, Edwards, will examine the substitutes men often put forth in place of this cardinal, decisive act of Obedience. Here, he pursues the question of Morality and the Will to the point where he comes into a large measure of agreement with Kant:-

> "So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required, and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of command ..... for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of, a good will".(1)

Edwards is convinced that his opponent is guilty of thinking of Morality as a series of right actions. He is, however, attempting to say that real Morality consists in a state of Will. It matters not how many actions a man might perform, the real crux of the whole matter centres in the quality of the Will from which they flow. Because, although the Law

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.4.

is concerned with right conduct, its command, in the primary instance, is not addressed to the "acts" of the Will, but to the Will itself. Now, the primary and only ethical reaction of the Will to the command is Obedience, and Obedience is not fundamentally concerned with right acts, but with the "submitting and yielding" of the Will itself to another. In other words, it is not a new series of acts of the Will which is required, but a new quality of Will, a new attitude of Will, in fact a New Will.

(C) Edwards confirms this teaching upon the Good Will by another statement which comes very near to the basic teaching of Kant.

> "If the will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused ..... If, therefore, there is a full compliance of the will, the person has done his duty...."(1)

Again, Edwards is rather impatient with those who argue that a man might have a very great desire to comply with the command, amounting to a good intention, or even to what might be termed his "better" self; and yet fail because of human frailty. He cannot tolerate this idea of a divided self. From his point of view, a "split-personality" is an impossible concept. The man wills the act, or he does not will the act, and the idea that a man can will one act, and desire another is completely foreign to his system.
Much later in his exposition of Determinism, Edwards will have to deal with the problem of "Necessitated Holiness", but this is a very different problem from the one he is now concerned with answering which is "Necessary Goodness". So far, his system has argued that acts of the Will are necessary, and he has extended this type of Necessity to cover even good acts of the Will in God and man, and he has tried to indicate

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.4.

that, in such instances, there is no real contradiction between Necessity and Morality. In fact, real Morality is always Necessary Morality. Now, he brings forth another argument to confirm his position. Let it be assumed, he says, that a man's actions have no real linkage with his real character. That is, that they are just actions, and are to be judged as such for their moral worth. Does this interpretation of Morality make any real sense? He argues:-

> "Or if there be no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it; it is therefore a contingence, that happens to a man, arising from nothing in him..... and therefore cannot make him either the better or worse, any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a swan or nightingale". (1)

In other words, the logical opposite of the term "necessary" is contingent, and this applies to acts of the Will in the realm of Morality as well as in Psychology. Except that in Morality, contingent acts are fatal to real moral worth. The second point which Edwards has in mind when insisting upon the Good Will as the only possible foundation for Morality is the fact that he wishes to confirm his doctrine of human Inability. He has already made clear that "moral" Inability must be sharply distinguished from "natural" Inability. Now, he wants to make clear his teaching upon "moral" Inability in an even more emphatic manner, and he uses this concept of the Good Will as the basis for this task. The Command is addressed to the Will, and the Will is the man, and the only real moral reaction to the Command is Obedience. If this Obedience is given, it matters not how natural events shall hinder the effects of this Obedience; the man has done his duty, and that is real Morality.
He gives considerable care to the analysis of "Sincerity", as that term is used by most people, and he finds that it

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.7.

is often used as some sort of substitute for right Willing. He decides that mere Sincerity cannot be termed a virtue, because a man can be sincerely "Evil", and he thinks it is dangerous to use it as a substitute for real, positive acts of the Will. The Good Will is the only thing which really matters:-

> "And, therefore, however sincere and real, and however great a person's endeavours are, yea, though they should be to the utmost of his ability, unless the will which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail, influence, or weight, to any purpose whatsoever, in a moral sense or respect." (1)

He is at one with Kant(2) when he insists "that nothing can counter-balance evil but good".

(D) Now, all this insistence upon a Good Will as the foundation of real Morality is no mere side-issue with Edwards, and it is not an intrusion of pious platitudes into his system of Determinism. Rather, it is one of the pivotal and crucial points of that system, for, without this foundation of real Morality, he would be unable to drive home two very important points of his Determinism.

The first point has already been noticed in the objection of his opponent, that is, that real virtue is inconsistent with Necessity. Edwards has already replied that if this argument is applied to God, then God must be conceived of possessing no real Morality. He now turns the argument as it stands related to man and argues that even in man Morality and Necessity are not imcompatible terms.

He has already argued that persons can become so Good or Evil that, in a very real sense, the opposite acts to their "determined" disposition can be viewed as almost impossible. Here, he proceeds to say that a man is much more virtuous when he acts from fixed principles than when he acts in some random manner:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.5.

(2) Religion. Sect.55.

> "If there be an approach to a moral necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of will, they being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue, it is so far from being the dictate of common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised, that it is agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that he is much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation." (1)

In other words, if a man's real character is good, and his actions flow from his good character, he is better than a man whose acts have little or no relation to his character. However, suppose that the Will does not obey the Command, what then? It is here, at this point, that Edwards faces one of the most complicated problems of the Will. Later, it will be seen that Hartmann uses this point to expound his doctrine of the "Antinomy of the Ought". Further, this point now brought into focus may well prove to be the watershed between the systems of Edwards and Kant. However, be these things as they may, the important matter is to discover what Edwards teaches upon this fact. His central argument is that if the Will does not comply with the Command it is because the Will is already in possession of an Inclination, an effective preference which is in direct opposition to the Command. This previous attitude of the Mind, this effective opposition to the Command is the very essence of human "moral" Inability.

> "I say, the will's opposition in this act to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral inability to do that thing". (2)

The Command is not addressed to a Will empty of some content, for it is addressed to a person, and not to a property. A person can only be termed a person in that he has a disposition, and a Will capable of making that disposition effective. It is useless to argue that, with one part of a man's Will, he wants to obey the Command, and with the other, he unfortun-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.4.
(2) " " " " " " 3. " 4.

ately violates the Command. Such a mixture of willing makes nonsense of effective preference, and is a parody on Morality. A man is always behind the acts of the Will, and, for this reason, he is responsible.

At this point, it is only fair to say that Edwards is convinced that the human heart, soul, mind or disposition is, by its very nature, opposed to the Command, and, different from Kant, he is not thinking only of man's sensuous nature, but of the whole of man's personality.

Indirectly, he attempts to prove this by saying that the Command is always addressed to the Will in an attempt to "bind" it to one side.

> "For the end of laws is to bind to one side; and the end of commands is to turn the will one way, and therefore they are of no use unless they turn or bias the will that way". (1)

The Will has a "content" prior to the Command, and the "content" is contrary to the Command, otherwise, there would be no real need for the Command.

Edwards now attempts to strengthen this pivotal point by taking up another objection made by his opponent. The objection is that according to the tenets of Determinism Moral Inability consists in man being quite unable to fulfil the Command. Here, the opponent sees a vital contradiction in such a system. On one side, stands God and the Command, on the other stands man with his "Moral" Inability. It appears that God is asking something which is totally and completely beyond the powers of the person to whom the Command is addressed. Is this just; is this real Morality in God? (2)

In the examination of this problem, Edwards is perfectly aware that there lies a much deeper problem than he is at this time prepared to face. It is the problem of Predestination and Election, but Edwards is convinced that the time has

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.4.
(2) " " " " " " 3. " 3.

not come in his exposition of Determinism to deal with this complicated issue; so, he takes the objection from its rather superficial point of view.

He says that what his opponent is really saying amounts to this, that God must never at any time Command anything but that which is within the orbit of man's normal Ability. Now, if this were true, there would be a complete end to Commands of any sort, for, the Command must never be limited by what is, that is, by the "actual".

> "Such a state, or act, of the will may be required by command as does not already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be which already is, there could be no use of precept, commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent". (1)

When Edwards says that the Command must not consult mere human Ability, he is saying something which agrees with the central teaching of Kant.(2) However, as already indicated, there is a much deeper problem in this question of human Ability than has yet been raised by Edwards, and it must be faced in the exposition of the Kantian Defence of Freedom. Yet, it is perfectly clear from the evidence already available in this exposition of Determinism advocated by Edwards that he has made out a very reasonable case for his system, and it cannot be dismissed in the rather dogmatic terms assumed by his opponents.

The preceeding exposition of the Determinism of Jonathan Edwards contains many of the crucial elements of his system, but there is still a considerable area of that system to be discussed. As already stated, it is Edwards who really sums up all the arguments and implications of Determinism, both in its Psychological and Theological aspects; and therefore it is against the background of his system of thought that the Kantian Defence of Freedom takes on a new

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.3. Sect.4.

(2) K. p. V. 134, 141, 150, 159, 197, 211, 214.

significance. It would be possible to proceed with the exposition of the Determinism of Edwards as already outlined, but this might lead to needless repetition of the arguments available in that system. Therefore, it appears more satisfactory to permit Kant to state his Defence of Freedom against the limited background of Determinism now available, and to introduce further arguments from the system of Edwards as they become necessary by Kant's treatment of Freedom. As already stated, Edwards thought there were only three explanations of Freedom possible other than that offered by his system. They were (a) that Freedom consists in a Self-determining power in the Will; (b) that Freedom consists in the Indifference of the Will; (c) that Freedom belongs to that which is Contingent, as that term stands opposed to Necessity.(1) These arguments for Freedom will arise in the discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and therefore need not be stated here. However, in addition to these supposed erroneous ideas of Freedom, it will be required to discuss Freedom as it stands related to Moral Evil, and, further, as it stands related to the Being of God. Therefore, it is proposed to discuss the Kantian Defence of Freedom as it stands related to (1) Causation; (2) Indifference; (3) Motive; (4) Moral Evil, and (5) the Idea of God, and it is felt that the full force of Determinism as expounded by Edwards will become clear in such a discussion. However, before proceeding to this task, some attempt must be made to discuss certain preliminary difficulties in the Kantian Defence of Freedom. These difficulties concern Kant's interpretation of the act of volition, and his seeming failure to give any clear decisive account of what the "Will" really is. It is to this task that the discussion now turns.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.5.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER FOUR

An

Approach to Kant's Conception

of

Volition, Freedom and Causation

"To ascertain exactly what Kant means by Will is a most perplexing problem. Among the numerous faculties into which the critical philosophy has analyzed our mental activity, this has sometimes an independent position, though at other times, it is almost, if not wholly, identified with reason. Perhaps, in general, reason might be defined as the faculty of principles or ideas, practical reason as the faculty that determines the will by these principles or ideas; and will as the faculty of acting according to them. But though there is abundant ground for such a distinction, the evidence against it is not less convincing."

(J.G. Schurman. Kantian Ethics. Page 30)

"The intelligible world is the world as Will, the sensible world is the world as Idea (Vorstellung); the former is related to the latter as thing-in-itself to phenomena; in other words, it is the thing-in-itself, and lies at the basis of the sense-world; hence it is independent of the latter, while this is dependent upon it. But just as the sensible world is related to the intelligible, so our faculty of knowledge must be related to the will, or, what is the same thing, our theoretical to our practical reason; the latter is independent of the former, while the former is dependent upon the latter. Herewith is that relation determined which Kant called the "Primacy of Practical Reason". He saw himself obliged to hold the reality and causality of things-in-themselves, and to identify the latter, as intelligible causality, with freedom or pure will, and thus to teach the primacy of practical reason. In other words, the true or real principle of the world is, according to Kant, not knowing reason, but will".

(Kuno Fischer. A Critique of Kant. Page 38)

"Kant rightly calls attention to the fact that all psychological or practical teaching with regard to freedom must remain valueless, unless it be shown that freedom as such is not incompatible with the mechanical law already recognised as an a priori condition of experience. The distinction drawn by him between Intelligible and Empirical character has been much misunderstood, and requires careful statement --------.The world of experience must be for intelligence a system of things causally connected --------. But the very fact that the conception of cause enables us to think each separate event as part of a united system, points out the limit of that conception. We cannot subject the whole of experience to the law of natural causation, and are led inevitably towards the notion of something beyond the phenomena of sense".

(R. Adamson. The Philosophy of Kant. Pages 94 & 96)

In commencing an exposition of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, there must be a preliminary task of attempting to discover what Kant means by the term Will. Kant, from a superficial point of view, seems to make his Defence of Freedom unduly complicated by using the term Will in an extensive and varied manner out of all proportion to the real needs of exposition. For instance, he speaks of a "Holy" Will, a "Rational" Will, a "Good" Will, a "Pure" Will, an "Elective" Will, and even a "Brute" Will. All these terms are intended to stand for some real and abiding truth about "Willing", and the study of such terms is made even more difficult because there are occasions upon which Kant is not consistent in his use of such terms. Further, the general teaching of Kant is that the Will is the very core of personal identity, and this appears to suggest that Kant is failing to see the wood because of the number of trees; and, what is much more serious, Kant appears to be breaking up the citadel of Freedom into a number of vague and scattered outposts. Perhaps the following questions will indicate the difficulties inherent in discovering what Kant means by the term "Will".

(1) Does Kant intend his readers to identify the "Holy" Will with the "Pure" Will? (2) Is the "Pure" Will the same as the "Rational" Will? (3) Is the "Good" to be identified with the "Elective" Will? (4) Is the"Holy" Will really free in the same sense as the "Good" Will? (5) Is the "Good" Will identical with the "Moral Law", or is it mere "awareness" of the "Moral Law"? (6) Can the "Good" Will ever become "Holy"?

All these questions indicate the difficulties which must be faced before coming to grips with the Kantian Defence of Freedom. Perhaps a very limited survey of Kant's unfolding of Volitional processes will be the best way to attempt to state, if not to solve, Kant's rather complicated descriptions of the term "Will".

(1) One of Kant's earliest descriptions of Will is found in the following terms:-

> "Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, i.e. have a will". (1)

Kant goes on to say two very important things. (a) The Will is but another term for the "Practical" Reason; (b) The Will is "Good" only when it chooses that which Reason, independent of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary. In other terms, the Will is "practical" Reason in action, and is Good in that it is determined by Reason. Now, this part of the exposition of Will is straight and clear. The "Good" Will is identified with the "Pure" Will, in that actions which are objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary.(2) However, this is not just what Kant desires to convey by the term "Good" Will, and he sees that he must modify his description of the "Good" Will by saying that now he is describing the "Absolutely" Good Will, or, in Kant's terms -- "the thoroughly good will" -- and which Dr. Paton translates as the will good through and through.(3)
In other words, Kant's argument appears to be that, if Reason infallibly determines the Will, the Will is perfectly Good, that is, Good in a "thorough" quality, or absolutely Good; but the Will of man is not always determined by Reason, therefore the Will of man, though it must be termed "Practical"

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(1) Gd. 36.
(2) Gd. 36.
(3) The Moral Law. P.80.

Reason because it is capable of acting according to the conception of laws, is imperfectly Good, and not good through and through. This is a very complicated way for Kant to take, and it would appear that his argument would have gained force and clarity if he had identified the Rationally determined Will with the Pure Will, as he does later on,(1) and left the Good Will to be defined as the Will "subject" to moral laws but not necessitated by moral laws. This limited glance at Kant's initial attempt to define the Will indicates how he complicates his exposition by attempting to crowd too much doctrine into too few words.

The above description of Will indicates Kant's emphasis upon the Rational features of the Volitional process. Will can have no real meaning or purpose unless it acts upon principles, and such principles cannot be obtained unless Will is intimately related to Reason. Further, Kant relates Rationality to Morality by making an action completely determined by Reason to be absolutely Good.

Now, Kant proceeds to develop another aspect of the Volitional process by looking at Will from another point of view.

> "The Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be the property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes determining it".(2)

This is an important contribution to the discussion of the Volitional process in that it relates Causality and Liberty to the Will. Further, here are the roots of Autonomy and Transcendental Law. Yet, this description of Will has certain hidden dangers. It does not imply what might be termed a morally defined quality of Freedom. Men have a Will in so far as they are rational beings, and Freedom is independence of foreign causes. Kant says that this is the "negative" aspect of

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(1) See Gd. 88, and K.p.V. 174.

(2) Gd. 79.

Freedom, but it is far more than this, it is the non-moral aspect of Freedom.

The greater part of Kant's teaching upon Freedom consists of the emphasis that only as a man is moral is he free, but sometimes he hesitates to make such an assertion the foundation of his complete exposition of Freedom. Later, Kant says "a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same".(1) However, the key-word here is "subject", and Kant uses the German word "unter" not "nach", and therefore leaves the whole position as before. It is "awareness" of, rather than submission to, moral laws. This might seem a small matter, but in the proceeding discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom it will become clear that Kant has left the way open to considerable misunderstanding, if not real weakening of his exposition of Freedom. However, here and now, it is possible only to draw attention to this fact, and pass on to other aspects of his teaching upon Will.

(A) The Rational Will seems to be another term for the Pure Will, and can be identified with the term, the "Practical" Reason. Kant conceives of it as the original endowment of all normal persons, and its authority remains undiminished in spite of its being opposed and defeated by Inclination. Further, it is Pure Reason in its practical aspect, and although it cannot be used as an instrument to further "knowledge" of the noumenal world, it does gives clear and certain "thinkability" of that world, and is the foundation of the moral and rational nature of man.

(B) The Good Will appears to be another term for the Elective Will. It belongs to the world of understanding, but its roots also belong to the world of sensibility. It appears to be the crucial point of what might be termed human Freedom.

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(1) Gd. 80.

It is the battle-ground of the noumenal and phenomenal forces. It "knows" the categorical imperative of the Rational Will, and it "knows" the springs of Inclination. Kant is never perfectly clear whether the Elective Will begins with Freedom or ends with it. That is, he gives no precise guidance as to whether the Elective Will starts off with the ability to turn either to the Good or the Evil: (The Freedom of Indifference) or whether the Elective Will is biassed in favour of the Good or of the Evil. However, these are matters which must receive attention from the following discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and cannot be raised here in any profitable manner.

(C) The Holy Will might be identified with the Rational or Pure Will, but it is better to keep it, as Kant appears to do, as expressing the Will of God. As already stated, Kant hints at an endless process of human effort in the cultivation of the Good Will, but he does not state in any clear manner that the Good Will ever becomes the Holy Will. It might be that the Holy Will has this special characteristic that it has never known the opposition or the victory of Inclination over its expression, which cannot be said of the Good Will.

(2) (1) Kant's second contribution to the discussion of the nature of Volition consists in his insistence that Freedom is not lawlessness.

> "Although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws; yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind, otherwise a free will would be an absurdity".(1)

The following comments indicate the difficulties of correct interpretation of such a passage.

(A) When Kant says that Freedom is a Causality acting according to immutable laws, it is easy to assume that Kant is

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(1) Gd. 79.

making another indication of the inevitable linkage of Freedom and Rationality which, by its own inherent nature and mode of operation, must come within the orbit of law. Yet, there is the concealed problem raised by Edwards in his doctrine of "philosophical" Necessity which must be borne in mind. Later, it will be observed that Kant is inclined to look upon the act of Freedom, or Self-determination, as an act which is spontaneous, original and self-caused. As already observed, Edwards cannot conceive of a human being AS anything else than a contingent being and therefore within the orbit of philosophical Necessity. That is, he would charge Kant, in the above extract, with being guilty of gross contradiction in that he insisted upon Freedom coming within the realm of law, and then denying that it is subject to the very essence of law which is cause and effect. Further, he would insist that only God can be capable of self-causation in the manner Kant is expounding such a concept. Edwards would regard Kant's admission of free Will as operating under a system of "immutable" laws as conclusive of his argument, and the insistence that such "immutable laws were of a "peculiar" kind, he would regard as evasive if not begging of the whole question under discussion. Kant's exposition of the a priori nature of cause and effect(1) would be used by Edwards to expound the nature of philosophical Necessity and to expose Kant's inconsistent attempt to postulate a self-causality of a contingent being whose only grasp of the a priori consists in postulating for such a concept Universality and Necessity.(2)

However, the main point here and now is to observe that Kant repudiates a lawless Freedom, or a Freedom based upon Chance.

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(1) K. p. V. B.13. A.109.

(2) K. p. V. B.4.

(B) In the above extract, Kant hints that Freedom consists in two points. First, that it is "efficient" Causality. Second, that it indicates its efficiency in that it acts independently of foreign causes. Both these aspects of Freedom will be repeated by Kant in all aspects of his exposition, and might be summed up as saying that Freedom is synonymous with Self-determination.

(3) The Problem of Transcendental and Moral Freedom in Kant. Dr. Paton raises the very interesting question whether Kant's Ethics was based on his metaphysics or whether his metaphysics were based on his Ethics.(1) Dr. Paton suggests that, in spite of occasional lapses, Kant's metaphysics are based on his Ethics; and this might well prove to be true, but the question constitutes a problem in his discussion of human Freedom which is worthy of attention.

The problem is important not only because of its implications for Freedom, but because ambiguity upon this point might well weaken the whole moral structure so carefully erected by Kant. It is customary to assume that the real and pivotal Kantian Defence of Freedom centres in the Moral Law, and there is a considerable body of doctrine in Kant to conclude that such an assumption is correct and final. Yet, it cannot be denied that there is another aspect of Kant's Defence of Freedom which is of great importance, and which must receive its due emphasis.

Perhaps the following analysis will make the depth of the problem clear.

(A) Kant appears to have the peculiar and unfortunate habit of diligently, and even painfully, discovering a concept which, according to the measure of labour involved, ought to have impressive worth; then it is relegated to a subordinate

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(1) The Categorical Imperative. Page 255.

position out of all proportion to its cost of discovery and inherent worth. Kant's unrepentant passion for the "architectonic" appearance of truth might be a possible explanation for this tendency. His urge to "schematize" elements of Reality is most commendable, but this very tidiness of his mind sometimes becomes a snare. His thesis that there is truth in organic unity is right only as long as he permits the facts of Reality to express their distinctive and inherent worth and not to be cut down to fit into a system which might be impressive as a structure of thought but which borders upon the grotesque when little or no attention is paid to such distinctive and independent worth. This objection to Kant's handling of concepts will become more clear in the following discussion, but, here and now, it must be registered, and perhaps made valid under the above title.

(B) In the Preface to the Second Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes it quite clear that he intends to keep faith with his promise to reconsider, if not reconstruct the whole basis of metaphysical thought, and, as already indicated, Freedom is a crucial element in such thought. He begins such a discussion by a distinction in terms which is important. He argues that there is a distinction between "knowing" Freedom, and "thinking" Freedom,(1) and it is obvious that the whole of Kant's effort in the above work is given over to proving that Freedom is "thinkable" and not "knowable". An adequate discussion of such terms would involve an entry into the Kantian theory of Knowledge which is beyond the capacity of the present effort. Yet, it might be observed that a limited appraisal of Kant's doctrine of phenomenon and the thing-in-itself does not encourage

(1) K. r. V. B. XXVIII.

the hope that the "knowable" is any more valuable than the "thinkable". At least, from one point ofview, the "thinkable" appears to have more permanence and reality than the "knowable". However, the main issue is not centred in the vexed question of Kantian epistemology but in, what might be termed his "metaphysical" Defence of Freedom. Kant begins by assuming that Morality presupposes Freedom, but he argues that it is not enough to infer Freedom from such a basis. For, if we cannot "think" Freedom as well as infer it, then this moral inference is in danger. He argues that Morality does not require that we shall be able to understand Freedom, but only that its thinkability should not contradict itself.(1) This is a very modest end which Kant set for himself, and there can be little doubt that he intended keeping within the limits of this modest plan. However, problems, postulates and concepts have a strange way of growing under the diligent concentration of Kant, and this "thinkability" of Freedom is no exception. Planned as a buttress to the main structure, this "transcendental" Defence of Freedom assumed proportions which makes it difficult to distinguish it from the main structure, and there is no doubt about Kant's fascination with his search and real satisfaction with his discovery. Right to the very end of his discussion of Freedom, this transcendental aspect exercises a powerful influence upon his thought.

(C) It is difficult,if not impossible, to discover how much of the structure of the New Metaphysics existed in the mind of Kant when he commenced his work, The Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, it is perfectly clear that there was, at least, one great aspect of this structure quite evident from the beginning. This aspect is the "Spontaneity" of mind.

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(1) K. r. V. B.XXIX.

The following extract is important, occurring as it does at the early stages of this great work, and relating to the "thinkability" of ideas.

> "If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge should be called the understanding -------. The faculty ------ which enables to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding".(1)

Later, Kant considers this Spontaneity of mind under the terms of Apprehension, Reproduction and Recognition;(2) and still later, he relates this Spontaneity to its highest category which he terms "transcendental synthesis of imagination".(3)

The purpose of the above references is to indicate the possible source of Kant's transcendental Defence of Freedom. It is submitted that here, in this crucial and central concept of Kant's metaphysics, that the roots of this other view of Freedom are to be found. If this submission is justified, it becomes quite clear why Kant was haunted by this metaphysical Defence of Freedom, and why it became more than a mere buttress to his moral inference of Freedom. The above argument is strengthened by the fact that, when Kant is discussing the Third Antinomy, he links this Spontaneity of mind to the Freedom of the Will.

> "The transcendental idea stands only for the absolute spontaneity of an action -------. But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved (though not understood) -------- and so to attribute to their substances a power acting from freedom".(4)

The above extract is made with the full knowledge that it is only one aspect of the Third Antinomy, but it is Kant's positive argument for Freedom, and expresses the linkage of spontaneity of mind and Freedom of Will. Of course, in this particular section, Kant indicates the inability of meta-

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(1) K. r. V. A.51.
(2) K. r. V. A.97.
(3) K. r. V. B.151.
(4) K. r. V. A.448.

physical thought to advance along this path, but the main point is the linkage of these two concepts in his argument. (D) However, it is in the discussion of "The Antinomy of Pure Reason" that Kant strengthens and deepens this linkage, and embarks upon an analysis of transcendental Freedom which tends to exceed the modest end he had set before himself. He begins by observing that there are two types of Causality conceivable. One from Nature and the other from Freedom. Transcendental, or cosmological Freedom has the following characteristics. It is capable of beginning a state spontaneously. It does not come under the law of Causality observable in Nature. It does not need to be substantiated by Nature, and it cannot be determined by any given experience. The following extract indicates the degree to which Kant has permitted transcendental Freedom to exceed mere "thinkability".

> "But since in this way no absolute totality of conditions determining causal relation can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality". (1)

Kant, then goes on to say something which reveals how much he has exceeded his original purpose, and which, if taken at its face value, would shake the foundations of the moral structure he seemed so anxious to strengthen.

> "It should especially be noted that the practical concept of Freedom is based on this transcendental idea, and that in the latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset".(2)

The whole context of the above extract is highly important to the analysis of Transcendental Freedom, and it reveals how Kant has permitted this concept to overwhelm the limits which he set for its discussion. It is true that he closes the discussion with the assurance that he has not intended

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(1) K. r. V. A.533.
(2) K. r. V. A.534.

to prove the Reality of Freedom, but this modesty of expression must not be allowed to blind the reader to the real value Kant puts upon such an argument. Further, although Kant brings in his moral doctrine into the above discussion it is made subordinate and contributory to his other exposition of Freedom. Again, he appears to give the impression that his dichotomous description of noumenal and phenomenal is essential not only to his doctrine of Transcendental Freedom,(1) but also to Moral Freedom.

(E) The great influence of this conception of Transcendental Freedom overflows from "The Critique of Pure Reason" into Kant's Ethical works. His first and perhaps primary idea of Freedom in these works is that it is a quality of Causality which is "independent" of foreign causes.(2) Kant describes this type of Freedom as "negative", but it is difficult to perceive how such a Freedom can be negative in the real meaning of that term. Here again, Kant appears to be underestimating the real value of the concept, Transcendental Freedom. However, he modifies this under-estimation when he says that a rational being cannot act except under the idea of Freedom.

> "Now I say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive".(3)

This is an argument borrowed from Transcendental Freedom, and indicates how Kant was divided in mind on the question of Theoretical and Moral Freedom. Further, when Kant finds himself in difficulties upon the relation of God to human Freedom, he does not take refuge in Moral Freedom as standing over against Divine power, but resorts to this haunting idea of Transcendental Freedom:-

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(1) K. r. V. A.536.
(2) Gd. 81. 92.
(3) Gd. 81.

> "In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications in time were not merely modifications of him as appearance, but as a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved". (1)

Of course, there are times when Kant uses with real force the argument of Moral Freedom as against Divine Authority, but the important thing is that in spite of all Kant's repeated assurance that the Transcendental idea of Freedom is a mere idea, he keeps on using it whenever he finds himself in real difficulty.

This fact is clearly seen when Kant is confronted with one of the most difficult problems of his exposition of Freedom. He is discussing what might be termed a kind of "psychological" Determinism. His analysis of this type of Determinism is sound, but when he comes to make a positive reply to this considerable objection to Freedom, he takes refuge in Transcendental Freedom and not in Moral Freedom.

Speaking of the error of thought involved in a discussion of internal and external Freedom, Kant says:-

> "This may imply psychological Freedom, (if we choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in the mind), but it involves physical necessity, and therefore leaves no room for transcendental freedom, which must be conceived as independence on everything empirical, and, consequently, on nature generally, whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in time only, or of the external in time and space. Without this freedom (in the latter and true sense) which alone is practical a priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible". (2)

As already observed, Kant's analysis of this type of Determinism is most valuable, but the question arises, why did he reply to it in terms of Transcendental Freedom? Of course, it might be argued that, in this particular context, Kant identified Transcendental Freedom with Moral Freedom, and the whole difficulty can be cleared up by a correction of terms. Yet, the difficulty is deeper than this proposed solution, because Kant here insists that without this concept of Trans-

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(1) K. p. V. 233.
(2) K. p. V. 228.

cendental Freedom no "Moral Law" is possible. Therefore, confusion of terms is ruled out as a possible explanation. Further, he is saying something in the above extract which conflicts with other sections of his teaching upon the Moral Law and Freedom.

For instance, earlier, he writes:-

> "Hence the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if we renounced its apodictic certainty, it could not be proved a posteriori by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself". (1)

All this is in keeping with Kant's repeated insistence that the Transcendental idea of Freedom is a mere idea whose objective Reality is doubtful(2); and that we know nothing of the supersensible except Freedom <u>through the Moral Law</u>.(3) Later, he confirms this:-

> "This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent of these suppositions, and is of itself apodictically certain, namely the moral law, and so far it needs no further support by theoretical views ....."(4)

This "rational" ground for Freedom is further emphasised by Kant when he says:-

> "Now I say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free ...."(5)

Butler uses this same argument(6), and there can be little doubt about its real value as a rational argument for Freedom; but it is only an argument which belongs to Reason rather than to Morality. It leads directly to the vicious circle which Kant clearly sees as:-

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(1) K. p. V. 163.
(2) Gd. 90.
(3) K. p. V. 194.
(4) K. p. V. 289.
(5) Gd. 81.
(6) The Analogy of Religion. Ch.6.

> "In the order of efficient causes we assume ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws; and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to these laws, because we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will." (1)

Kant is haunted by this problem. He makes, at least, two major attempts to solve it. (a) By taking refuge in the postulation that man must be viewed from two different aspects(2); (b) By trying to explain the relation of "ratio essendi" to "ratio cognoscendi".(3) Yet, the problem is far greater than these explanations, and will be indicated in the following discussion of Freedom. On the way to this vicious circle, Kant makes an attempt to subordinate the rational to the moral motive for Freedom by using an argument for the Freedom of the Will which might be termed both Rational and Moral:-

> "To consider ourselves as free in action and yet as subject to certain laws, so as to find a worth simply in our own person which can compensate us for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition".(4)

This idea of "worthship" will be used by Kant time after time, but he never gives it its required emphasis because he feels it is identical with the argument "why we take an interest in the moral law", which he thinks is insoluble. Yet, the arguments can be separated, and there are times when Kant makes such a decision and builds his defence on Freedom upon purely Moral grounds.(5)

The terms Self-worth and Self-determination appear to mean the same thing. Yet, in a very real sense they stand for two different lines of argument for Freedom. Self-worth is a moral valuation, and Self-determination is a rational valuation. Of course, it can be argued that the Moral and the Rational are so blended in the teaching of Kant that he

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(1) Gd. 83.
(2) Gd. 85.
(3) K. p. V. 107.
(4) Gd. 83.
(5) Gd. 34. 56. 66. 71. K. p. V. 164. 215.

uses the one in place of the other. This is true to a very great extent, but there must be careful limitations to this identification. After all, the Good Will stands apart from, if not opposed to, mere Intelligence, calm Self-control or Deliberation;(1) and Kant appears to give primacy to the Good Will over even Reason when he says that the task of Reason is to produce a Will which is Good in itself.(2) These two arguments of Self-determination and Self-worth are put by Kant in the following terms:-

(a) Self-determination. When we say we are free, we transfer ourselves by this very assertion to the world of "understanding" (Reason). In the act of this transference, we assert our autonomy, and this autonomy involves Morality, but this Morality involves an Imperative because, although we have, by an act of Reason, transferred ourselves to the world of Understanding, we still belong to the world of Sense. However, the world of Understanding contains the foundation of the world of Sense, and consequently of its laws also, and accordingly gives the law to my Will which is the law of Freedom.(3)

(b) Self-worth. Every reasonable being who makes any real use of his "Reason", even an immoral use (Consummate villain), sets before himself certain ideals of conduct; and these very ideals are impossible in the absence of a desire to possess them. Yet, by the strength of his actual passions he does not possess these ideals. His Will is only a vague "wish", but even this wish proves that he can transfer himself in thought, at least, to the world of Understanding. He imagines a type of conduct possible to him which has worth in itself not mere advantage to his inclinations. Thus, he

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(1) Gd. 12.
(2) Gd. 16.
(3) Gd. 88.

asserts his real Freedom, the Reality of a Good Will, and the authority of the Moral Law. In other words, his Freedom is founded upon the Ought.(1)

This problem has been raised in this introduction to Kant's Defence of Freedom because Kant is conscious of the vicious circle in which his own arguments for Freedom and Morality have involved him.(2) Yet, it appears that the circle was of his own making. He is haunted by the belief that he can establish Freedom upon a foundation independent of Morality. He speaks of the "spontaneity of Reason"(3); of the inherent Causality of Reason(4), and he gives the impression, as already noted, that these factors constitute Transcendental Freedom which makes the Moral Law possible. This emphasis is truly unfortunate, and, if it is allowed to predominate, weakens his Defence of Freedom as that Freedom stands confronted with Determinism. Transcendental Freedom is a valuable support for "Moral" Freedom, but if it is placed upon an equal footing with Moral Freedom, it might prove fatal to the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and all the endless ramifications of noumenal and phenomenal might not save it from complete collapse.

It is believed that Kant saw this clearly, at least, in one section of his exposition.(5) Here, at last, he comes to grips with the problem already discussed. He asks the question, "How is the consciousness of the moral law possible? and concludes:-

> "It is morality that first discovers to us the notion of freedom, -------- He judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free -- a fact which but for the moral law he would never have known". (5)

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(1) Gd. 89.
(2) Gd. 83.
(3) Gd. 86.
(4) K. p. V. 174.
(5) K. p. V. 141.

This problem has been raised at this stage of the Kantian Defence of Freedom because it is a major problem of Kantian interpretation. Some thinkers have assumed that Kant taught the fundamental thing in all existence was "Pure" Will, and, because this thing-in-itself is "Pure" Will, it is therefore "free". In other words, the Causality of the thing-in-itself is "Freedom" Causality, and exists in itself unrelated to all "Moral" considerations. As already stated, Kant says that "freedom must be postulated as a property of the will of every rational creature". This could mean that Freedom is established upon grounds other than the moral, and belongs to man as an inherent right or attribute of his noumenal nature. Here, there is no apparent moral conditions of Freedom, and the categorical imperative has faded into the background of the Causality of the thing-in-itself. It is this view of Freedom which seems to have compelled Kant to have divided existence into intelligible and phenomenal, and which many interpreters of Kant term "metaphysical" wrappings of Freedom, and destructive of his real contribution to the fundamental meaning and purpose of that term. Any dogmatism upon this major point of interpretation would be out of place in such an exposition of Kant as the present work contemplates. However, the guidance of Kuno Fischer might be taken at this stage as a possible escape from complete contradiction in the teaching of Kant upon Freedom. He thinks that Kant taught that the end of all willing is "purity" of willing, and that this purity of willing constitutes the real foundation of the possibility of a "moral" world. Now, without the existence of the "sense" world, there would be no sensous motives or appetites operating in man. Therefore, there would be no possibility of "will" obtaining any moral meaning. However, the laws of the "sensible" world are, by their very constitution, subordinate to the laws of Freedom,

although they are not on this fact suspended or annulled. Without all these factors in the "sensible" world, the "freedom" of the intelligible world would be an abstraction, without any real, moral value. Therefore, for Kant, "pure" Freedom is the basis of something much more valuable, that is, "Moral" Freedom, and this must be won upon the battle-field of life. This important matter must receive attention at a later stage.

(4) The nature and operation of Causation.

Kant's conception of Causality is one of the most important contributions of the Critical Philosophy, and it is impossible to grasp in any adequate manner his Defence of Freedom without giving attention to this most vital aspect of his system of thought. Yet, for the purpose in hand, it is not essential to attempt to trace the evolution of his conception of Causality, or even to expound, in any exhaustive manner, this Kantian concept. The main purpose of the present discussion is to attempt to relate Kant's handling of this concept to Eighteenth-century Determinism, and to examine whether he has contributed any durable solution to the problem of Freedom and Necessity. It would be interesting and important to discuss Kant's relation to Hume on this important concept. For there can be little doubt about Kant being roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume's challenging exposition of Causality; and it is interesting to indicate how Kant was influenced by Hume and how he differed from him upon this crucial concept. These matters, however, have been handled in a most competent manner already by most serious students of Kant, and Dr. Caird(1), and Dr. Ewing(2), to mention only two such students, appear to have covered this field of enquiry. The important fact is that both Kant and Hume believed in the actuality of the causal process. It is true

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(1) The Critical Philosophy. 2 Vols.

(2) Kant's Treatment of Causality.

that Hume clouded such a belief by a somewhat sceptical discussion upon the actual "proof" of the causal process. Yet, as already indicated, Hume built his system of Determinism upon a real belief in Causation. Doubts upon this fact were never felt by Kant as the following extract indicates:-

> "The question is not whether the conception of causation is right, useful, and, relatively to the whole cognition of nature, indispensable; for of this Hume never harboured a doubt; but whether it is thought of a priori by reason, and in this manner has internal utility, which is not limited to objects of experience merely; on this subject Hume wanted information, and, as he himself tells us, always kept his mind open for instruction." (1)

In the examination of the contribution of Anthony Collins to the Determinism of the Eighteenth-century, it was observed that, in spite of the ~~rather~~ over-confidence of Collins in his rationalistic solution of the problem of Liberty and Necessity, he did expound a system of Determinism which was to have far-reaching results. In his work "A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Liberty and Necessity" (1717), he stated that the whole question of Liberty and Necessity could be settled in a final manner if all scholars involved in the debate would answer in a clear manner two important questions. These questions were (i) Does man come within the Universal system of Causation? (ii) If so, can man, at any point, break through this Universal system of Causation?
It is not too high a tribute to pay to Collins to say that all the exponents of Determinism in the Eighteenth-century would have agreed that he had put his finger on the very nerve centre of Liberty and Necessity by asking these two questions. To confirm such a statement it is necessary only to quote short extracts from Edwards and Hume.

> "So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the human soul ..... or the whole universe should come into existence without a cause." (2)

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(1) The Prolegomena to Metaphysics. (Preface)

(2) The Freedom of the Will. Part 2. Sect.3.

> "We must now shew, that as the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same, in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another."(1)

These extracts indicate how right Collins was to ask the above questions, and J.S. Mill, an exponent of Determinism of more recent date, confirms the importance of such questions:

> "The question whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy concerning the freedom of the will, which from at least as far back as the time of Pelagius, has divided both the philosophical and the religious world." (2)

Collins, Edwards and Hume are in complete agreement (i) that man does come within the universal system of Causation; (ii) that it is quite impossible for man, at any point, to break through this universal system of Causation. Therefore, the Kantian Defence of Freedom must attempt an answer to these two crucial assertions, and the following analysis of Kant's position might be taken as setting forth the central features of his teaching upon this important subject.

In his "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant enters upon a careful discussion of what he terms "The Antinomy of Pure Reason.". The whole point in examining this "conflict" within pure reason is, in the words of Kant:- "not for the purpose of deciding in favour of one or other side, but of investigating whether the object of controversy is not perhaps a deceptive appearance which each vainly strives to grasp."(3)

One of his illustrations of the Antinomy of Reason is this question of Freedom and Causality, and is termed the "Third" Antinomy. It is here, in the "Antithetical" aspect of the Antinomy, that Kant gives clear evidence of his grasp of the Deterministic concept of Causation. The following points sum up Kant's analysis of this concept -- that is, as he thought the Determinists would put it.

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(1) The Treatise. Bk.2. Part 3. Sect.1.
(2) A System of Logic. Bk.6. Ch.2.
(3) K. r. V. B.451.

(A) Freedom of Will is inconceivable because everything, including the Will of man, is subject to the laws of Causation, which is another name for the laws of nature.
(B) Even if it assumed that there is what might be termed a "transcendental" quality of Freedom, that is, a Freedom which cannot become subject to the laws of nature, but a Freedom which has a power of spontaneity and origination, such an assumption does not solve the Antinomy.
(C) A "transcendental" Freedom appears to raise more difficulties than it can solve. To postulate this spontaneity or origination of an absolute "cause" comes very near to begging the whole question involved in Freedom and Causation. For the human mind cannot conceive of the concept of Causation except under the terms of antecedent and consequent, and here it is being assumed that "transcendental" Freedom has a consequent without an antecedent. Further, it is claimed that "transcendental" Freedom operates within real laws of a special type of Causality. Yet, how can it be termed Causality, special or otherwise, if its system lacks one of the essential terms?
(D) If "transcendental" Freedom is insisted upon, it must be a type of Freedom which works according to laws, and the only knowledge which we have of such laws is found in experience. Therefore, "transcendental" Freedom presents two horns of a dilemma. (i) If it be assumed that "transcendental" Freedom works according to law, even a higher type of law, it must grant that the only knowledge of such law is found in experience, and therefore Causation governs this higher quality of Freedom. Therefore, the problem has not been solved, but only pressed further back. (ii) If it be assumed that "transcendental" Freedom is governed by law quite different from that found in experience, then, "transcendental" Freedom stands opposed to the only concept of law available to the human mind, and must be defined in terms of

"Lawless" Freedom, which is just another term for "Chance" Causality, and this is a flat contradiction in terms.

(B) Even if this dilemma can be solved, "transcendental" Freedom is still outside the real world of human experience and cannot be given in any possible perception. Finally, what kind of systematic and unified view of the universe is possible when a part of the world is stated to be governed by natural law and a part by a type of Causality which is different from natural law, and even stands opposed to natural law, and which can be defined in no other terms than a "lawless" Freedom of Causality?

This very limited analysis of Kant's antethetical argument of the Third Antinomy is valuable for, at least, the following reasons:-

First, it confirms a previous statement upon Kant's careful and profound insight into the gravity of the challenge of Determinism. Kant was convinced that Determinism contained a possible explanation of man and the world. It was not based upon superficial prejudice, or theological blindness, or even empirical scepticism. It went much deeper than all these, and divided, if not antagonised Reason itself. The Determinism of the Eighteenth-century never put its case for the concept of Causality quite as clearly as is done by Kant in the Third Antinomy, but it implied all that Kant has said under this title, and Kant has not exaggerated any of these logical implications.

Second, the Third Antinomy indicates why Kant never entered upon a "refutation" of Determinism. Determinism stood rooted in pure Reason itself. Determinism was metaphysically justifiable, in that it possessed as much rationality for its system as could be uttered against it. Kant saw, with remarkable clarity of judgment, that "Pure" Reason could not utter a decisive verdict upon the rival claims of Determinism and Freedom; for each possessed an inherent "rationale" for

the system it constructed. However, this did not mean the collapse of metaphysics as utterly incapable of offering guidance upon this question, but it did mean a careful limitation of the sphere and operation of metaphysical thought. Determinism presented mere Rationalism with an Antinomy, therefore another way would have to be sought in obtaining a solution of Liberty and Necessity.

Third, Kant's analysis in the Third Antinomy reveals another conviction which stands related to his Defence of Freedom. It is that Freedom, though incapable of Rational proof, is also incapable of being over-thrown by arguments of Reason. Being an essential part of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, it shares the prestige of inherent rationality, and cannot be dismissed as a figment of the imagination. So far as metaphysical thought is involved, Freedom must always be considered as "possible", and capable of supplying a reasonable interpretation of life and thought. Later Kant puts this conviction in the following terms:-

> "Whenever I hear that a writer of real ability has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, ... I am eager to read the book, ... Already, before having opened it, I am perfectly certain that he has not justified any one of his specific claims; not because I believe that I am in possession of conclusive proofs of these important propositions, but because the transcendental critique ..... has completely convinced me that, as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less able, to establish any negative conclusion in regard to these questions."(1)

The above extract is valuable because it sums up an important aspect of Kant's speculative Defence of Freedom. Viewed against the impressive background of Deterministic thought it does not seem to be of very great significance. Yet, it marks a very real advance in the conception of Freedom. Of course, its claims are limited, but this does not mean that a careful analysis of all the implications of the Third Antinomy calls a very decisive halt to the march of a bold

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(1) K. r. V. A.753.

or cavalier Determinism. He knows he cannot demolish the structure of Deterministic thought, but he knows he is clearing the ground for the erection of an alternative structure of Freedom. He declines to charge Determinism with irrationality, but he defies the exponents of such a system to level such a charge against his exposition of Freedom.

However, Kant's work upon this speculative Defence of Freedom is far from completed by the exposition of the "antithetical" aspect of the Third Antinomy. He presses forward with a more detailed analysis of the "Thesis" of this section, and, in spite of ambiguity of expression, it is felt that he has added weight to this particular aspect of his Defence of Freedom. In the enlargement of his "Thesis" on the Third Antinomy, Kant seems to have the following aims:- (i) He wants to keep this particular aspect of Freedom within the speculative sphere; (ii) He wants to reserve for a later work (The Critique of Practical Reason) the major arguments for an exposition of Freedom; (iii) He wants to keep his argument for Freedom upon ground which he thinks is common to Freedom and Determinism. Unfortunately, he succeeds in none of these aims, and the result is a very involved argument which, taken as a whole, does strengthen his general position, but which, if taken in detail, is weak. In the enlargement of his positive argument for Freedom, Kant makes an attempt to give a new interpretation of Causation, and, to assist such a new interpretation, he links up the discussion with a reference to his fundamental doctrine of "the thing-in-itself". Therefore, to understand Kant's handling of the problem under discussion, it will be necessary to view Causation and the "thing-in-itself" in isolation, although in Kant's mind and teaching they are intimately related.

(1) The Concept of Causation.

By natural Causation Kant means the connection of one state with another in the world of phenomena, and he is emphatic that such Causation is inflexible and universal.

> " This law is a law of the understanding, from which no departure can be permitted, and from which no appearance may be exempted." (1)

This is a type of statement which is found in all forms of Determinism, but it would be incorrect to assume that Kant is saying the exact thing meant by the Determinists. The operative word in the above extract is "Appearance", and its inclusion indicates Kant's careful habit of limiting the range of his definitions. He has a special meaning for the term "Appearance", and this saves his definition of Causation from granting any vital point to the Determinists. Further, it indicates how deeply Kant has involved his concept of Causation with the concept of "the Thing-in-itself". Kant feels there is a serious defect in the generally accepted view of Causation. The usual interpretation of Causation presents no real "totality" of the causal series. It has no real beginning, and can have no real end and purpose. The human Reason can never rest satisfied by a mere endless series, for it comes from nowhere, and, therefore, ends nowhere. Kant is quite convinced that human Reason cannot find this a satisfactory explanation of the causal process, and infers that, quite apart from the problem of Liberty and Necessity, Reason must postulate a "spontaneous" cause to give real meaning to the causal process:-

> "Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality." (2)

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(1) K. r. V. A. 542.

(2) K. r. V. A. 533.

In judging of the soundness of Kant's argument upon this particular point, it is important to have in mind what Kant is trying to do. His sole purpose appears to be to indicate a "speculative" need, inherent in "Pure" Reason, for going beyond the causal series for an original cause which cannot be found within the natural causal process itself. He is convinced of the need of what he terms this "cause noumenon"(1), but he is careful not to allow dogmatism upon this point to exceed the needs of the case. Later, it will be necessary to ask what the Determinists think of such an argument, but here and now, it might be observed, that Kant is inserting the very thin end of a wedge which, with a strange irony, though it might succeed in splitting the rock of determinist thought, also rends in twain the cosmic unity in which Kant seemed so deeply interested.(2) However, this problem is too complicated for such an early stage of Kant's Defence of Freedom.

He has another argument which is rooted in this particular section but which is not given the care which it deserves. In fact, it is found scattered throughout the whole of The Critique of Pure Reason, but is never pressed home with the required emphasis. It is an argument which takes the battle right into the centre of the Determinist camp, and if rightly used could have been a source of real embarrassment to the over-confident Collins. Kant everywhere implies, but nowhere states in an explicit manner, that Determinism is founded upon Empiricism.

If Kant's argument were paraphrased it would appear as follows:- "The Determinists make a considerable stir about the concept of Causation. This is quite understandable because without it their whole structure would fall into ruins. They insist that the causal series be conceived as 'universal and

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(1) K. p. V. 165.

(2) K. r. V. A.536.

and inflexible'. They will permit of no possible exception in its nature and operation. They demand that all life and thought be brought within its orbit and influence. I do not challenge the implications of their major premise, but I deny that they have, upon the grounds of Empiricism, a right to such a concept. For it is utterly and completely impossible for Empirical thought to evolve or deduce such a concept as universal and inflexible Causality. Universal and inflexible Causality which, by its very terms, is an A Priori concept, does not and cannot belong to the sphere of Empirical thought. It is a complete absurdity in such a context, and Hume was perfectly consistent when he said that he could find no A Priori foundations for Causality in his Empirical world of thought. Therefore, if the Determinists dare to be logical, they will find themselves upon the horns of a hopeless dilemma. (a) If they deny universal and inflexible Causality their whole system of Determinism is shattered; (b) If they insist upon universal and inflexible Causality as a foundation for their system, they must go outside the Empirical sphere of thought for a reasonable postulation of this A Priori concept. They cannot have the argument both ways, and whichever way they choose they have indicated that "Empirical" Determinism does not present a consistent and intelligible view of human life and thought....."

Thus Kant would have argued this particular Defence of Freedom, or, to put the case in his own words:-

> "If we thought to escape these toilsome enquiries by saying that experience continually presents examples of such regularity among appearances and so affords abundant opportunity of abstracting the concept of cause, and at the same time of verifying the objective validity of such a concept, we should be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause can never arise in this manner. It must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a mere phantom of the brain."(1)

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(1) K. r. V. A.91.

This section of Kant's argument for Freedom from the concept of Causality would have real value against the bold and flippant "Psychological" Determinism of Collins, but it would have less value against Edwards. Edwards was deeply endebted to the Empiricism of Locke, and his Determinism might also be termed "Psychological" to a limited degree. However, upon this concept of Causality, Edwards never felt satisfied with the Empirical position, and declared that the "concept of causality was emplanted in the human mind by God". In other words, Edwards escapes the horns of the dilemma because his "Psychological" Determinism is mixed with "Theological" principles. Against Hume, the above argument of Kant would have little or no value because Hume had already agreed with such an argument, and was probably the first person to supply Kant with the materials for such an argument.

At this stage of the Kantian exposition of Freedom, it is necessary to pause in the examination of the concept of Causation, and turn attention to one of the most complicated concepts of the Critical Philosophy. However, later, a return must be made to further discussion of Causation as viewed by Kant, because he never really gives up the struggle to extract from this concept a meaning which will give a foundation for his system of Freedom, a rationale for his view of the universe, and an argument which will prove that the Determinists have misunderstood this central feature of their system.

(2) The Concept of "the thing-in-itself".

On the face of it, it appears impertinent to attempt to discuss the concept of "the thing-in-itself" under the limitations of a sub-heading. For Kant discusses this concept throughout "The Critique of Pure Reason", and the analysis overflows into his subsequent works. Yet, it has to be dis-

cussed in this particular context because Kant introduces it as an important element in his "transcendental" Defence of Freedom, and although the following summary is brief, even to the point of over-simplification of all the factors involved in such a concept, it may serve to provide a very limited background to the present analysis of the Kantian Defence of Freedom.

There is little doubt that Kant considered the doctrine of "the thing-in-itself" to be essential to the whole of the Critical Philosophy. His distinction between Phenomena and "things-in-themselves" pervades everything he writes upon the basic problems of metaphysics, and he always turns to this doctrine as the way of escape from all the dilemmas which arise from the discussion of God, Immortality and Freedom. It is difficult to find many passages in Kant which put forth the doctrine of "the thing-in-itself" in a clear and concise manner. Perhaps the following extract will serve the immediate purpose:-

> "External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations. Apart from them they are nothing. Thus external things exist as I myself, and both, indeed, upon the immediate witness of my self-consciousness. The only difference is that the representation of myself, as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while the representations which mark extended beings belong also to outer sense." (1)

Kant insists that if there were no things in themselves, but only a consciousness of phenomena, then, all thought would be a dream. It may be a harmonious dream, but it would be invalid because it would be purely subjective. There can be little doubt that Kant made many inconsistent statements upon things in themselves. In many places, he declares that they are unknown and unknowable. Yet, there are, at least, four positive statements which can be found in his analysis of

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(1) K. r. V. A.371.

the noumenal. (a) They are the substance of all sensibility; (b) They are the direct cause of phenomena; (c) They are basic, and causal to all experienced sensations.
Space and Time are not "things-in-themselves"; rather the "thing-in-itself" is outside Space and Time, yet it is the ultimate basis of all human "experience" which is within Space and Time. (d) The "thing-in-itself" does not come within the causal series of humanly conceived Causality, yet it has a Causality all its own which vitally affects the causal series operating in human experience. Therefore, it is not just to Kant's teaching upon this central concept to conceive of it as completely separated from phenomena, Time and Space, and common human"experience". Yet, there is little doubt that Kant gave ample grounds for such a misunderstanding. Further, he creates the impression that the "thing-in-itself" is fundamentally more comparable to Will than to Idea. The world of Sensibility seems to be productive of Idea, but the world of the noumenal seems to have no essence or purpose other than that of Will. Therefore, Will is fundamental to all Kant's system. It seems to be prior to Idea, and all this is confirmed by Kant's insistence upon the "primacy" of the Practical Reason. Yet, even if this conclusion is inevitable, Kant saves his system from the implications that it is an exposition of "will-force". For his Will is always essentially moral, and is always purified from the gross and sensuous.

The purpose of this summary is to provide the background against which Kant is trying to find answers to two questions. First, what is the real nature of the causal series? Second, can Freedom exist alongside of this causal series? In other words, can it be said that all changes in the world arise either from nature or from Freedom? If the objects of experience are "things-in-themselves", then, Freedom is utterly

impossible because the concept of Freedom would be within the causal series and would be subordinate to nature. This is the cardinal error of all Determinists. They assume that objects of experience are "things-in-themselves", that there is nothing behind, beneath and beyond mere sensibility. Human "experience" thus becomes a closed circuit. Nature is the complete and adequate cause of all events, and new beginnings, or spontaneous origination are impossible. Kant sees very clearly that a former method of defending the Freedom paid the price of Liberty by making a hopeless breach in Causality. This is an impossible situation, for it makes Liberty an aspect of Chance, lawless and chaotic. The Determinists are right in their demand that Causality be universal and inflexible, but is it not possible that Liberty and Necessity can exist side by side?

> "Admitting that in the whole series of events there is nothing but natural necessity, is it yet possible to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of nature, and in another aspect an effect due to freedom; or is there between these two kinds of causality a direct contradiction?"(1)

When Kant asks this question about man, he is on reasonable grounds. Moreso, when he insists that all "things"operate according to law, but man "acts" according to his "conception" of law. There can be no doubt about the validity of such a dividing line between man and the rest of the universe. It is easy to find fault with Kant's division of the noumenal and the phenomenal, the intelligible and the sensuous. Yet, there can be little doubt concerning Kant's valuable reminder that a being who is capable of acting according to Principles is in a very different category from something in which law operates without any perception.

The Determinists were never very successful in providing a satisfactory explanation of Reason or Understanding in their

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(1) K. r. V. A.543.

systems. By conviction they were Rationalists. Their whole appeal was made to the reasonable in life and thought, but they never succeeded in treating the fact of Reason in any realistic manner. For instance, Hume attempts to say that Reason is the slave of the passions, but his whole system of thought is a refutation of such a statement, and, as Kant cleverly remarks, Hume is a "dispassionate" writer in philosophy.(1) Edwards does not attempt to hide his unbounded admiration for Reason, but, in his discussion of Motivation, he cannot make up his mind what part is played by Reason in the choice of Motives. Kant is making a real effort to give Reason an adequate place in his system. Yet, he created many difficulties for himself by granting to the Determinists that the causal series control not only things but man himself as a "phenomenon".

A very limited analysis of Kant's exposition of Causality can be said to result in the following observations:-

(1) There are two kinds of Causality. One is observed in Nature and might be said to consist of necessary succession.(2) The other has its roots in the noumenal and might be termed dynamical Causality. It is important to observe that Kant was more emphatic than Hume in his analysis of natural or empirical Causation. Kant insisted upon "Necessary" succession. This element of Necessity is not a result of mere association, habit or inference. It is a law of the understanding which is imposed upon the manifold phenomena, thus giving unity, and providing the only real basis for human "experience". However, Kant would grant to Hume that such "natural" Causality does not imply some hidden force. Rather, he is inclined to reserve for the noumenal sphere the operation of such a

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(1) K. r. V. A.745.

(2) Ewing. Kant's Treatment of Causality. P.102.

dynamic interpretation of Causation. An attempt has been made in recent discussions upon this difference of view upon the nature of phenomenal and noumenal Causation to render the whole matter more easy of interpretation by reserving the term "Causation" to mere succession, and to use the term "Causality" for the dynamic phase of the operation. There is much to be said for such a distinction in terms more so in any attempt to interpret Kant's teaching upon this subject. However, Kant makes no such distinction in the terms, but it is obvious that his effort to distinguish two types of Causality or Causation calls for some sort of distinction, as suggested above. The very idea of two kinds of Causality or Causation appears to be repugnant to the concept of a unified world, but if there is one single causal process which has two aspects or phases, then, the idea is not incapable of being "thought", although, in Kantian terminology, it may be incapable of being "known". There can be little doubt that Kant meant "Causality", that is, creative, dynamic causal process to be applied to the "things-in-themselves." This aspect of his teaching on this subject raises very serious difficulties, and appears to justify Schopenhauer's view that Kant taught nothing more or less than the universe was fundamentally "Will" or some "Will-force".

If Kant had strictly reserved this dynamic Causality for Reason alone, he might have saved his exponents considerable embarrassment, but, in view of his careful and continuous insistence upon the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal spheres, it is difficult to see how such an argument could have been worked out in any consistent manner.

(2) The empirical self seems to belong to the sphere of natural Causation.(1) This sounds very simple until an attempt is made to obtain from Kant those aspects of the self which

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(1) K. r. V. A.529.

are to be classified as "empirical". If the physical is regarded as "empirical", and the mental as "noumenal", such a division is guilty of an over-simplification which is everywhere repudiated by Kant. For, according to his doctrine, the mental, that is, the "understanding" as distinguished from "pure" Reason, comes within the sphere of the "empirical". Perhaps the best division of the two spheres is expressed by saying that the Ego as "Subject" belongs to the noumenal sphere, and the Ego as "Object" belongs to the phenomenal sphere, but even here the expositor of Kant is not upon very safe ground. For the "Ego as Subject" appears to have very little positive content if the following extract is to be received as vital to the Kantian doctrine:-

> "If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term." (1)

Kant later says this noumenon is a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretentions of sensibility, and therefore only of a negative employment. Still, he maintains it is no mere invention of the mind, and that it must be considered as being bound up with sensibility. Nothing can be affirmed of it as to its positive character except that it limits sensibility.(2)

All this does not throw very much light upon the nature of the empirical self, but if it is to be assumed that when the "noumenon" self, as indicated above, is isolated and subtracted from the total self, the residue constitutes the "empirical" self; then, the "empirical" self most certainly covers a vast area of consciousness.

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(1) K. r. V. B.307.

(2) K. r. V. B.311.

Therefore, when Kant states that the "empirical" self is governed by natural Causation, he appears to be saying that the whole area of the objective self is determined in every detail by natural Causation which is universal and inflexible; and that only the "unknown" self is capable of creative, original and dynamic Causality. As already stated, Schopenhauer fastened upon this aspect of Kant's teaching to involve Kant in an exposition of sheer "Will-force", and even if such an interpretation of noumenal Causality is rejected as totally inconsistent with the major portion of Kant's doctrine, the problem of this noumenal Causality is far from satisfactory.

It is of interest to observe that Edwards deals with a position similar to Kant's when he is expounding his system of Determinism. He quotes one of his opponents as saying that "Men are beings of active nature who have the springs of action within themselves, and can determine themselves.(1)" Of course, Kant never puts his position in such terms, but when all the terms he uses have been cleared of ambiguity and metaphysical wrappings, this is precisely what Kant is saying:

> "By freedom, on the other hand, in its cosmological meaning, I understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature."(2)

This appears to be nothing more or less than an assertion that man has an active nature, and that he carries the spring of action within himself which can determine himself. Edwards replies to this interpretation of Freedom in the following manner:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.4.

(2) K. r. V. A.533.

First, Edwards reminds his opponent that it is quite impossible to speak of an "active" force anywhere or in anything without granting that such a force constitutes some kind of Causation. The very fact that it is an "active" force is an explicit statement of its inherent Causality. What it causes is not important, and where it functions is not important. The very fact that it is an "active" force indicates its Causality. Now, declares Edwards, it is impossible to postulate an "active" force as Causality without granting that it comes within the orbit of the causal series, and such a series must always involve two essential elements, these are antecendent and consequent. In other words, a cause implies an effect, and is itself a result of some prior ground. Edwards rejects the idea that any cause can begin to exist of itself. He admits that it is quite impossible to trace the root causes of all effects, but he insists that there must be some "cause" why the effect is what it is and not something quite different. Therefore, he charges his opponent with taking refuge in an "uncaused" cause, while his whole system of Causation demands a sure and complete linkage of the causal series. Edwards says that if it is once granted that an "uncaused" cause can exist, then, the whole systematic thought of man is in ruins. Anything can happen, and the mind of man and the universe are in complete confusion, and order, system and unity are completely unthinkable. In an examination of the Third Antinomy, it was observed that Kant treated such an argument with respect, and declared it to be the basis of a conflict in Reason. Yet, he insisted that this view of Causation had, at least, one serious defect. It left the human mind with an endless causal series which went back and forward to infinitude. Edwards has no such misgivings. For him the causal series were inaugurated by God and will be ended by God, and this is an added reason for his Determinism.

> "When we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual mutation and succession." (1)

Therefore, Edwards cannot agree with Kant that the generally accepted view of Causation confronts the human mind with a dilemma, and he sees no reason to postulate a "spontaneity" of cause in man to escape from the dilemma presented in the causal series in nature. Edwards would be prepared to accept the division of Reality and Appearance, of Noumena and Phenomena, but he would include the whole of man as appearance and phenomenon because he is a "dependent" being by the very act of his creation and the nature of his finite constitution.

Later, it will be observed that Edwards carries the conflict into the arena of this supposed "absolute" human Freedom by declaring that God alone has Freedom in this absolute sense, because God alone has real Morality. God himself is Determined, but it is Determination by His own self-legislated Moral Law. It is difficult to see how Kant can answer this type of Moral Determination which is so similar to his own.

Second, Edwards is most anxious to understand this postulated active, freedom-force, in man, and he presses his opponent to say whether such a freedom-force has been termed "active" because of the manifestations of activity, or whether there is some resident "dormant" activity in man regardless of its manifestations. In other words, is there some "reservoir" of this "freedom-force" waiting to be turned on at the needed occasions, or does the occasion of Freedom create its own activity? Edwards is sure that whatever reply is given to

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.7.

such an investigation such a reply will reveal the absurdity of such a postulated active nature in man. For the very idea of "dormant" activity is a contradiction in terms. Activity is active or it is non-existent. Further, a dormant freedom-force would be without moral value. If the occasion for "freedom-willing" creates its own power, such a power, which was once non-existent, cannot begin to exist without a "cause", and this involves his opponent in saying that Freedom and its inherent force are factors within the orbit of the causal series, which is all that Edwards demands of Reason for confirmation of his system of Determinism.

Third, Edwards would argue that the postulation of an active, freedom-force in man has little or nothing to do with the essential Freedom of the Will, for it postulates such a force external to the Will.

Edwards attempts to state his case by saying that the very essence of Freedom consists in "choice", and "choice" is acting according to the preference of the mind. Freedom of Will consists in doing what is "agreeable" to the mind. It does not mean always acting on impulse, or even on what might be termed "inclination". Doing what is agreeable to the mind may be doing one's duty, or it may mean following one's inclinations for pleasure. Much will depend upon the character of the person making the particular choice, but it is this act of Choice which constitutes the Freedom of the Will. Once the choice is made there is an end to Freedom, because the act, good or evil, is now determined by the Choice. Therefore, to speak of an active "freedom-force" in man conveys no meaning to Edwards. For real activity begins and ends in particular operations of the Will through Choice, and there is always a ground, or a cause why the Will chooses one line of conduct rather than another. A permanent freedom-force in man waiting to be turned on by the Will upon particular

occasions is unthinkable according to Edwards. For it postulates an already manufactured store of Freedom which has no real moral value. Even if he were to grant the existence of such a vital Freedom-force resident in man, he cannot exempt or exclude its operation from the law of Causation, because to 'tap' this already existent reservoir of activity the Will would have to be moved by some ground or cause, and this again involves the Will in the causal series. The existence of "Sheer" Will-force in man is no real argument for existence of real "Freedom" in man.

The whole point of the above discussion is to attempt to understand the different interpretations put upon Causation by Kant and the Determinists. Both appear to say that the causal process is universal and inflexible, but Kant restricts such Causation to empirical man and the world of phenomena. He insists upon such a limitation.

> "And consequently, since natural necessity is to be met with only in the sensible world, this active being must in his actions be independent of, and free from all such necessity. No action begins in this active being itself, but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world." (1)

The above extract from Kant indicates that the review of the arguments used by Edwards against the possible existence of a "freedom-force" in man is not beating the air as far as the Kantian Defence of Freedom is concerned. The important part of the above extract is, however, the reference to "natural necessity". Kant says if "natural necessity" were the only Causality to be met with in the world, then Freedom would be impossible.(2) Here, it is important to observe that Edwards fully agrees with Kant. Edwards had been charged with making man a mere automaton, and handing him over to the laws of "natural necessity". Edwards repudiates such a charge and says:-

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(1) K. r. V. A.541.

(2) K.r. V. A.534.

> "It is indeed a plain dictate of common sense, that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or blame .... There is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done, nor are they who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected, on that account."(1)

In other words, if there is nothing else in the world but "natural" Necessity, then Freedom is impossible and moral judgments are impossible. These statements by Kant and Edwards are important not only because of the agreement which they register upon one of the central concepts of their conflicting systems, but because of the manner in which they seek a way of escape from involving man in mere "natural" Necessity. The method of Kant is by an appeal to noumena and phenomena. Every object has an intelligible and a sensuous aspect, and "natural" Necessity has reference only to the phenomenal and the sensuous. The noumenal and the intelligible aspects possess a Causality all their own. It is Freedom Causality, and is different from "natural" Causation in that it is original and is uncaused. All this is completely repugnant to Edwards. While giving due weight to the rational or spiritual aspect of man, he is unable to conceive of an "uncaused" cause. His reason for this is that he believes that "Necessity" governs both God and man. There are two types of "Necessity". One might be termed "Natural", and the other "PHILOSOPHICAL". They are the same in that they both possess the essential features of antecedent and consequent. Yet, they are different in that "natural" Necessity possesses force, compulsion, and is irresistible. "Philosophical" Necessity, however, must never be regarded as force or compulsion. It is simply the logical relation of subject and predicate. Perhaps it is better to allow Edwards to put his case in his own words:-

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.3.

> "Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true."(1)

"Philosophical" Necessity comes into operation in the very laws of thought. For instance, it is utterly impossible for the human mind to deny the existence of being in general, or to postulate universal and absolute "nothing". Further, such Necessity operates in the statements that two and two make four, or that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference are equal. He refers to what he terms a quality of Necessity in doing one's duty, and also to what Kant terms the hypothetical imperative, or what Edwards terms the "consequential" Necessity. He insists that these aspects of "philosophical" Necessity cannot be said to be "irresistible", that is, in the general use of that term. In a sense they do compel assent, but it is a very different meaning from that found in "natural" Necessity. "Philosophical" Necessity operates in a universal and an inflexible manner, but it does not exempt man from moral responsibility, for it does not violate moral standards. This quality of "philosophical" Necessity is the highest concept which is available to human Reason. It is from such a quality of Necessity that the human mind infers. (1) Moral Necessity; (2) Natural Necessity. Moral Necessity might be said to operate "When he is under bonds of duty and conscience, which he cannot be discharged from." (2) Natural Necessity is that discernible and obvious course of events in which the vital feature of Choice is absent.

It is this supreme concept of "philosophical" Necessity inherent in the very texture of mind and thought which makes it quite impossible for Edwards to grant the existence of any

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt. 1. Sect.3.
(2) " " " " " Pt. 1. Sect.4.

quality of Causality which has its roots in what Kant has termed "an original act, such as can by itself bring about what did not exist before".(1)

At this point of the discussion, two questions press forward for consideration. First, did Kant maintain the concept of "philosophical" Necessity? Second, has Kant been able to reconcile such a concept with his views upon noumenal and phenomenal Causality?

First, in reply to the former question there can be little doubt that the whole of the Critical Philosophy is concerned with the exposition and vindication of such a concept, or, in Kantian language -- the possibility of A Priori synthetic propositions. The following extract indicates the depth of Kant's interest in such a concept:-

> "In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of representations is always successive. Now no object is hereby represented, since through this succession, which is common to all apprehensions, nothing is distinguished from anything else. But immediately I perceive or assume that in this succession there is a relation to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in conformity with a rule, I represent something as an event, as something that happens .....
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> "From this there results a twofold consequence. In the first place, I cannot reverse the series, placing that which happens prior to that upon which it follows. And, secondly, if the state which precedes is posited, this determinate event follows inevitably and necessarily." (2)

In the above quotation there is a kind of "philosophical" Necessity with which Edwards would agree, but it would be hasty and inaccurate to assume that Kant and Edwards are saying exactly the same thing. Kant would insist, and Edwards would probably agree that such a concept is an A Priori concept and cannot be evolved out of, or deduced from the merely empirical. Edwards and Kant would both agree that such a concept constituted the very form and material of all thinking, but, here, their agreement would end, and this brings

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(1) K. r. V. A.544.

(2) K. r. V. A.198.

the discussion to the second question.

Second, has Kant been able to reconcile such a concept with his view upon phenomenal Causality? On the surface, it would appear that Kant held a doctrine of "philosophical" Necessity and then went on to repudiate it by his views upon noumenal Causality. Yet, such a criticism would be less than just to the position taken up by Kant. For he is careful to explain the grounds for belief in such a concept which might be termed "philosophical" Necessity, and his consistency upon this subject is commendable.

The following extract indicates Kant's particular interpretation of the concept under discussion:-

> "It therefore follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible experience, the law that everything which happens is determined a priori through its cause in the (field of) appearance. We thus know the necessity only of those effects in nature the causes of which are given to us, and the character of necessity in existence extends no further than the field of possible experience, and even in this field is not applicable to the existence of things as substances, since substances can never be viewed as empirical effects... ..... Necessity concerns only the relations of appearances in conformity with the dynamical law of causality and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from a given existence (a cause) to another existence, (the effect).(1)

Therefore, Kant's reply to Edwards concerning the concept of "philosophical" Necessity might be paraphrased as follows:- "I agree with the argument that the concept of philosophical Necessity stands rooted in the very texture of human thought. Further, I agree it is not a product of mere empiricism. For, by its very nature and operation, it is A Priori. However, its value and use as a metaphysical concept must be clearly defined. From such a concept it is quite impossible to infer that there is a necessary existence of God or the universe, and it is equally impossible to say concerning God and rational beings that they are involved in such a Necessity.

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(1) K. r. V. B. 280.

This is due to the fact that, although the formal element in the concept is truly A Priori, the material element is empirical. In other words, we would never be able to confirm such a concept if it were not for the Necessity which is observed in the empirical or the phenomenal.(1) Yet, this observable Necessity cannot provide adequate ground for inferring that the whole of the universe of being is governed by the same quality of Necessity. For instance, we know nothing of what things are in themselves. We cannot, therefore, apply the law of Necessity to things in themselves. Necessity, as far as we know, is the law which governs phenomena, because it is in phenomena that we first become aware of its existence and operation. It is true that the concept of Necessity gives unity and system to the universe we know, and that it is a fundamental concept in the possibility of all human thought and experience; but any extension of this concept to the reality behind all phenomena is futile and quite unjustifiable."

Is this reply made by Kant a reply which can be accepted as valid against the argument of Edwards for the "universality" of "philosophical" Necessity? It is feared that it is quite impossible to give Kant the better of the argument upon this important aspect of the discussion of Liberty and Necessity. There are two principal reasons for such a decision. These have already been hinted at, but, for the purposes of clarity, they will be repeated.

First, Kant has given considerable prestige to his argument for Freedom by denying to Empiricism the lawful possession of such a term as "universal and inflexible causation". He has claimed that such a term cannot arise from a purely empirical point of view. It is "A Priori" in origin and implication. His insistence upon this point is found in all

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(1) Gd. 90.

aspects of his system, and another instance of his teaching upon this subject will not be out of place:-

> "Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of a validity holding in most cases to one which holds in all ..... When, on the other hand, strict universality is essential to a judgment, this indicates a special source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of a priori knowledge. Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and inseparable from one another."(1)

This is a type of "philosophical" Necessity which has been used by Edwards to deny the possibility of an "Uncaused" cause in nature and in man. The question is whether Kant is justified in giving so much importance to the term "universality", and then deliberately emptying it of real meaning by saying that it has application only to "the field of appearances"? It is impossible to enter into all the aspects of this fundamental problem of Kantian interpretation, and, at the risk of some amount of dogmatism, it must be stated that Kant has not given a durable reply to Determinism upon this particular aspect of its system. It does not seem enough to say that the concept of "Necessity" cannot arise from the Empirical, and then say that this same concept must apply only to the Empirical. It does not seem enough to say that Necessity, such as is stated in the above extract, is applicable only to the field of experience, because it seems to demand that it shall govern every "possible" experience of every rational being.

Second, Kant makes it abundantly clear in all his exposition of Freedom that it is impossible to conceive of a "lawless" Freedom. The negative aspect of such Freedom is that it is independent of empirical conditions, but the positive aspect is that it fulfils the demands of the Moral Law. Such a law may be"transcendental", or it may be conceived as the product

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(1) K. r. V. B.4.

of the practical Reason, and be self-imposed. However, the important point is that it is Law, and the question is whether it is possible to conceive of any kind of law without conceiving of Necessity as involved in the very concept of Law? It is not enough to say that the noumenal is clouded in complete mystery, and that the human mind is limited to the realm of the phenomenal. Kant says these things, but he also gives expression to an opposite point of view. It is no answer to the above question to say that the concept of Necessity belong only to the phenomenal, for Kant has already stated that the phenomenal by itself can give no valid ground for the concept of Necessity.

Nicolas Berdyaev has seen this problem involved in Freedom and Law, and is obviously dissatisfied with the manner in which Kant has left the problem. Berdyaev takes a plunge which is the logical opposite of a "Lawful" Freedom by saying:-

> "Freedom is rooted in nothing, in baselessness, in non-being ..... Freedom is without foundation; it is not determined by being nor born of it." (1)

This is in flat opposition to all that Kant taught upon Freedom, but it has the merit of being logical in that it sees that a Freedom which works according to laws, even laws of its own making, cannot escape the net of some measure of Necessity. Kant insists upon a "Lawful" Freedom. He attempts to say that such Freedom operates upon a different level from that of mere "natural" Necessity. Further, that it has a spontaneous power of Causality. All this can be granted, but, as long as Kant insists upon Freedom being subject to law, he cannot deny that, even in Freedom, there must be somekind of Necessity such as has been indicated by Edwards. To confound this with mere physical or natural Necessity is to beg the whole of the arguments advanced by Edwards.

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(1) Slavery and Freedom. Page 76.

Is this the full and final verdict upon Kant's Defence of Freedom as that Defence stands related to Causation? Has Kant failed completely in his attempt to give an adequate reply to Determinism? That is, as that reply stands related to Causation, and as that reply is directed against the "Theological" Determinism such as that expounded by Edwards? From the facts which are available in the preceeding discussion, this would appear to be the case. To make clear beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt that this is the case, a brief summary of the argument will not be out of place. (A) Kant's first argument for Freedom in this particular section[1] is that the very nature of the causal process demands that every effect must have a cause, and that this cause must in itself be an effect of some other cause. Now, says Kant, this involves the Reason in a hopeless task of going back through an endless chain of causes and effects, and never coming to the end of the chain. Therefore, Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can act of itself without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of Causality. This argument appears to Kant to be unanswerable, not so much as a positive factor in Freedom, but as a refutation of the argument by the Determinists that natural Causation can explain everything. This argument is of real value, but against Edwards' position it is useless. For Edwards would heartily agree with Kant in exploding "natural" Determinism, because such a destruction would make more clear the worth of his "theological" Determinism. There is no endless chain of Causation for Edwards. The causal series begin and will end in God; and therefore, Kant's postulation of a "spontaneity which begins to act of itself" is only another term for God.

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(1) See K. r. V. A.532 to A.559.

Kant is perfectly aware of the strength of this "theological" position, and takes a great deal of care, in a later section, to provide an answer. It is impossible to deal with this reply at this stage, but it is enough to say that hardly any theologian of the present day would grant the validity of the reply offered by Kant.

Therefore, on this first argument, Kant is far from convincing.

(B) The second argument used by Kant is his well-worn division of existence into noumenal and phenomenal. Freedom, in this sense is a pure "transcendental" idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in any experience. Enough has been said already to indicate that this division of existence into noumenal and phenomenal is an essential part of the teaching of Kant, but its value as an argument for Freedom rests upon the assumption that existence can be divided in this manner. Hardly any serious and sympathetic student of Kant would accept such a division as left by Kant. Dr. Caird thinks it is a tolerable theory when carefully amended by subsequent thought.(1) Dr. Kuno Fischer thinks that it involves thought in a hopeless contradiction.(2) Perhaps Dr. Paulsen might be quoted as putting the right emphasis upon such an argument:-

> "So far as I see, the doctrine of transcendental freedom has been no gain in any way. As Kant holds it, the concept of the homo noumenon as a cause of phenomenon, and thus too of the same phenomena that are caused by natural conditions, is neither thinkable nor even consistent with his own fundamental notions." (3)

Be this as it may, the whole argument of noumenal and phenomenal would be accepted by Edwards as a feasible explanation of the division of existence into Spirit and Matter, and which he would accept in its broad outline as a refutation of

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(1) The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page 154.
(2) A Critique of Kant. Page 132.
(3) Kant, His Life and Doctrine. Page 260.

"natural" Determinism expounded by Collins, Kames and Hume. However, as already indicated, Edwards would view Kant's "unknowableness" of the noumenal as a clear indication that his argument had very rigid limitations, and as inconsistent with Kant's view that man was a "causa noumenon". Because, according to Kant's own statement, "causality" can be conceived only in that sphere which is capable of "explanation." The fallacy of attempting to explain the known by the unknown was too well-known to Edwards to allow Kant too much credit for its use. Further, the postulation of Causality, whether in the noumenal or phenomenal, can be done only upon the assumption that such Causality involves cause and effect. An uncaused cause might be postulated in speaking about God, but having once postulated it, it cannot be postulated a second time in man; for then it loses its purpose in being postulated of God. Kant seems to want the argument both ways.(1)

(C) Kant's third argument for Freedom in the section under discussion is based upon the two preceeding arguments, and is expressed in these terms:-

> "There is in man a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses".(2)

This is what Kant terms Freedom in the "practical" sense, but he provokes a great deal of uncertainty in his reader by asserting that "practical" Freedom is based on the "transcendental" idea. This problem has already received attention. The main point is that Kant claims for man a power of self-determination regardless of sensuous impulses. This is an impressive claim, and one which is flatly opposed to the Determinism of Edwards. Can it be said that Kant has substantiated such a claim? The former arguments upon which it rested have been duly weighed and found wanting. Is there

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(1) K. p. V. 266. K. r. V. A.826. A.829.
(2) K. r. V. A.534.

anything in the above argument which can be allowed in its own right?

The trouble really starts when Kant begins to explain the above argument, and this explanation occupies the greater part of "The Critique of the Practical Reason". Therefore, only a very limited and perhaps dogmatic statement can be made here, but the following might be enough to indicate its inherent weakness.

What does Kant mean by this "power" in man for self-determination? The obvious answer is the "Will". However, what does Kant mean by the term"Will"? His works abound in terms such as the "Good" Will, the "Rational" Will, the "Pure" Will, the"Free" Will, and the "Elective" Will. The difficulty of understanding Kant's conception of the volitional process is not helped by the fact that he always gives the impression that "Will" is the very core of personality. Therefore, the reader obtains the impression that the self is distributed over a wide range of personal entities. For it is obvious that, although the "Rational" Will might be identified with the "Pure" Will, the "Good" Will is something different from these, and it is not easy to conclude that the "Good" Will and the "Elective" Will are always one and the same. Still, when all these difficulties have been solved, the reader has to make room for the "Bad" Will among his entities.

However, in the section under discussion, Kant is speaking of the "Elective" Will (Willkuhr), and this is very helpful to the understanding of his point of view. For in a later analysis of this same term, Kant puts forth the following explanation:- (1) The"Elective" Will seems to be another term for the "Appetitive" faculty, and this faculty is doing or forbearing as we please. (2) The "Elective" Will can be determined by Pure Reason, then, it is termed "Free" Elective Will; (3) The "Elective Will can be affected by impulse, but not determined by them; (4) Freedom of the "Elective" Will is

its independence of determination by impulse (negative), and (positive) its determination by Pure Reason.(1) That is, the "Moral" law of Pure Reason. All this might be highly complicated, but it is essential to the understanding of Kant's point of view. The criticism of Edwards would be in the following terms:- (1) Kant is unable to make up his mind upon the real centre of personality — "Will". He has complicated the discussion of Freedom by breaking up the Will into various entities, and this is due to his contempt of psychological investigation: (2) The "Elective" Will is affected by sensuous impulses, therefore, if language is to have any meaning at all, the "Elective" Will can be "influenced" by sensuous impulses. To say that it can be determined only by Pure Reason is to beg the whole question of the Freedom of the Will. This is but a new version of the old error that the determination of the Will comes from the last dictate of the understanding. From a psychological point of view, this is impossible, because the actions of man are real actions, and they are not always good and rational; (3) If the "Elective" Will is only "Free" when it is determined by Pure Reason, then, there is no real ground for Kant speaking about a "Bad" Will, because Praise and Blame must rest upon a real "Choice" between Good and Evil; and the "Elective" Will, in spite of its name, appears to have no such choice; (4) Besides all this, whichever way Kant moves he cannot evade or ignore the problem created by the "Indifference" of the Will, and by the postulation of an "Elective" Will between Reason and Action, he has opened himself to a hopeless dilemma in this direction. Much more could be said in criticism of Kant's point of view, but such criticism must await a later discussion. Enough has been said to indicate that Kant's position is far from strong. Yet, there is another argument, in the section under considera-

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(1) M. d. S. 12.

tion, which must receive attention, and it is unfortunate that Kant did not make this argument primary and fundamental to his position. It is the "Moral" argument for Freedom. Later, it will be necessary to discuss Kant's extensive arguments for Moral Freedom. Here, it must be said, in a rather dogmatic manner, that only the Moral argument for Freedom saves Kant's Defence of Freedom from complete collapse. It is put in these words:-

> "But although we believe that the action is thus determined, we none the less blame the agent ..... Our blame is based on the law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all the above-mentioned empirical conditions could have determined, and ought to have determined, the agent to act otherwise." (1)

Here is the very citadel of real Freedom and real Morality. This is the fortress against which all the assaults of Determinism beat in vain. Edwards will use the weapons of original Sin, necessitated Holiness, Divine Decree, and preponderating tendency, but they cannot really cancel out this vital assertion. Kant is not always loyal to this great fact. At times, he is convinced that he can build "moral" Freedom upon the foundation of "transcendental" Freedom -- "without this (transcendental) freedom -- which alone is practical a priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible."(2) Yet, his real emphasis is directed to the moral foundations of Freedom, and it is here that he is giving the only reply possible to "natural" or "theological" Determinism. It is when Kant makes this moral fact the bed-rock of his teaching that he can turn to the task of buttressing his work by a discussion on Causality, or postulating the noumenal and the phenomenal, or making distinctions within the volitional process. All these are justified as postulations, and as attempts to account for the primary fact of moral judgment. When Kant

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(1) K. r. V. A.555.

(2) K. p. V. 228.

is at his best, this is what he says;(1) and it is because he says this that his Defence of Freedom has continuing value. This approach to Kant's handling of Volition, Freedom and Causation is confessedly far from adequate, but it does indicate some of the major problems which are inherent in any serious discussion of Liberty and Necessity. Further, it appears to justify the statement that Kant understood the depth of the challenge offered by Determinism to any exposition of Freedom. Again, the preceeding exposition of the Kantian Defence of Freedom is but a very limited account of what Kant has to say upon such a matter; and care must be taken to observe what Kant has in mind in, what might be termed, this "speculative" aspect of his Defence of Freedom. There are, at least, two hasty verdicts which must be avoided in summing up what Kant as so far accomplished. First, it would be unwise to dismiss this metaphysical aspect of Freedom as quite unnecessary to any Defence of Freedom, more so, to Kant's own Defence. Second, it would be unwise to assume that Kant has suffered a major defeat in his Defence of Freedom because of his inability to rid his conceptions of Will, Freedom and Causation from ambiguity and uncertainty. Kant has a very clear and limited objective in view as he argues for this "metaphysical" context of Freedom. He says:-

> "The reader should be careful to observe that in what has been said our intention has not been to establish the reality of freedom as one of the faculties which contain the cause of the appearances of our sensible world..... It has not even been our intention to prove the possibility of freedom, ... What we have alone been able to show, and what we have been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature." (2)

In a very real sense it can be said that the whole of "The Critique of Pure Reason" is an attempt to show that Freedom is not incompatible with nature; and only a bold and bigoted

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(1) Gd. 12. 16. 27. 34.
K. p. V. 140. 152. 164. 201. 215. 226.

(2) K. r. V. A.558.

Determinist could say that Kant had failed in such a task. In other words, if Kant's success, so far, is strictly limited, it is because deliberately he sets himself a limited objective. Yet, if he has succeeded in this very limited task, he has succeeded in what he most desired to do:-- "the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare Freedom impossible."(1)

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(1) Cd. 95.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER FIVE

"Freedom and the Indifference of the Will"

"It is a radical mistake to regard a person's mere fulfilment of value as morality. From this mistake spring a host of fundamental errors. The greatest conformity to values would be precisely where there was the least freedom, namely where there was complete determination by the principle. And precisely in that case there would be least morality. Only on the part of a free being, a being who, when confronted by the value could do otherwise, is conformity to value morality. .....

"The will is not as it ought to be, at least never completely so. Were all volition determined by the Ought, man would be perfect, and the actualization of the moral claim would be behind him instead of in front of him. Precisely because this is not so, this actuality, the positive existence of the Ought, is a problem for him."

(Hartmann. Ethics. Vol.3. Pages, 106 and 184.)

"This suspending of volition, if there be properly any such thing, is itself an act of volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination is an act of the will; and indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis; for it is supposed that the liberty of the will consists in its power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the will exercises its liberty. But how can the will exercise liberty in it, if it be not an act of the will? The liberty of the will is not exercised in anything but what the will does."

(Jonathan Edwards. The Freedom of the Will. Part 2. Sect.7.)

The "Indifference" of the Will is one of the most crucial problems in any discussion of Liberty and Necessity. The exponents of Determinism have no hesitation in declaring that all the arguments for the Freedom of the Will, which stand opposed to their system, are arguments which are based upon the "Indifference"of the Will. In other words, they contend that the logical opposite of a "necessary" act of the Will is the "indifferent" act of the Will. That is, if the Will is not "determined" to action by some causes, then, its action is "indifferent", and instead of expressing Freedom of the agent, it stands rooted in "un-freedom", which is motiveless, purposeless Indifference. Perhaps this term "Indifference" of the Will is not the most fortunate term which could be chosen to express the contention of the Determinists. What they have in mind is some kind of "neutrality" which is supposed to exist in the self, and in the Will prior to some decisive act of the Will. For them, the Will is moved to action in a necessary manner, that is, it follows the prevailing preference of the mind. They cannot conceive of "freedom" between the preference of the mind and the act of Volition. Further, they argue that all opposing theories of the Freedom of the Will demand such a pause in which the Will can come to its own decision concerning the act which is to be performed. The Determinists insist that all explanations of the self-determination of the Will are basically rooted in this idea of the "indifference" or "neutrality" of the Will as it stands over against the motive of the person, and the attractiveness or otherwise of the act to be performed. As already stated, Locke was deeply interested in this type of Freedom of the Will, and he argued that it was the highest

quality of Freedom to suspend decision until all the factors involved in such a decision had been weighed and checked by the "Mind". At a first glance, this explanation of Freedom by Locke appears reasonable, but a Determinist, such as Edwards, finds it fallacious and totally opposed to his system of Determinism, and his arguments against such "deliberated" self-determination of the Will are impressive.

In order to give Edwards an opportunity of stating his case, it might be helpful to quote an extract from one of his opponents which he takes time to examine in his work "The Freedom of the Will". The opponent is an advocate of the Freedom of the Will, and has put down in careful terms what he means by such a statement. Here are his words:-

> "That there are many instances wherein the will is determined neither by present uneasiness nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by anything else, but merely by itself, as a sovereign self-determining power of the soul; and that the soul does not will this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it will." (1)

Now, this is a statement which is a very bald expression of what is termed "self-determination" of the Will, and, in its present form, might not commend itself to many advocates of the Freedom of the Will. Yet, fundamentally, it expresses an argument for volitional Freedom which is widespread, and, with some minor modifications, might be said to include Kant's view of Freedom. Here, however, it is necessary to say that Kant avoids many of the crude assertions of the above statement which appear to advocate "motiveless" Volition, and a separation of willing from the intellect. Still, there are many passages in Kant which can be taken as teaching this "self-determination" of the Will which is quite oblivious to external influences. The "Autonomy" of the Will is one of the basic explanations in Kant for the Freedom

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.6.

of the Will, and the following passage is typical of much that Kant has to say upon this subject:-

> "Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently on any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law.....
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> "If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy."(1)

Now, it is perfectly obvious that such extracts as the above do not teach "mere" self-determination. They do more, they indicate "moral" self-determination, and Kant makes this abundantly clear in all his Ethical works. "Thus the will is not subject simply to law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject to the law." (2)

There are times when Kant is still more emphatic upon this ability of the Will to determine itself regardless of all influences external to it.

> "But the same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in general every modification of his existence, varying according to his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon." (3)

Edwards would select as the operative term of the above passage the statement that "nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will", and would charge Kant with making the Will of man "indifferent" in this supreme act of Volition. Further, it is difficult to see how Kant could escape this charge of

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(1) Gd. 71.
(2) Gd. 60.
(3) K. p. V. 228.

"Indifference" when he everywhere insists that the Will as "noumenon" is actually un-caused, that is, in the generally accepted meaning of Causality. Edwards would not be impressed by the argument of Kant "that we might define practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the moral law;"(1) because Kant has already insisted that man gives himself this moral law, and it is essential to Freedom that he should be the "author" of this moral law. Later, it will be seen that this aspect of Freedom in Kant presents very great difficulties for the question of man's relation to God. Here and now, the discussion must restrict itself to this question of the "indifference" of the Will as found in its power of sovereign self-determination.

It is important to note that Kant expressly repudiates the "indifference" of the Will:-

> "Freedom of elective will, however, cannot be defined as the power of choosing to act for or against the law (libertas indifferentiae) as some have attempted to define it, although the elective will as a phenomenon gives many examples of this in experience." (2)

Dr. E. Caird and Dr. A.C. Ewing take this passage as clearly teaching Kant's attitude upon this question of the "indifference" of the Will.(3)

The above evidence from Kant and his qualified interpreters ought to be sufficient to settle this question of the "Indifference" of the Will and the teaching of Kant. However, the matter is not quite as simple as that. It must be observed that, in the above passage, Kant is speaking of the "Elective" Will; he makes it quite clear that he draws a clear distinction between what he terms the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will. Further, it is unfortunate for the interpreters of Kant that he did not make this distinction much clearer earlier in his discussion of the Freedom of the Will (4)

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(1) K. p. V. 223.
(2) M. d. S. Intro. 28.
(3) The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page 254.
Kant's Treatment of Causality. Page 202.
(4) M. d. S. Intro. 12. Footnote.

In the context of the above passage, Kant says that "Laws proceed from the"Rational" Will; maxims from the "Elective" Will": and according to the teaching of Kant, morality consists in making maxims into laws, that is, bringing the "Elective" Will into harmony with the "Rational" Will. At this point the discussion must be careful to avoid being lost in the labyrinth of Kant's rather numerous descriptions of willing, and attempt to keep to a restricted path to the heart of the problem. It is perfectly obvious that Kant means the "Rational" Will to have that complete power of determination which Edwards thinks falls within the category of what has been termed the "indifference" of the Will. Edwards will have something to say about this supposed "Elective" Will, but first the problem of the "Rational" as expressed in the teaching of Kant must be examined in the light of the teaching of Edwards on Determinism.

This sovereign power of the Will to determine itself is denied by Edwards, in the first instance, when he says:-

> "If the will determines the will, then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct, of other acts of choice. And therefore, if the will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will or choice be also a free act, then, by these principles, in this act too, the will is self-determined, that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses, or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the will choosing that. ..... Which brings us directly to a contradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest, or a free act of the will, before the first free act of the will."(1)

Edwards prefaced this difficult passage by making it clear that only the man, the agent, can make any real choice, and therefore when people say they believe in self-determination of the Will, they really mean self-determination of the self or "soul". Further, he can see no real meaning in any willing

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.1.

if it does not involve "choice"; so that, when it is said that the Will "wills" something, it really means that the person "chooses" something. Now, Edwards can see no meaning in this act of "choice" unless it be granted that, behind the Choice, there is a cause which makes the Choice what it is and not something else. Therefore, if Choice implies the existence of an antecedent cause prior to the determination of the self, or Will, then the act of the Will, in choosing, cannot be free or cut off from its antecedents. Therefore, in a very real sense, self-determination is a contradiction in terms if it means an independent, completely isolated act of the Will, and is supposed to be "self-caused". As already stated, Kant saw the implications of this type of argument in his discussion of "The Third Antinomy", but he insisted upon making the "rational" Will as the"Causality of the acting being as belonging to the supersensible world, and may consequently be conceived as free."(1) There is very little more that can be said concerning this position of Kant, except that it would be considered a fatal weakness by Edwards in the Defence of Freedom, and even Kant's most sympathetic interpreters can say very little in its support.(2) The supreme difficulty of Kant's idea of willing, however, does not lie in the existence and operation of the "Rational" Will. It is true that Edwards would decline to accept Kant's argument that the Rational Will possessed the sovereign power of "spontaneity" of action; that is, that it was capable of originating an act of Will out of itself without any possibility of prior causes or antecedent influences. For Edwards, the human Will, in all its relations, is a dependent Will, and only God's Will comes within the category described by Kant. From all the theological and psychological evidence available, Edwards would declare that Kant's "Rational" Will is but a figment of the imagination.

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(1) K. p. V. 237.
(2) Dr. H.J. Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Pages 234. 274

Yet, in this present section which deals with the "Indifference" of the Will, the problem of the "Rational" Will is not the supreme issue. The real battle-ground lies in the postulation of the "Elective" Will, and it is important to grasp what Kant really meant by this term. As already noted, Kant introduced this distinction rather late into his discussion of the Freedom of the Will, and there can be no doubt about the fact that interpretation of the teaching of Kant would have been easier if he had revised his earlier expressions on willing in the light of this distinction. For instance, when Kant says that the task of Reason is to produce a "Good" Will, does he mean that Reason in this passage is to be taken as the "Rational" Will, and that the "Good" Will is to mean the "Elective" Will?

> "For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination."(1)

Further, what does he mean by such a passage as follows?--

> "For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it."(2)

When Kant uses the term "Will" in such a passage, does he mean the "Elective" Will, and does the "Elective" Will stand as it were at the "parting of the ways"? If this is what he means, then, the"Elective"Will is, in this instance, falling within the category of what Edwards terms the "Indifference" of the Will. Further, Kant gives grounds for assuming that the real struggle for Morality takes place in the "Elective" Will when he goes on to say that man "feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations"(3); and,

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(1) Gd. 15.
(2) Gd. 20.
(3) Gd. 26.

then, on the other hand, "the conception of the moral law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone ..... an influence so much more powerful than all other springs."(1) Here, it would appear that the "Rational" Will is to be identified with "reason and the moral law" on the one side, and wants and inclinations on the other, with the "Elective" Will standing at the cross-roads between the two contending forces; and that the "Elective" Will only becomes the "Good" Will as it conforms to the Moral Law given by the "Rational" Will.

Again, Kant does not make the task of interpretation easier by making it quite clear in this instance that the "Elective" Will alone is free.

> "Laws proceed from the Rational will; maxims from the elective will. The latter is in man a free elective will. The Rational Will, which is directed to nothing but the law only, cannot be called either free or unfree, because it is not directed to actions, but immediately to the legislation for the maxims of actions.... Consequently it is absolutely necessary, and is even incapable of constraint. It is therefore only the elective will that can be called free." (2)

Earlier, Kant had given a somewhat different meaning to Freedom when he writes:-

> "Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent on foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be the will of its own except under the idea of freedom."(3)

In this latter passage, Kant appears to be speaking of the "Rational" Will, or, as he terms it "practical" Reason which is the author of its principles, and he gives the impression that this "Rational" Will cannot be conceived as having real value unless it be conceived of as "free". Whereas, in the former passage, he says that the question of Freedom does

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(1) Gd. 34.
(2) M. d. S. Intro. 28.
(3) Gd. 81.

not concern this "Rational" Will. Further, the whole doctrine of "transcendental" Freedom, which has already been discussed, seems to prove that Kant conceived of real Freedom existing in the "Rational" Will. However, there is an important passage to which reference has already been made which might assist in the solution of this difficulty. Kant is again discussing the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will and it makes the following statement:-

> "The Elective will, which can be determined by pure reason is called free elective will. That which is determinable only by inclination would be animal elective will..... Human elective will, on the contrary, is one which is affected but not determined by impulses. It is accordingly in itself (apart from acquired practice of reason) not pure, but it can be determined to actions by the pure will. Freedom of the elective will is just that independence of its determination on sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of it. The positive is: the power of pure reason to be of itself practical."(1)

This passage does throw some light upon the complicated question under discussion, but, indirectly, it raises a very important issue, and that is, where does Kant really place "Autonomy" of the Will? Is it in the "Rational" Will or is it in the "Elective" Will? Or is it jointly in the "Rational" and "Elective" Will; that is, by the "Elective" Will coming into complete harmony with the Rational" Will? If these questions can be answered in a satisfactory manner, there is hope of a solution of the subject under discussion. For, it appears from the teaching of Kant, "Autonomy" is but another term for "Personality".

> "The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will." (2)

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(1) M. d. S. Intro. 12.
(2) K. p. V. 145.

Now, how is Kant using the term "Will" in the first instance? Is he speaking here of the "Elective" or the "Rational" Will as the sole principle of all moral laws? He seems to be making clear reference to the "Elective" Will, but later in this same section, he appears to weaken this interpretation by saying:- "In that case the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological law ..... but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical reason". The general teaching of Kant is that the "Rational" Will, and that alone is capable of giving itself the law, but in this passage, (if he is speaking of the "Elective" Will), the very "Elective" Will seems capable of giving itself the law. Further, he has just said that the "Elective" Will could be only "affected" by impulses, and not "determined" by them; but here he appears to grant that the "Elective" Will can be subjected to Heteronomy and follow in some "rational" way the Pathological Law, which, of course, is nothing more or less than the "Elective" Will being, in this instance at least, determined by impulses. However, the primary question is, where does Kant place the centre of Autonomy? Is it in the"Rational" or the "Elective" Will? The above passage does not give any clear guidance for the reasons already given. Therefore, the discussion must seek help from other aspects of Kant's teaching.
In one of Kant's later works, "Religion within the limits of mere Reason", it is quite clear that he maintains this distinction between the"Rational" and the "Elective" Will. He is speaking of the origin of Evil in human actions. He states that the source of "badness" cannot be placed in the Sensibility and the natural Inclinations springing therefrom for two reasons. First, because these very Inclinations can be the ground of Good or Evil. Second, because Humanity is not to be held responsible for the existance of these Inclintions. They are a real part of its "natural" endowment, and,

in their true meaning, cannot be said to be Good or Evil, but only the ground of Good or Evil. Kant then turns to another source which might be said to be the origin of the "Bad" principle in man -- that is, the very opposite of the sensible qualities in man, the Rational Nature of man. Can Evil be traced to its origin here? Kant is quite emphatic that this cannot be the source of the Bad principle.

> "The source of this evil cannot be placed in a corruption of Reason which gives the moral law, and if Reason could abolish the authority of the law in itself and disown its obligation; for this is absolutely impossible."(1)

Kant, then goes on to make his position even more clear by stating that the "Rational" Will (Wille) cannot be the source of corruption, because being already the source of the moral law, it is the only "spring" of action for the "Elective" Will towards the Good. If the "Rational" Will was Bad, then man would not be a Sinner, he would be a Devil. Kant, now goes on to make his position concerning the "Rational" Will and the "Elective" Will more obvious, and his teaching might be summed up under the following points:-

(1) He has no doubts about what he terms "the existence of this propensity to evil in human nature". There is a real antagonism between the human Will and the moral law. Yet, the knowledge of this antagonism cannot give a real clue to its origin. As far as Kant can see, this antagonism centres in the "free elective Will". He has already made it quite impossible that it should centre in the "Rational" Will, therefore, he is left no alternative but that it concerns the "Elective" Will.

(2) Man, even the worst, does not abandon the moral law. In fact, the moral law "forces itself upon him irresistibly", and, if no other spring opposed this moral law, man would be morally Good. That is, he would make the maxim of his

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(1) Religion. 39.

"Elective" Will similar to the law of his "Rational" Will.

(3) Kant has already denied that the origin of Evil can lie in man's merely "physical" nature. It is true that this sensibility can be the ground of "Springs" which can be used for Evil, but then, on the other hand, this sensibility can be used for Good.

(4) Therefore, there are two sources or "springs" of action in man. One comes from his "Rational" Will, the other from his sensible Nature, and Evil consists in allowing the sensible springs to gain the upper hand over the "Rational"; that is, Evil is the subordination of the "Rational" by the "Sensible".

> "Consequently a man (even the best) is bad only by this, that he reverses the moral order of the springs in adopting them into his maxims."(1)

(5) Kant clinches this argument about the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will in a very conclusive manner, by saying:-

> "Now if there is in human nature a propensity to this, then there is in man a natural propensity to evil; and since this propensity itself must ultimately be sought in a free elective will, and therefore can be imputed, it is morally bad." (2)

Here, then, is a very important instance of Kant's teaching upon this complicated question of the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will, and it throws light on his previous references to this subject. Such teaching might be summed up as saying that the "Rational" Will is the source of the Moral Law, and is unalterably determined by the Moral Law. In other words, Kant seems to allow no "corruption", and no possibility of "conflict" with the "Rational" Will in relation to the Moral Law. On the other hand, the "Elective" Will is not at one with the Moral Law, yet, at the same time, it does not belong to mere Sensibility. It too, like the "Rational" Will must belong to the supersensible, but with this important

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(1) Religion. 40.
(2) Religion. 41. See also 24.

difference, the "Elective" Will can be affected by the sensible, and, if the above teaching is to have any meaning, can take up into itself maxims which are contrary to the Moral Law, and thus become the centre and source of that which is Evil, the morally Bad.

It is quite possible that the above attempt to discover what Kant really means by the "Rational" and "Elective" Will can be interpreted as merely academic and only remotely related to the principal purpose of this section upon the Kantian Defence of Freedom, that is, the "Indifference" of the Will. However, it is submitted that the above discussion is of vital importance to Kant's Defence of Freedom, and this for the following reasons:

(1) Edwards is convinced that Determinism offers the only possible explanation of the volitional process in man. Further, its conception of Liberty in human choice consists in allowing man to do what he "pleases", and, in fairness to Edwards, this does not mean always doing that which is in accord with his "sensuous" nature. Doing as he pleases might make a criminal of one man, but it might make a saint of another. It all depends upon what is the preponderating preference in the mind of that particular man, that is, his view of the apparent Good. His use of the term the "apparent Good" is quite deliberate, because Edwards is convinced that man is a "fallen" creature, and it is utterly impossible for him to have a view of the "real" Good until he has passed through a spiritual experience known as "Conversion". This can be brought about only by the action of the Spirit of God in keeping with God's Election. Therefore, empirical or fallen man has the liberty of doing as he "pleases", not as God pleases, and this is the only Liberty of which he is capable. What he pleases is already conditioned by what he is, and, because he does what he pleases, he is capable of responsibility for his deeds.

(2) Edwards is also fully convinced that any other quality of Freedom attributed to man assumes that man can be differen from his own character. That is, such Freedom postulates in man a quality of Will which is unrelated to his character, that is, "indifferent" to his character. Therefore, he states that all opposing theories of Freedom are ultimately based upon the "Indifference" of the Will. Now, it has been observed that Kant was quite aware of this charge by Determinism, and that he emphatically denied that his view of Freedom was compatible with the "Indifference" of the Will.
(3) Further, it has been observed that Kant made a careful distinction between the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will in man. Again, there are times when Kant seems to put Freedom in the "Rational" Will of man. That is, Freedom means the fulfilment of the Moral Law, which is also a creation of the "Rational" Will. Kant appears, in certain places, to deny that the Free "Elective" Will can be determined by that which is in opposition to the Moral Law. He admits that it can be affected, but not determined. This seems to be his general teaching in most of his Ethical works, and it has been assume that this is his basic teaching upon the Will. This assumption has had certain results. For instance, Dr. E. Caird is quite convinced that Kant taught a Freedom which was only a "one way" Freedom. That is, Freedom in doing the Good, but not a Freedom in doing the Evil.(1) A still more important results has been that Hartmann has charged Kant with omitting the whole of this problem from his view of human Freedom.(2)
(4) Now, it is submitted that Kant's doctrine of Radical Evi is a vital part of his Ethical system, and its teaching must stand related to the rest of his work. If this is correct, then, it is obvious that Kant's doctrine upon Radical Evil

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(1) The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page 259.
(2) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 67.

must be viewed as a logical development of his Ethical doctrine, and must influence the general aspects of his conclusions concerning Freedom. If the above evidence is considered reasonably valid, Kant must be held as teaching that the real Freedom of the Will centred in the attitude and action of the "Elective" Will. When this term "real Freedom" is used, it simply means "actual" Freedom. Of course, it is perfectly true to say that Kant was right when he said that Freedom consisted in the Will being independent of any foreign causes. However, this is the "ideal" Freedom, and might be compared to the "Christian" Freedom -- "If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, you shall be free indeed".(1) Kant might have said with equal sincerity, "If the Rational Will shall make you free, you shall be free indeed," but the important point is how can the "Rational" Will make a man free? There are times when Kant is inclined to view the "Rational" Will as pressing forward to fulfil itself in spite of all sensuous opposition.

There is an interesting passage in Kant where he, perhaps, gives a rather extreme expression to this tendency of the "Rational" Will to have its way regardless of the sensuous nature of man. In this passage, Kant says it is undeniable that Pure Reason of itself alone gives to man the universal law which is the Moral Law. He speaks of Reason "incorruptible and self-constrained" confronting the Will (elective) in any action with the "Pure" Will. Further, he argues, because this law is universal, it is made the formal determining principle of the Will, "without regard to subjective differences". He mentions that this"pure"Will meets no opposition in a Holy and Infinite Being, but in man it meets with wants and "physical motives". He goes on to say:-

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(1) The Gospel of St. John. Ch.8., v.36.

> "In their case (men), therefore, the moral law is an imperative, which commands categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which implies a constraint to an action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to pathological affections (though not determined by them, and therefore still free) implies a wish that arises from subjective causes, and there may often be opposed to the pure objective determining principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the practical reason, which may be called internal, but intellectual, compulsion."(1)

Many instances could be quoted from Kant to support this argument that the "Rational" Will takes little or no account of subjective influences -- "Hence, it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and inclinations, and on the contrary conceives actions as possible to him, nay, even as necessary, which can only be done by disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations".(2) Kant goes on to use the term "Will" in two different senses in one context.

> "Nay, he does not even hold himself responsible for the former or ascribe them to his proper self, i.e. his will, he only ascribes to his will any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to influence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the will (3)

Now, it seems clear that Kant means by the proper self, the "Rational" Will, and by the indulgence of his Will, the "Elective" Will, because it is quite inconsistent with the whole of Kant's teaching to conceive of the "Rational" Will as being corrupted, as he says, to the prejudice of rational laws of his Will. It is this confusion in terms which makes misunderstanding of Kant upon this important point so easy. Yet, in spite of this tendency in Kant to emphasise the "primacy" of the "Practical" Reason or the "Rational" Will,

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(1) K. p. V. 144.

(2) & (3) Gd. 92.

there is another aspect of his teaching which obtains its logical development in his doctrine of Radical Evil. In other words, there is in Kant's Ethical works a latent, but very real dualism as far as the volitional process is concerned. From one point of view, he appears to give prominence and primacy to the "Rational" Will, which, with a kind of intellectual compulsion can press through to fulfilment regardless of the sensuous nature of man. Still, on the other hand, Kant is deeply conscious of the depth and reality of the "hindrance" to the Moral Law of the "Rational" Will. It is true that he does not give clear, emphatic guidance as to the character of this hindrance; and he certainly does not identify the "Elective" Will with this sensuous hindrance. Yet, he is perfectly aware that wants, inclinations, subjective maxims and sensible springs of action are not accurate descriptions of what he has in mind in recognising this hindrance. Yet, it is there, and it is highly important to his Ethical system. As already stated, in his doctrine of Radical Evil, he comes to grips with this already recognised hindrance, and his description of it now becomes positive and truly personal. However, his doctrine of Radical Evil is no mere after-thought. Rather, it is the logical sequence of the latent subjective hindrance to the Moral Law which haunts everything he wrote upon Ethics. Perhaps the following points will assist in making clear this fact.

(1) One of Kant's cardinal concepts is that of the "Good" Will, and he makes it perfectly clear that a "Good" Will is a Will which is conscious of the Moral Law, but, in man, is not in complete conformity to the Moral Law. It is under Moral Law, but not "subject" to Moral Law, that is, is not fully and finally determined by the Moral Law. A "Good" Will fully subject to the Moral Law, Kant terms "a completely" Good Will, or a "Good" Will through and through; still more often a "Holy" Will. Now, it is quite obvious that this "Good" Will

in man cannot be identified with Kant's description of the "Rational" Will; therefore, it can mean only the "Elective" Will.

As already stated, it is unfortunate that Kant did not make earlier reference to his distinction of the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will, yet, in the absence of such an early distinction, it seems that it is inevitable that it must be assumed that Kant meant the term "Good" Will to be taken in the sense of being the "Elective" Will. In the following extract, Kant seems to make this inevitable:-

> "Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e. the will is a faculty to choose only that which reason independent on inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e. the good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason, (which is actually the case with man) then the actions which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow." (1)

Now, it is perfectly obvious that Kant could have made this important and difficult passage much simpler if he had introduced his later distinction between the "Rational" and "Elective" Will; for there can be little doubt that he is using the term "Will" in such two distinct meanings. If this is not granted, then, the extract becomes almost impossible to interpret. When Kant says that the "Will" is nothing but "practical Reason", obviously he is using the term "Will" different from the meaning he gives it when he speaks of it, in

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(1) Gd. 36.

men, as not "thoroughly Good". In the former case, it must be the "Rational" Will which is meant. In the latter, the "Elective". Now, if this interpretation is correct, then, it is the "Elective" Will which is meant when Kant says:-- "the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e. the good". Again, if this is correct, then, it is the "Elective" Will which is the real, crucial centre of moral action.

Later, he gives another definition of Will. It is "a faculty to determine oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws"(1), and, still later, as "the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational".(2) The former definition appears to mean the "Elective" Will, and the latter seems to point to the "Rational" Will. Be this as it may, Kant is quite clear that the "Good" Will is central to his ethical system, and, in man, it is something to be attained, not something with which man is already endowed.

(2) Another important fact is that the "Elective" Will is the "Good" Will in the making. Moral Laws proceed from the "Rational" Will, but Moral Laws must be accepted by the "Elective" Will. It is true that there are times when Kant appears to give the impression that the only task of the "Elective" Will is to resist the inclinations, then, the "Rational" Will follows through into complete fulfilment. The former process is termed "negative" Freedom, and the latter "positive" Freedom. Yet, any un-critical acceptance of this teaching is likely to result in serious complications in interpretation of Kant's ethical system. For, he repeats on many occasions, that the whole essence of morality consists in the deliberate acceptance of universal and objective laws

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(1) Gd. 55.
(2) Gd. 79.

in place of "subjective" maxims. Or, in his own terms:— "We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law".(1) Kant is never weary of repeating the Categorical Imperative:-

> "I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected ....."(2)

This deliberate, decisive act of the will to make its maxim conform to universal law is important as indicating that the "Elective" Will had a "positive" task to do in Morality quite beyond the mere rejection of inclinations and subjective influences. It is the "Elective" Will which has to make the crucial decision that its maxims shall be objective and universal instead of subjective and particular; and it is only as this "positive" action is understood that Kant's emphasis upon the "Elective" Will can be fully appreciated.

(3) Dr. Paton remarks that Kant nearly always illustrates his doctrine of Freedom by examples of bad moral action.(3) This is important for the understanding of the real emphasis given by Kant to the "Elective" Will. For, obviously, it is quite impossible to conceive of Kant teaching that the "Ratio Will is capable of bad moral action. Kant has very little sympathy for the 'crook', and even the "consummate villain"(4 is without excuse for failing to reform his conduct. Even the apparently "hopeless" characters are left without sufficient excuse(5), and he views with real horror the vice of insincerity.(6) These instances indicate that Kant believed that Moral Evil could not be defined in any final manner by

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(1) Gd. 50.
(2) Gd. 24.
(3) The Categorical Imperative. Page 213.
(4) Gd. 89.
(5) K. p. V. 231.
(6) K. p. V. 152. See also Religion. 43.

the excuse that sensuous feelings were too strong to be dealt with by the "Elective" Will;(1) and his general teaching upon Moral Evil, in his ethical works, can be summed up in the following extract:-

> "He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly; but if he is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained thereby) he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law." (2)

(4) Finally, on this importance of the "Elective" Will in moral action, it is necessary only to quote one extract from Kant's analysis of Radical Evil and its remedy:-

> "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself. Both must be the effect of his free elective will, otherwise it could not be imputed to him, and, consequently, he would be morally neither good nor bad. When it is said he is created good, that can only mean that he is created for good, and the original constitution in man is good; but this does not yet make the man himself good, but according as he does or does not adopt into his maxim the springs which this constitution contains (which must be left altogether to his own free choice), he makes himself become good or bad."(3)

This ought to be sufficient proof that Kant looked to the "Elective" Will as the real battle-ground for Morality, and, if this fact is granted, it has important implications for the charge which Edwards makes that all opposing theories of Freedom are really grounded upon the "Indifference" of the Wi

In any discussion of the "Indifference" of the Will it is impossible to avoid some discussion of Motivation and Radical Evil. Yet, these subjects can be treated only in a very limited manner in the present discussion because Motivation and Radical Evil must be discussed in greater detail at a later stage, that is, in their relation to the concept of Freedom. However, it is quite impossible to keep these fact completely outside the present discussion, but anything said

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(1) K. p. V. 141.
(2) K. p. V. 150.
(3) Religion. 50.

at this stage must be tentative and subject to modification. If the above-mentioned evidence upon Kant's treatment of the "Elective" Will is generally correct, then certain implications are inevitable, and they might be stated under the following points.

(1) If Kant actually taught that the "Elective" Will was crucial to real Morality, and possessed within itself that element of Freedom, negative and positive aspects, then, the criticisms of Hartmann concerning Kant upon this phase of Freedom must be modified. In order to see what modification is required, it might be helpful to give some indication of what kind of Freedom Hartmann would postulate for the human Will. As already noted, he was convinced that Kant had failed to see this valuable aspect of Freedom which he, Hartmann, now explains. To a limited degree, Hartmann confirms Caird's criticism of Kant's view of Freedom that it is a one-way theory of Freedom; that is, it is Freedom of the "Rational Will to express itself regardless of subjective principles. Hartmann writes:-

> "Kant was right in maintaining that the will is not in need of being less determined, but of being more determined than a mere natural entity. In place of the phrase 'not determined from without', the positive phrase must be introduced 'so much the more determined from within'. But since inner determination wholly attaches to the ethical principle, a transformation of the problem is here tacitly assumed. Freedom of the will refers, according to Kant, exclusively to the autonomy of the principle. He had a certain right to be satisfied with this point of view; for him the principle is anchored in the practical reason. His moral law is valid as legislative act of reason. And it is, moreover, the same reason which demonstrates its freedom in following the moral law. But, subordinating itself to its own law, it is actually determined by itself. Hence the autonomy of the principle is its own autonomy." (1)

Very little can be said to deny that this is a real aspect of Kant's teaching upon the Freedom of the Will, but it is submitted that this "autonomy" of the rational principle is only one aspect of Kant's discussion of Freedom.

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 102.

As already observed, the above evidence upon Kant's analysis of the place and function of the "Elective" Will is drawn from a wide area of his discussion of Freedom, and, if this evidence is valid, the emphasis upon the "Rational" Will must be balanced by the evidence available on the "Elective" Will. Yet, for the time being, let it be assumed that Hartmann has given expression to the only possible theory of Kant's view of Freedom. It now follows that Hartmann must attempt a correction of the Kantian analysis, and this he does in the following extract:-

> "But for the person this means that he is not bound to the moral claim of the principle. He may grasp the trend of the commandment and surrender himself to it, but he may also not seize upon it, indeed he may expressly reject it. Naturally in the latter case he is determined by other powers, whether these be only natural forces in him, inclinations, impulses, instincts, or moral tendencies from other sources, which prove to be stronger. Were his will coerced by the Ought, it would not be a moral will and his decision would not be imputed to him. He is responsible only in so far as he is not constrained, that is, only so far as he has in face of the principle a freedom for or against. Hence it follows that freedom subsists not only as against natural law, but also as against the Ought as a principle. The Ought and the Will do not coincide ....."(1)

It is this theory of Freedom which Hartmann terms "The Antinomy of the Ought" that he uses it to correct Kant's view. He charges Kant with not having seen this "higher" idea of Freedom, of being over-hasty in his analysis of the problem, and of being "one-sided". Hartmann mentions that the scholastics saw this problem when they indicated the fact that man could "sin" against God.... Hartmann continues:

> "Kant does not meet the point that, when faced by the law, Reason which promulgates the law ought to have freedom of decision, that therefore, when face to face with itself, the practical reason ought to be free."(2)

In the face of such a passage, it is almost impossible to avoid the conclusion that Hartmann has not only misunderstood

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 104.
(2) " " 3. " 108.

Kant, but has involved the concept of Freedom itself in hopeless, if not absurd contradictions. Surely Kant is right when he insists that the "Rational" Will, which not only promulgates, but "creates" the law cannot be at conflict with itself by possessing some supposed "freedom" to oppose its inherent character? It is believed that Hartmann has asked a very important question in the analysis of human Freedom, but that the latter extract is most unfortunate in its method of expression.

However, let it be assumed that Hartmann is contending for a Freedom which is real, personal and positive as against mere determination by the objective principle, or, as he terms it, the "Ought". Is it true that Kant never saw this supposed "higher" view of Freedom, or that "the Kantian doctrine of Freedom overwhelmed this side of the problem"?(1) If the above evidence upon the nature and operation of the "Elective Will is correct, then, the answer to such a question must be a decisive negative. Kant saw this problem in all that he wrote upon Freedom, and the evidence indicates that he felt its increasing importance, and, ultimately, he gives clear recognition to this problem by the distinction of the "Ration and "Elective" Will. Finally, his treatment of Radical Evil leads him to a position which is almost identical with Hartmann. It is submitted that the extract already given on how a man must make of himself Good or Bad is enough to confirm such a statement, but the following also adds confirmation:-

> "Lest any difficulty should be found in the expression nature which, if it meant (as usual) the opposite of the source of actions from freedom, would be directly contradictory to the predicates morally good or evil, it is to be observed, that by the nature of man we mean here only the subjective ground of the use of his freedom in gener (under objective moral laws) which precedes every act that falls under the senses, wherever this ground lies. This subjective ground, however, must itself again be always an act of freedom (else the use or the abuse of man's elective will in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor the good or bad in him be

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 109.

> "called moral). Consequently, the source of the bad cannot lie in any object that determines the elective will through inclination, or any natural impulse, but only in a rule that the elective will makes for itself for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim."(1)

Here, Kant indicates, in more careful terms than Hartmann, the fact of Freedom against determination by the merely "natural". He rejects all excuses that would put the determining principle in the merely subjective ground, and insists upon the reality of Freedom even in the face of every object that would determine the "elective" will through inclination or natural impulse. Kant denies, in this extract, that man can claim Freedom from responsibility for his action by taking cover under his sensuous "nature", and insists that sensuous acts are done by the Freedom of the "Elective" Will.

When Kant comes to examine the fact that man is a "sinner", and not always determined by the objective principle or the "Ought"; he is very painstaking in his analysis of the cause for this transgression. He is willing to admit that there might be degrees of "Sin" or Radical Evil. First, there is the Fraility of the human heart or Will; that is, man adopts the Good law into the maxim of the "Elective" Will, but this adoption is weaker than the "Inclination". Second, there is the degree of transgression known as "Impurity". By this term Kant means the tendency of the human heart or Will to mix its motives in carrying out the dictates of the Moral Law. Man introduces other springs to determine his "Elective" Will besides those which have their origin in the law. Third, there comes the stage or degree of "Perversity". Kant is quite willing to call this state "corruption", and it consists in the propensity of the "Elective" Will to "prefer" springs other than those of the law. Thus, the "Elective" Will reverses the moral order, and uses its "Freedom" deliberately t

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(1) Religion. 21.

put its maxims in place of objective law. This careful analysis of why the human heart does not fulfil the law surely constitutes an analysis of what Hartmann terms the "Antinomy of the Ought". In fact, again Kant is more careful and detailed than Hartmann in the analysis of "opposition to the law. However, for Kant it is more than mere "opposition" to the law, it is wickedness, radical moral Evil, and transgression of the law. Perhaps there is no more emphatic statement upon human wickedness in ethical writings than the following made by Kant in his description of rejection of the Ought:-

> "But those study Sages (Stoics) mistook their enemy, who is not to be sought in the natural, and, though undisciplined, still openly displayed and undisguised, appetites of the sensory; for the inward foe is an invisible occult enemy, lurking behind the ambushes of reason, and upon that account just so much the more dangerous and deadly. They called on Wisdom to make a stand against Folly, which allows itself unawares to be inveigled and worsted by the sensory, instead of calling upon her to wage war upon the wickedness of the human heart, which, by soul-destroying principles, secretly saps and undermines the moral fortresses of the soul."(1

Hartmann wants Freedom against the determination by natural causes. Kant has given it to him. Hartmann wants Freedom against determination of inclinations. Kant has given it to him. Further, Hartmann wants Freedom against Determination by the objective principle, the Ought. Kant has given it to him, but he has given more. He has given the results of such a Freedom; it is nothing less than the concept of Radical Evil.

If the preceding discussion of Kant's view of Freedom has succeeded in clarifying the fact that he granted real Freedom to the "Elective" Will as against "Nature" on the one hand, and as against the "Ought" on the other; it has not yet answered in any satisfactory manner the charge which Determinism brings against Kant's exposition. As already noted, Edwards

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(1) Religion. Bk.2. (Semple's Translation)

would not allow Kant to postulate "Freedom" of the "Rational" Will in the manner Kant is inclined to do. For there can be little doubt that Kant never really gave up this view of Freedom which made the "Rational" Will a noumenal cause. Yet, it can hardly be doubted, in view of the above evidence, that Kant also postulated "Freedom" in the "Elective" Will. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two centres of Freedom. However, such a task is not imperative for the present discussion. The salient difficulty now confronting this discussion of Kant's "Defence" of Freedom is, assuming that Kant actually granted Freedom to the "Elective" Will, how can such a postulation of Freedom have escaped the Determinist's charge of being "Indifferent"? The problem might be put in these terms. If the "Elective" Will is free to choose the Good or the Bad, that is, if it has complete Liberty to be determined by the objective principle or the sensuous inclination, then, it appears to stand somewhere between the objective principle and the sensuous inclination. That is, prior to its actual commitment in any particular act of will, it appears to be poised between two different and opposing principles of action. Of course, once it has chosen a course of action, it is committed to this particular course, and is "determined"; therefore, decision means some form of Determination. Yet, the problem is that, prior to a particular decision, the Will, possessed of its Freedom, appears to stand un-committed to any particular course of action. In other words, it appears to be "Neutral" or, as Edwards would say, "Indifferent". So that, if the previous discussion of Kant's view of Freedom does not succeed in condemning the "Rational" as guilty of the charge of "Indifference", the present discussion must examine the charge of "Indifference" as it stands related to the "Elective" Will; and it is against this "second" aspect of Kant's theory of Freedom that the charg of "Indifference" appears to become impressive.

It has already been noted how Edwards would have declined to permit Kant to claim for the "Rational" Will that absolute spontaneity which he postulates of such a Will, and how he would have insisted that such a Will came within the category of "Indifference". Perhaps the following extract indicates best how Edwards conceived the "Indifference" of the "Elective Will. He is quoting one of his opponents who says that human Freedom consists in:-

> "Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting, agreeable with, or contrary to, any motive that presents. ..... Man has power, and is as much at liberty, to reject the motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty, to reject those motives that do not ..... In order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon such motives as he pleases."(1)

Again, this thesis upon human Freedom is put in rather awkward terms, and, in its present form, does not express adequately the Freedom of the "Elective" Will in its most precise terms. However, Edwards saw that, behind the complicated expression, there was a real objection to his exposition of Determinism, and he takes time to reply to this objection. The argument of his opponent is that Freedom of the Will consists not in doing as one pleases, but in willing as one pleases. Edwards is quite ready to admit liberty of action as the out-come of the pleasure of the Will, but his opponent is not satisfied with this kind of Liberty, and insists upon Liberty to choose not only how to act, but how to will, that is, not only to act upon Motive, but to choose the motive upon which to act. This complicated question of Motivation must be dealt with in a later section, but here, it must be examined as it stands related to this question of the "Indifference" of the Will. If the term "motive" is taken in its most general sense as an internal impulse to action, then, the argument of the opponent of Edwards is that the Will can lift itself above all internal impulses to action, review them in a state of impartiality, o

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.10.

non-commitment, and then finally decide to accept a particular motive as a course of action. This, says Edwards, is utterly inconceivable, and classifies such a view of Freedom as the "Indifference" of the Will. Now, the important question is does Kant's Freedom of the "Elective" Will correspond to this Freedom of "Indifference"?

Kant does not use the term "Motive" in a consistent manner. Sometimes, he gives the impression that he is using Motive in opposition to mere "Impulse"(1), but, at another time, he uses Motive in a less exact manner.(2) Yet, this question of the correct use of the term "Motive" is not vital to the understanding of Kant's position concerning the Freedom of the "Elective" Will. The above-mentioned evidence appears conclusive as indicating that Kant conceived of the "Elective" Will as being able to choose Motivation by Inclination or by the objective principle. When Kant is speaking of the reform of a bad man to a good man, he says:-

> "The only way this difficulty can be got over is, that a revolution is necessary for the mental disposition, but a gradual reform for the sensible temperament, which opposes obstacles to the former; and being necessary, must therefore be possible; that is, when a man reverses the ultimate principle of his maxims by which he is a bad man by a single immutable resolution (and in so doing puts on a new man);" (3)

Here, Kant conceives man as capable of being affected and determined by either inclinations or the objective principle, the former will make him bad, the latter will make him good, and it is the "Elective" Will which must make the choice by a "single immutable resolution". It is in such an expression of the "Elective" Will, and in such a view of Freedom that Kant corresponds to the above-mentioned "Freedom of Indifference", and Edwards would have no hesitation in putting such a view of Freedom in the same category as that of his opponent. Without anticipating too much the later discussion of Motiva-

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(1) Gd. 55.
(2) Gd. 30.
(3) Religion. 55.

tion and Freedom, and Radical Evil and Freedom, perhaps the objections of Edwards against this type of Freedom can be put in the following terms:-

(1) Edwards is quite unable to conceive of this volitional "pause"; this state of volitional "neutrality", between two different and opposing internal impulses to action, that is, unless it be granted that such a state is a state brought about by a prior act of Will. That the Will, the soul, or the agent can, by an act of Will, stand back from contending internal impulses and view them as possible courses of action, Edwards is quite ready to admit, but he insists that this can be done only by an act of Will. He calls this act of Will "suspension" of action, but denies that it is suspension of volition.

To state this point perhaps more clearly: the advocates of the Freedom of the Will who declare that the Will is "Free" to say how it shall be determined must, in view of such a Freedom, postulate an inherent Freedom of the Will to turn to the Good or the Evil, that is, to be determined by the sensuou or by the sublime. Now, to be determined by either, it must be in a state of non-commitment to either, that is, it must be in a position to accept or to reject as it wills. Therefore, in this state of non-commitment, it must be impartial or neutral, or Indifferent to either, until, out of itself, it wills to accept one and reject the other course of action or determination. This state of indecision constitutes its real Freedom. It is here, in the Will's ability to turn one way or another, that real Freedom is said to exist.

Hartmann puts his view of Freedom in these terms:-

> "There must be freedom in two senses; not only freedom over against the regularity of nature (the causal nexus and any other ontological determinations), but equally there must be freedom over against moral principles and the demands of the Ought - whether over against an imperative or against the values (the antinomy of the Ought The will must have scope precisely as regards those principles by which as a moral will it ought to allow itself to be determined." (1)

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 126.

Kant has already said:- "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself. Both must be the effect of his free elective will".(1) In other words, for both Freedom seems to consist in conscious, deliberate determination by either the Good or the Bad, and this is nothing more or less than the postulating of a state of Will which is somewhere between the Good and the Bad. Edwards charges such a view of Freedom with being inconsistent with itself in that it postulates "Freedom" of a state which is in itself a state brought about by a prior act of Will. Such a view of Freedom confuses "suspension" of action with "suspension" of Volition. Edwards wants to know the "purpose" behind this state of volitional hesitation between the Good and the Bad. If it is said that the "purpose" is to make a "Freedom" decision, then, says Edwards, by the very fact that this state has a "purpose" means that it has been inaugurated by an act of Will, and this "prior" act of Will cancels out all talk of Freedom within that supposed state of Deliberation.

(2) If it is argued by these exponents of Freedom of the Will that such Freedom can only consist in the ability of the Will to choose how it shall be determined, Edwards replies that this argument is self-contradictory. For the Will to choose how it shall be determined means that it is able to choose the "motives" by which it shall be determined. Now, says Edwards, the advocates of such a view of Freedom cannot avoid finding themselves involved in a hopeless dilemma. (a) If they insist that Freedom consists in a choice of Motives, then the state of Freedom in which this choice must be made must be a state in which the "free" Will is empty of Motive. That is, it is a state of complete "Indifference", or "motiveless neutrality". If this is the case, how is it possible that

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(1) Religion. 50.

a Motive shall be chosen within a state which is completely empty of Motive? (b) If it is argued that the Will, in this state of Deliberation between the Good and the Bad, is actuate by a self-determined Motive, then, says Edwards, the Will, being already in possession of a Motive, is using a Motive to choose a Motive which is a flat contradiction; and this existence of a self-determined Motive points back to a prior act of Will in "Selecting" this Motive.

Therefore, the supposed state of "Freedom" is actually a state of Determination by a prior act of the Will in creating such a state. Edwards is quite willing to admit that there are occasions in which a state of Suspension might arise. The mind or soul might be confronted with a host of possibilities of action. This case of Suspension concerns not only actions of the body but judgments of the mind. However, this state of Suspension is not a state of Neutrality, for the mind is deeply involved in the problems productive of such a state. Further, it is not a state of Freedom because its very existence is conditioned by a prior act of the Will to deliberate what course of action to follow, or what judgment to deliver. In other words, the mind, or Will, suspended action by a "prior" action, and it did this because it was possessed by a Motive, which, in the system of Edwards, was the prevailing preference of the mind, or its view of the apparent Good. The Will never departs from this prevailing preference of the mind, but it might suspend action until this prevailing preference of the mind is clarified or made deliberate.

(3) Edwards would have a special word of criticism for Kant, but all the implications of this criticism cannot be stated until the discussion of Freedom and Radical Evil. However, here and now, it can be observed that Kant tries to link a free "Elective" Will with a disposition that is radically Evil

Further, his argument for human reformation assumes that out of this free, "Elective" Will can come a Motive, or an "absolute immutable resolution" by which the radically bad disposition can put on the new man of Morality. Again, Kant admits that it was the free "Elective" Will which was the cause of the bad disposition; and Edwards would want to know how these things can hang together. For him, the disposition or character and the Will are interchangeable terms. He cannot conceive of the Will standing outside of the character, more so, if it is agreed that it is the Will which makes the character Good or Bad. Kant further complicates the subject by insisting that, in addition to the isolation of the free, "Elective" Will, there is the uncorrupted "Rational" Will, which, in spite of the Radical Evil, or wickedness of the human heart, remains untouched by the personal and positive Evil of the character to which it belongs. The whole problem of Kant's view of Freedom is further complicated by the fact that he insists that it is the free, "Elective" Will which chooses the subjective maxim as against the objective principl

> "Every bad action, when we inquire into its rational origin, must be viewed as if the man had fallen into it directly from the state of innocence. For whatever may have been his previous conduct, and of whatever kind the natural causes influencing him may be, whether moreover they are internal or external, his action is still free, and not determined by any causes, and therefore it both can and must be always judged as an original exercise of his elective will."(1)

This complicated question of Evil and Innocence must be dealt with later, the main point here is that Kant insists upon the "responsibility" of the "Elective" Will for Radical Evil, and later, tries to say that this same "Elective" Will must produce "reform" of character from within itself. Kant admits that it is impossible to describe how an evil tree can bear such good fruit, and Edwards would view such an admission as a complete repudiation of its thesis. For Edwards, the Will

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(1) Religion. 46.

is always in possession of some "content", and it is this content which makes it Good or Bad. If it performs Evil, that is, wills it, it is in possession of Evil, and its Evil content is proof of its "inability" to will Good.

The present section has attempted to deal with the "Indifference" of the Will as that terms stands related to Kant's Defence of Freedom. The discussion has had to move in a very restricted area because this problem must arise in other sections of this work. However, it is difficult, in this limited area, to see how Kant can escape the charge of "Indifference" of the Will as uttered by Determinism. It might be argued that too much emphasis has been put upon Kant's analysis of the "Elective" Will; yet, in reply to such an argument, it must be insisted that this Freedom of the "Elective" Will stands rooted in Kant's ethical system, and this ethical system can be preserved only as this type of Freedom is stressed. Kant brings these two factors together in a passage which epitomizes his moral philosophy:-

> "Duty: Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening ought that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it, what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves (1)

In this passage, Kant sees real Morality and real Freedom. There are signs that he tried to solve this problem by saying that the Will of man is "determined" by the Moral Law which is given by the Self, but there is clear evidence that Kant was not satisfied with this solution. This fact might be true of some ideal state, but actual man is capable of being

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(1) K. p. V. 214.

governed by subjective maxims, and his real "moral worth" consists not only in his giving himself the Moral Law, but in his "accepting" the Moral Law, and accepting it without the heteronomy of Inclination, or of Divine pressure, or even of the compulsion of the "Rational" Will. This is Kant's supreme problem, but it is not only his problem. It is the problem of all ethical striving. St. Paul saw the problem when he wrote:- "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."(1) The Founder of the Christian Faith saw it, and perhaps that is why He said:- "Behold, I stand at the door and knock, if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in."(2)

To conclude this rather limited discussion of the "Indifferenc of the Will, it might be possible to sum up Kant's teaching in the following manner:-

(1) He begins his ethical discussion with the concept of the "Good" Will which is termed "Good" not because of what he succeeds in doing in external action, but because it is directed to action by Reason. Further, the "goodness" of the "Good" Will is not perfect, because it acts under duty or obligation. This is due to the fact that the "Good" Will has to contend with subjective hindrances, and to be good it must act under the command of Reason. In this early section of Kant's ethical discussion, there is no distinction between the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will. In fact, because there is no distinction, Kant is guilty sometimes of using the term "Will" in two different meanings. However, it is quite clear that he means "Reason" to be taken as the "Rational" Will, and the "Good" Will to be taken as the "Elective" Will.

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(1) Romans. Ch.7. vv. 22, 23.

(2) Revelation Ch 3. v. 20.

(2) Later, Kant makes this distinction between the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will. Yet, when he has made this distinction, Kant seems to look upon the "Rational" Will as "ideally" free, and the "Elective" Will as "actually" free. However, even here, he is reluctant to say that the "Elective" Will is free to choose for or against the "Rational" Will. Further, although he has made the "Rational" Will belong to the supersensible, he insists that the "Elective" Will as such has a supersensible aspect. Empirically, it might appear to have Freedom for and against the Law, but according to its supersensible aspect, this is not so. Yet, it is quite obvious that the "Elective" Will is gaining a new and vital role in moral decisions. Further, even in its earlier category of the "Good" Will, it is decisive for making subjective maxims into objective principles. However, in this second phase, the "Elective" Will is denied that power to act "against" the Law. Its main purpose appears to be to suppress subjective Inclinations and to "accept the Law under, what Kant has termed, some amount of "intellectual compulsion by the practical Reason which is another term for the "Ration Thus, Kant thinks he has earned the right to repudiate any charge of the "Indifference" of the Will, and there can be little doubt that, so far, he has kept his teaching consisten with such a repudiation.

If Kant had kept to this teaching upon the respective tasks of the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will, he would have had a fairly strong case for insisting that the "Elective" Will, in his system, could not possibly come within the category of "Indifference". Yet, Kant would have left a host of unsolved problems in his "Defence" of Freedom, and Edwards would have claimed that his concept of the "Rational" Will, in being an uncaused source of Moral and Rational Conduct was, in one sense, another form of Determinism, and in another, guilt

of being charged with "Indifference", in that it was said to "choose" the Good without any prior purpose or cause for such a choice. However, Kant, like most serious students of ethical conduct, was deeply concerned with the "dual" interpretation of Morality. In one sense, Morality means to do, or to be determined to, the Good. That is, to act in a manner which is consistent with moral values. In another sense, Morality means not merely to do the Good, but to "choose" to do the Good. That is, to choose to do the Good by a decisive rejection of the Evil. Hartmann, like Kant, sees this problem of Morality. He speaks of a Will which is more "fixed" towards virtue as having greater moral value than a Will which, in any single case, has to make a "free" decision."(1) Yet, he fastens upon the other aspect of Morality in which the Will is "free" to choose between alternatives of Good and Evil as finally and fully "moral". This is the problem which haunts serious ethical thought, and Kant was not able to avoid its discussion.

(3) Therefore, when he is confronted with the concept of Radical Evil, he has to make a few amendments of his former teaching upon Freedom and Morality. First, the centre of importance begins to move from the "Rational" to the "Elective" Will: for, he has to have some personal and positive basis for Radical Evil, and he cannot place this in the "Rational" Will, so, he gradually builds up the "Elective" Will as the cause and centre of this Radical Evil. Now, having taken this important step, that is, of making the "Elective" Will crucial to his teaching upon this subject; he is compelled to make another step. Second, Kant is unable to rest in a pessimistic view of human nature, he must indicate the nature of the "bad" principle, but he must also indicate the triumph of the "good" principle.

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 24.

The "Rational" Will is in possession of the Moral Law, and remains uncorrupted in the presence of Radical Evil. Therefore, it is not really responsible for the existence of Radical Evil. It is the "Elective" Will which actually makes a man Bad, and it must be the "Elective" Will which actually makes a man Good. So, Kant calls on this Will not only to resist the subjective Inclinations, but, by an immutable resolution, to put on the new man of Morality. He knows perfectly well that by teaching such a doctrine he has set himself insoluble problems. How can Good come out of Evil? How can that which was the sole, responsible source of Badness become the source of Goodness? Kant tries to say that the origin of both Good and Evil is inscrutible, but he does suggest that it might be explained as the Scriptural doctrine of the "New Birth". Yet, he resists any Theological doctrine of Divine Grace. God might help a man, but the first and supreme effort must come from the man's own Will, that is, his "free Elective" Will. Now, it is just at this point that Kant corrects much of his earlier teaching that the "Elective" Will, by resisting the Inclinations, indicated only a "negative" type of Freedom. For, it is now conceived as being crucial to accepting the Bad and the Good principle, and its Freedom is positive in that it has this vital part to play in making the Self truly "moral". Yet, it is at this point that Kant opens himself quite clearly to the charge of "Indifference" in the "Elective" Will. He makes his position much more susceptible to such a charge because he seems to teach that the "Elective" Will, although guilty of making a decision to follow the Bad principle, really remains uncontaminated by the "Badness" of the principle, and, at its own "free" choice, can turn to the Good principle. For Edwards this is stating "indifference" in its grossest form. For him the Will must have some content, and this content makes it Good or Bad. To postulate a Will which can "handle" Good and

Evil, without being possessed by them, is to postulate a Will which is fundamentally "indifferent" to Good and Evil. Edwards insists that the Will rejects the command because it is possessed by a "contrary principle" to the command. It is possessed of Evil; and how a Will possessed of Evil, can empty itself of Evil in the absence of Divine Grace is, for Edwards, utterly unthinkable.

Thus, Kant, by shifting the centre of vital, Moral Freedom from the "Rational" Will to the "Elective" Will, has complicated his Defence of Freedom, as such a Defence stands related to Determinism. Further, he has complicated the problem of "Autonomy". In which orbit of being, "Rational" or "Elective" Will, does real personality exist? Where is a man truly and finally himself? Is it when he is under the domination of "Rational" Will? If so, how does he effect, within himself, such a domination? As already observed, most of the teaching of Kant places "Autonomy" in the "Rational" Will by which a man possesses Freedom to perform the "moral law" of which the "Rational" Will is the author, and disregards subjective Inclinations as almost non-existant. The "Elective" Will simply holds in check, or sweeps aside these Inclinations, and the "Rational" Will then fulfils itself in almost an automatic manner. Here, the centre of "Autonomy" is plainly placed in the primacy of the Practical Reason, and the whole matter is straight-forward. Yet, when Kant gives such a vital role to the "Elective" Will in his teaching upon Radical Evil, he begins to shift this centre of vital, decisive action, or "Autonomy" to the "Elective" Will, and the "Rational" Will appears to have the role of simply "holding forth the Law". In other words, the "Rational" Will stands at the door of the citadel of human personality and knocks, and it is only as the "Elective" Will opens the door, that real Morality begins to have meaning. This is the problem of the "Indifference" of the Will. The Will can now allow

Evil or Good to enter. It can be possessed of either the Bad or the Good principle, and, for Edwards, this is the destruction of all real analysis of the Will, and the end of all Freedom. However, there stands the problem, and it cannot be said that Kant has solved it in any satisfactory manner. However, before any final conclusions can be reached upon this, the questions of Motivation and Freedom; and Radical Evil and Freedom must be examined in more careful detail.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER SIX

Freedom and Motive

Freedom and Motive

"This feeling (reverence, sentiment) which we call the moral feeling is therefore produced simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply to thissingular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be as the disposal of reason only, and that pure practical reason."

(Kant. The Critique of the Practical Reason. Sect.201)

"What ascetic systems do, is to sharpen the antagonism to a point at which reason appears as just the negative of passion. So, with the Stoics, passion is said to be unnatural, i.e. it is treated as a mere foreign intruder into the man, who is essentially, in his own nature, reason. Passion, therefore, has to be absolutely expelled, that reason may be one with itself by its own law and end. Kant has in common with these systems the idea of the moral law as absolutely excluding from its motives the operation of natural desire, which according to him is essentially desire for pleasure and for objects as means of pleasure; and he has in common with them also the idea of a pure self-determination of reason as the only true source of moral action. ...."

(Caird. The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page, 200)

"Perhaps Kant himself was not conscious that he appears to be speaking of two different kinds of motive. The word 'motive' is itself ambiguous. A motive is what moves us; and many people seem to assume that it must therefore be something that, as it were, pushes or shoves us from behind, as a feeling may be said to do. They forget that we may also be moved by something that pulls or attracts us, as perhaps the idea of the law might be said to do."

(Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Page 67)

"Now it is just the same with the feeling of the numinous as with that of moral obligation. It too is not to be derived from any other feeling, and is in this sense ' unevolvable'. It is a content of feeling that is qualitatively sui generis, yet at the same time one that has numerous analogies with others, and therefore it and they may reciprocally excite or stimulate one another and cause one another to appear in the mind."

(Otto. The Idea of the Holy. Page 45)

There is a preliminary problem in any discussion of motivation, and this consists of the fact that the term Motive can be used in, at least, two ways. First, it can be used to describe any internal stimulus which, consciously, or even unconsciously, prompts or prevents a particular course of action. In this sense, it is usually termed "impulse" or might even be described as some instinctive reaction. Here the emphasis is obviously upon the "feeling" of the agent. Second, the term Motive can be used to describe a "perceived" influence which prompts or prevents any particular course of action. In this sense, the term Motive is used as "intention"; and the emphasis is upon the "thought" aspect of the agent's willing. T.H. Green uses the term Motive in the latter sense when he writes:-

> "A motive again being an idea of an end, which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise." (1)

This particular section of the Kantian Defence of Freedom would be much simpler if it could be claimed that Kant used the term Motive consistently in either of these two possible ways. However, this is not the case, and thus Kant complicates the discussion of Motivation as it stands related to his Defence of Freedom.

The task of attempting to interpret the Kantian conception of Motive would also have been made much easier if Kant had been more positive in his treatment of Empirical Psychology. As already stated, Kant had very strong reasons for rejecting the conclusions of such a Psychology as such conclusions stood related to moral values; but he never takes the

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(1) Prolegomena to Ethics. Page 92.

necessary time and space to clarify such reasons or their implications. It is rather futile to express the wish that Kant had written a "Critique of Psychology"; yet, his profound and continuing interest in this aspect of experience seemed to have merited some such work. However, in the absence of such positive treatment of this branch of knowledge, it might be profitable to attempt a very limited outline of what Kant meant by the term Motive; and the following analysis might be accepted as generally correct. (A) Motive might be conceived as an Impulse of which the agent is not conscious but which nevertheless drives the agent to perform some action. Kant speaks of the possibility of the agent flattering himself by falsely taking credit for a noble motive -- "whereas in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs of action..."(1) It appears that, in such a passage, Kant is thinking of Motive as a secret, hidden drive to action, working in the subconscious self, and quite beyond rational recognition. (B) Then it is possible to think of Kant regarding a Motive as a "desire" for consciously formulated "end" which the agent seeks to realise. Here, he seems to come to the recognition of Motive as put forth by Green. However, the end to be realised is "particular", and the part played by Reason is still limited. Perhaps the following passage supports this further view of Motive:-- "The appetitive faculty which depends on concepts, in so far as the ground of its determination is found in itself, not in the object, is called a faculty of <u>doing or forbearing as we please.</u>"(2)
(C) Again, it is possible to perceive in Kant another gradation in his view of Motive which might be stated as a general principle of action, or a general maxim of action. It is with this aspect of Motive that Kant is most engaged.

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(1) Gd. 29.
(2) M. d. S. Intro. 11.

He gives many examples of its influence and operation. His well-known instances of the man who despairs of life, of the man who borrows money, of the man who tries to make himself oblivious of his surroundings, and of the man who is selfish in his prosperity. All these, Kant conceives of as acting upon Motives which are rationally conceived principles, or in his own terms - "subjective maxims".(1) Kant advances many arguments why all such "subjective principles or maxims" are inadequate for the purpose of real Morality. The present discussion of Motive cannot concern itself with the validity or otherwise of such arguments, but perhaps the following extract indicates best why Kant thought that Motive, in this particular sense, was insufficient for ethical values.

> "If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy."(2)

Here, and in many such passages, Kant gives the reason why he cannot accept this kind of Motive, in the three aspects already considered, as adequate for the purposes of Morality. Therefore, he passes to what might be termed his highest conception of Motive (D), which is a general principle of action, purely formal, not based upon Desire, but which determines the Will absolutely according to the Moral Law. Much earlier, Kant had discussed different aspects of the term "Imperative". In a sense, Kant's use of the Hypothetical Imperative covers the third aspect of the term Motive, and is inadequate for the needs of Morality. He says

> "Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result, and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality." (3)

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(1) Gd. 50.
(2) Gd. 72.
(3) Gd. 40.

Later, Kant sees it is not enough to declare the existence of such a Categorical Imperative. He must try and relate it to the human consciousness; and he comes to the question - "How the moral law provides an interest?" Although he is convinced that he cannot "explain" how this is possible, yet, his description of the "Moral Motive" is an effort to describe how it might be possible.(1)

However, the final and convincing argument as to what Kant meant by the term "Motive" must come from his careful analysis of what he terms:- "The Motives of Pure Practical Reason", which occupies a large and important place in "The Critique of the Practical Reason". It is here that Kant comes to grips with this question of Motivation, and, it is only as this section of his discussion of Freedom is emphasised that a proper appreciation of his contribution to the very difficult subject can be made. Therefore, it is proposed to deal with this section of the Motives of the Pure Practical Reason as Kant's central teaching upon how he conceived of Motive as related to Morality; and the following, general divisions of his analysis might prove acceptable.

(1) Kant begins by making it quite clear that he intends to discuss actions which have "moral worth". This is important for any understanding of Kant's analysis of Motivation. In this section, at least, he is not concerned with a mere "psychological" investigation of Motivation. This decisive, and perhaps, dogmatic departure from usual methods of inspecting "Motives" might be viewed with dismay by those who are interested only in the "facts" of Empirical Psychology However, there is little than can be said at this stage to justify or condemn Kant's deliberate rejection of the "facts" of Psychology as a basis for Morality. Later, Edwards, a very enthusaistic exponent of "Empirical Psychology" must be given an opportunity to challenge Kant's analysis of Motivati

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(1) Gd. 97.

Here and now, an attempt must be made to understand it. Having made it quite clear that he proposes to discuss actions of moral worth, Kant then proceeds to say that, for any action to have such moral worth, the Moral Law must determine the Will directly; if the determination of the Will takes place in conformity to the Moral Law, but only by means of a "feeling", no matter of what kind, then, the resulting action is Legality rather than Morality. This exclusion of "feeling" as a possible determination of the Will indicates Kant relentless opposition to Empirical Psychology, that is, as a basis for morals.

Now, Kant, makes a statement which indicates his "ethical" handling of the term "Motive":-

> "Now, if we understand by motive (or spring) (elater animi) the subjective ground of determination of the will ofa being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it follows, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine Will, and that the motives of the human will (as well of that of every created rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law, without containing its spirit."(1)

The main point of the extract is that Kant is insisting upon "purity" of Motive as essential to real moral worth, and this is in keeping with the whole of his teaching of Ethics.

He goes on to say that man must not seek for Motives to determine his Will except the Motive of the Moral Law itself, and he puts the task of this section in these words:- "hence nothing is left us but to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a motive, and what effect this has upon the faculty of desire."(2) This is the central purpose of this particular section of the discussion of Motivation by Kant.

It is only as this fact is appreciated that there is any hope of solving the supposed "dualism" in Kant between

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(1) K. p. V. 195.
(2) K. p. V. 196.

Reason and Desire. Many writers have taken Kant to task upon this subject, and have insisted that Kant repudiates Desire as utterly unworthy and incapable of affecting a moral and rational being.(1) Yet, there are grounds for thinking that their criticism consists of an over-simplification of the problem faced by Kant. In short, there are two major considerations which must be borne in mind when any commentary on Kant is attempted upon this particular question.

First, Kant is dealing with Ethics, and not with Psychology. He is talking about what "ought" to be, and not what actually exists. He writes under the sign and spell of the Categorical Imperative, and his analysis of human nature is conditioned by this universe of discourse.

Second, if Kant appears to give too little meaning and purpose to Desire, it is because mere Desire as a Determinant of the Will ceases to have any meaning for him when found in a moral and rational being. Even Desire cannot remain unaffected by the "activity" of the moral principle in man. At least, he, different from the animals, is "conscious" of his Desires, and this very awareness prevents them from being mere impulsive Determinants of the Will. In addition to this awareness of Desire, Kant conceives of man as being continually challenged by his very "authorship" of the Moral Law. In man the Moral Law is always present, and would be omnipotent but for these recognised "Desires". As already observed, in the discussion of the "Indifference" of the Will, Kant progressed in his conception of "Subjective Hindrances" to the Moral Law. His negative view of Freedom tended to make them mere impediments to the Law, but later, these subjected hindrances become the ground of Radical Evil. In any case, Desires and Inclinations of the subjective self are never viewed by Kant as mere "empirical factors". They are always viewed from within the context

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(1) E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page 200.
J. Watson. Outline of Philosophy. Page 216.

of man's moral and rational nature. Of course, it might well be that Kant pays too scant attention to them in one aspect of his system, and then becomes too morbid or hostile in another. Be this as it may, Kant never looks at Desire except through the eyes of an EXPONENT of Morality. He is quite incapable of viewing it as an impartial psychological investigator.

(2) It cannot be stressed too strongly that the supreme purpose of Kant, in this particular section, is "to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a Motive, and what effect this has upon the faculty of Desire". This is not an empirical investigation of Motive. Rather, it is an investigation of Motive from the point of view of Morals. If this is fatal to Kant's conception of Motivation, then, there is nothing further which can be said. It is true that Kant cannot avoid psychological terminology, but the result of such a "psychological" analysis must be something quite different from that upon which Determinism based its arguments. However, no serious student of human nature who grants that man is a moral and rational being can repudiate completely the terms of reference Kant has set for his investigation. As Kant so often reminds his readers, if man is merely a creature of wants and desires then he ought to be a creature of "instinct" rather than the possesser of Reason. Kant takes his stand upon the reality and primacy of man's "practical reason", which is only another way of saying that the deepest meaning of man can be understood only by an investigation of his rational and moral nature, and it is with this set purpose that Kant proceeds to investigate "in what way" the moral law can become a Motive.

He denies that it is possible to explain how the Moral Law, of itself, can directly determine the Will of man. This is an insoluble problem, and complete explanation is impossible, but Kant intends to "describe", in the most careful terms, how the Moral Law can become a Motive.

Kant insists that he is speaking about a "free" Will finding its sole and sufficient Determination in the Moral Law without any help from the subjective feelings and inclinations, yes, even to the checking and rejection of such feelings "if they are opposed to the moral law". Now, he makes the point that all Inclinations and every sensible Impulse are founded upon "feeling". Further, if these subjective factors are in any way influenced the subjective resultant is also a "feeling". Therefore, if Desire is a feeling, and Desire is affected in any way, the result of this reaction to the influence is another type of feeling. For instance, says Kant, let it be assumed that man is conscious of the Moral Law; then, this Moral Law, being a product of man's moral and rational self, must stand opposed to his subjective Inclinations. Therefore, the impact of the Moral Law upon subjective Inclinations will not result in making them as the Moral Law because one is the product of Reason and the other is the product of "feeling". The subjective Inclinations will not be transformed into Reason, but, as they are affected by the impact of the Moral Law, a new type or quality of "feeling" arises. It is thus that Kant makes his point that Inclinations, Wants and Desires are not merely "these things", when they are found in the context of a moral and rational being. They can be merely "these things" in animals, but in man they cannot escape "impact" with the Moral Law, and this "impact" leaves these very subjective elements with a new quality of existence. Again, Kant insists that all the subjective feelings can be brought together under one central concept, that is, "happiness", or, as he says in this section -- "Self-regard". Now, the Moral Law, in its deepest meaning, is opposed to this "subjective" view of happiness. It is true that it has its own quality of happiness, but it is something quite different from that based upon "subjective" Inclinations. Therefore, the first result of the impact of the Moral Law

upon the Inclinations is a "feeling" of Pain. It is caused by the frustration of the subjective Inclinations. They cannot have their own way with Ease and Pleasure, therefore, says Kant, there is produced this feeling of Pain, and this feeling of Pain is very important because it is the first indication, although a "negative" indication, of the "a priori" character of the Moral "Motive". Kant, now looks at this feeling of Pain from another aspect. All the Inclinations reach out for Happiness, but, from another point of view, all the Inclinations constitute a "feeling" which might be termed "Self-regard". Therefore, the fundamental urge of man is to conserve and enhance this Self-regard; and Kant would find many modern exponents of psychology who would agree with this statement. Kant then goes on to show that this Self-regard can be viewed as having two aspects, or, of expressing itself in two forms; that is, Self-love and Self-conceit.

Kant now makes statements without sufficient explanation. He insists that the Moral Law confronts this central feeling of Self-regard with two differing results. It strikes down Self-conceit, and checks, or keeps within "reasonable" limitations, Self-love. Kant does not explain why this is so, that is, why Self-love is checked, and Self-conceit struck down; but it is quite obvious that his ethical system has no place for "arrogantia", but it has a place for what he terms "rational self-love". However, the main point is that the subjective Inclinations have come into direct contact with the Moral Law, and the result has been Pain by modifying Self-love and striking down Self-conceit.

Kant proceeds to make one of his most important points. It is that the Moral Law has "caused" this "negative" feeling, Pain; therefore it, the Moral Law, must be viewed as a "form of intellectual causality", and this view of the Moral Law as intellectual Causality results in it being an object of "Respect". This concept of Respect, or Reverence,

plays a very important part in Kant's analysis of Motivation, and it would not be just to such an analysis to mark too carefully this particular aspect of why man has respect for the Moral Law. It is due to far more than its being a kind of intellectual Causality. However, this matter must receive more careful attention later. For this "feeling" of Reverence is far too complicated to be explained by one root or ground, and already Kant points out that it stands linked not only to the intellectual Causality of the Moral Law, but is intimately related to the "negative" feeling of Pain at the striking down of Self-conceit. Self-conceit lies fatally wounded by the impact with the Moral Law. As it exists in its native and subjective form, it can receive no "mercy" from the Moral Law. Yet, in its humiliation and death, this feeling of Self-conceit gives birth to a feeling which is a true element of Respect. It might be termed "negative" Self-feeling, depreciation of the Self, or, in Kant's own words -- "intellectual self-depreciation".(1) The present analysis of Kantian Motivation is not concerned with the tenability of the analysis, but it cannot be ignored that it has much in common with the "Idea of the Holy" set forth by Dr. Otto in the work of that name. The primary difference lies in the insistance of Kant upon this "intellectual causality" of the Moral Law.

(3) Kant now proceeds to look at the Moral Law, and this feeling of Respect from another aspect. He has already made it plain that if the Will is to be determined by the Moral Law, it must be deterined "only" by the Moral Law; and still more, it must not be thought of being determined by any feeling "prior" to this Moral Motive which is the Moral Law. He does not deny that the subjective Inclinations do, in themselves, exist prior to the consciousness of the Moral Law, but he does deny that they constitute any quality of feeling (moral feeling) prior to their impact with the Moral,

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(1) K. p. V. 199.

which might make the fulfilment of the Moral Law more conducive. In fact, far from possessing a feeling conducive to the fulfilment of the Moral Law, these subjective Inclinations jointly constitute a state of affairs which stand opposed to the Moral Law. That is, left to themselves, they put forth "maxims" quite unfit for universal legislation, which is the basic requirement of the Moral Law. In Kant's own language:-

> "This propensity to make ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be called **self-love**, and if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional practical principle, it may be called **self-conceit.**" (1)

It is here that Kant gives the reason why the Moral Law can make no compromise with Self-conceit. It is a "Pretender" in the fullest meaning of that term in that it seeks to put forth "subjective principles" as the objective principle for the Determination of the Will. Here, too, Kant is beginning to reveal the roots of his doctrine of Radical Evil. Thus the Moral Law, or consciousness of the Moral Law, cannot view Self-love and Self-conceit in an impartial manner. They are not mere Desires, or "natural" factors of the Self. They are fundamentally and truly "un-natural" in that they tend, or have the propensity to "usurp" the true nature and destiny of man. They cannot stand side by side with the Moral Law and remain "innocent" and natural, but they must be affected in a most positive manner. Self-love becomes limited, or transmuted to "rational" Self-love, and Self-conceit is humiliated and, both, in this new state, become the ground of Respect. As already noted, Kant will allow no truly "moral feeling" for the Law to exist in these twin aspects of Self-regard, that is, in its own right, and prior to this impact of the Moral Law. In fact, if his inferences

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(1) K. p. V. 198.

are given logical conclusions, Self-regard contains all the elements of "im-moral" feeling as regards the Moral Law.

(4) Kant is most anxious to "isolate" this factor of Respect in the human consciousness, and he spares no pains to reveal it in all its various aspects. In a previous chapter, in "The Critique of the Practical Reason", he had referred to his dictum that, prior to the impact of the Moral Law upon the sensibilities, there is no case for assuming the existence of a moral feeling conducive to the fulfilment of the Moral Law. In fact, he had gone further, and said that, prior to this impact, there was no true knowledge of Good and Evil. Therefore, according to Kant, the subjective sensible Self is completely without any ground for producing a "Motive" for the realisation of the Moral Law. It is impotent to produce any "interest" in the Moral Law when it is left completely to itself. Kant had two objects in making this matter beyond dispute.

First, the whole of his ethical teaching stands rooted in the claim that the Moral Law must determine the Will without the help of the subjective Inclinations. At first, this is stated as a moral claim; now Kant makes it a "psychological" fact. That is, according to his "psychological" view of the nature of man, there is no possible ground in man to assist the Moral Law to its fulfilment. To be determined by sensible Inclinations, that is, in order to fulfil the Moral Law, or to be partly determined so, is not only morally wrong, but it is "psychologically" impossible, because there is nothing in the subjective Inclinations, as such, or in their native state, upon which the Moral Law can find any possible footing.

Second, Kant wished to prove that it was the Moral Law, and it alone which was capable of providing a "Motive" fitted to its own fulfilment.

> "Thus the respect for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law which now alone has influence." (1)

He goes on to say that Respect is not so much a feeling as it is the "effect" upon a feeling, and arises from the very sensibility of rational creatures. Further, this Respect is an indication of their being "finite". Therefore, to feel Respect involves being a rational, moral, finite being, and endowed with sensibility; and it is important to bear in mind that all these attributes of "human" nature contribute their respective and differing elements to make this composite "effect" Respect. God, according to Kant, not possessing subjective limitations, cannot be said to have this "sui generis" feeling of Respect.

Kant is most anxious to discover a true "moral feeling" for the Law, and, with care and sensitive touch, he offers the following analysis. The impact of the Moral Law upon the subjective Inclinations results in Pain or "Unpleasantness". However, this feeling is not only"negative,"it is also "pathological" as opposed to "moral", and therefore, in its first form cannot be termed true "moral" feeling. Yet, it is the result of the Moral Law which is a supersensible Cause, therefore, it is not merely "pathological". Further, this feeling belongs to the person who is in possession of the Moral Law. In other words, it is not the "pathological" reaction of an animal. Therefore, Kant feels justified in calling this feeling more than mere Pain or Unpleasantness, it is "Humiliation", and Humiliation is a feeling which can be experienced only by a moral and rational being. Now, Humiliation cannot exist merely as a feeling in itself, it must imply some Cause for its existence; that is, a man cannot feel Humiliation and let the matter rest there.

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(1) K. p. V. 200.

He must try and discover the source or the Cause of the Humiliation. When it is known that the Moral Law is the supreme and sole Cause of this feeling, even, Humiliation ceases to be Humiliation, and Respect for the Moral Law is the positive reaction of this feeling. All this careful analysis on the part of Kant indicates how importantly he views this question of Motivation. His rather impolite references to "Empirical" Psychology, and his scanty attention to its results become somewhat more tolerable as he attempts to set forth what might be termed a system of "moral" psycholo How far all this is an answer to Eighteenth-century Determinism must be examined at a later stage, but, here and now, it is quite obvious that Kant is constructing his Defence of Freedom with very great care and commendable skill.
According to Kant, therefore, the sensible Desires, upon impact with the Moral Law, cease to be mere sensible Desires. Further, the Pain of this checking of their natural tendencies is not merely Pain, or pathological "Unpleasantness" because it is Pain within the context of a rational and moral being. Therefore, its best description is Humiliation, which is the capacity of Respect for that which humiliates, because it is the same Self which gives the Law as it is the same Self which feels the impact of the Law. It is the same Moral Law which humiliates and elevates.
(5) Kant has a great deal more to say concerning this "sentiment" of Respect, but much of it concerns the application of this "sentiment" to Life. Yet, there are a few important points worthy of note concerning Respect as a Motive, and might be stated in the following terms.
(a) This sentiment of Respect must not be considered as mere Admiration. It has in it an element of Admiration, but there is also the element of Awe. Again, it is far from being described as a "pleasant" feeling, for it stands rooted in Self-humiliation. (b) Further, Respect is not a sentiment which man gladly accepts. Kant says there is an element

of Reluctance in granting Respect to the Law, or to persons whose conduct agrees with that Law. (c) It is a sentiment which is almost irresistible. It cannot be held back, although given reluctantly. In a sense, it overwhelms the subjective feelings of Self-love and Self-conceit, and compels man to grant Respect in spite of his subjective Inclinations. (d) This Respect is, as Kant has already said, Morality subjectively considered. It is the fundamental stratum of feeling available to a man who is a moral and rational being. Upon Respect rises an "Interest", and this "interest" is productive of a Maxim. Of course, when Kant uses Maxim in this particular context, he is thinking of the subjective Maxim which agrees with the objective principle. That is, this Maxim now becomes a Law of Duty. (e) Kant feels that this Law of Duty is the highest which can be expected from mortal man. He argues that this is the real meaning of Love to God and man. That is, receiving Duties as Divine Commands. He declines the orthodox view of Christian Love as encouraging Fanaticism. Man is under a "discipline" of Reason. He does not do his Duty gladly, but does it because of Respect, an element of which is Humiliation. The reluctance to admit Humiliation is akin to the reluctance to do the Law.

Here, then, is Kant's moral psychology as such a psychology stands related to Motivation. He claims to have described the real Motive which underlies all "moral" action, and claims to have constituted or "discovered" such a Motive which is quite independent of commonly accepted principles of "Empirical" Psychology. Perhaps the following extract best sums up his position:-

> "Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it is no other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us conscious of the sublimity of our supersensible existence, and subjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent dependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature (1)

(1) K. p. V. 216.

Before attempting to challenge this system of Motivation by the opposing system of Determinism, a word must be said in appreciation of the task which Kant has performed.

First, there can be little doubt that Empiricism neglected the implications of man's moral and rational nature. Butler, to some degree, had perceived this problem when he wrote:-

> "There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is ...." (1)

Butler proceeds to discuss ethical values in man from the point of view of what he terms "a matter of fact". Yet, such a discussion is haunted by the "Categorical Imperative."

> "Truth, and real good sense, and thorough integrity, carry along with them a peculiar consciousness of their own genuineness; there is a feeling belonging to them, which does not accompany their counterfeits ...." (2)

Hume began his discussion of morals by defining Moral Philosophy as the science of human nature, and he means by human nature those facts which are available in his extreme Empiricism. However, not even Hume can avoid saying:-

> "Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong, and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe that others are susceptible of like impressions." (3)

However, Hume attempts to explain this consciousness of Right and Wrong by the feeling or sentiment of "Taste"; yet, when he is asked to describe Taste, he confesses that it is something given by God to man to baffle philosophers.(4) Again, Edwards admits that "moral" Necessity might be illustrated by a man being conscious that he is bound by ties of Duty from which he cannot escape. Yet, in spite of these glimmerings of the "Categorical Imperative", the exponents of Empiricism never take time and space to come to grips with

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(1) Author's Preface to Sermons. 1729.
(2) Sermon. 10.
(3) Enquiry. 2. Sect. 133.
(4) Enquiry. 2. Sect. 216.

this implication of the moral and rational nature of man. Second, another feature which seems to be a support to Kant's system of Motivation is that he is a competent student of Empirical Psychology. Kant often gives the impression that he is contemptuous of Empirical Psychology. Yet, this apparent contempt must not be assumed to be based upon ignorance. No student of Kant is able to ignore the fact that when Kant rejects the conclusions of Empirical Psychology, that is, as such conclusions stand related to Morality, Kant knows what he is talking about.

Perhaps Dr. Paulsen rightly expresses Kant's attitude to Empirical Psychology when he says:-

> "Psychology according to Kant is an experimental science, and as such, therefore, does not belong to philosophy in the proper sense of the word. Indeed, it cannot even be called a science in the proper sense, like physics, which is based upon mathematical principles. Psychology is only a collection of purely empirical facts, something like chemistry, only it is in a still worse position than the latter in that it is restricted to observation, and cannot employ experiment." (1)

Such a statement can be accepted as summing up Kant's attitude to Empirical Psychology, but it must be borne in mind that such an attitude is based upon two other facts. (a) Kant knew what Empirical Psychology was, and reached opposition to such a science only after long and careful deliberation of its meaning and nature; (b) Kant knew what was meant by Morality. His moral system might be subjected to considerable criticism and modification, but few thinkers suppass him in moral analysis and ethical insight. In other terms, Kant knew why he rejected psychological conclusions as a basis for moral considerations, and his reasons cannot be ignored by any serious student of Psychology or Morals. Third, a great deal of time and space would be saved in criticism of Kant, if agreement could be reached upon the fact that Kant, in all his expositions of Morality, is utterly "realistic" in his approach to, and analysis of "human nature". In fact, this point might be expressed by

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(1) Immanuel Kant. Page 287.

these "three" gradations.

(1) Kant is quite convinced that men desire to be happy. As Dr. Paton rightly indicates, Kant very often speaks too much about human happiness.(1)

> "To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and this therefore is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire."(2)

The language of the above extract is carefully chosen, and must not be taken as expressing, what Kant denies, that the subjective Inclinations culminating in the concept of Happiness, actually "determines" the Will of a moral and rational being. Rather, Happiness is a determining principle of the faculty of "Desire". Yet, such a statement does reveal Kant's realistic concession to Empirical Psychology.

(2) Having settled this basic issue that man pursues Happiness as one of the fundamental laws of his nature as a finite creature, Kant goes on to make his position still more clear by saying:-

> "Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far as his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to that of a future."(3)

Here, Kant is realistic enough to bring in Reason to guide man in the supplying of his "natural" wants; and all this is but another way by which Kant draws attention to the reality of Hypothetical Imperatives. Kant, in no place, denies the actual existence of such Hypothetical Imperatives. They are counsels of skill or prudence, and his knowledge of human affairs was sufficiently wide to recognize that such Imperatives covered a considerable part of human conduct.

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(1) The Categorical Imperative. Page 57.
(2) K. p. V. 133.
(3) K. p. V. 181.

(3) Yet, Kant is quite convinced that the real purpose of Reason cannot be defined in any final matter by making it the servant of human wants; and the "Hypothetical" Imperative by its very nature, points beyond itself to a "Categorical" Imperative. In other words:-

> "But he is not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a sensible being. For the possession of reason would not raise his worth above that of the brutes, if it serve him only for the same purpose that serves in them." (1)

This is Kant's problem, and it is the problem of "moral" Philosophy, that is, what purpose is served by man's moral and rational nature? Hume had said that Reason was impotent to produce a Motive for action, but he admitted that Reason was capable of directing the impulses to serve "useful" purposes. For Kant such a view of Reasons means at most only a"Hypothetical" Imperative and is the end of moral and rational questions. If Reason is but the servant of the subjective Inclinations, then, there might be a state called "Legality", but there never can be a state of Morality.

> "In that case the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such a case, never contains the universally legislative form, not only produces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical reason, and, therefore, also to the moral disposition, even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law."(2)

The present discussion of the Kantian conception of Motivation has reached the stage when an attempt must be made to compare and challenge such a conception with the type of Motivation found in Determinism; and the burden of such a challenge must come from the system of Edwards. In the previous analysis of his system, reference was made to his views on Motivation, but, in the interests of clarity, it is necessary to restate his definition of Motive

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(1) K. p. V. 181.
(2) K. p. V. 146.

> "By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as one complex motive." (1)

Edwards follows up this definition by saying the following things. (a) Every motive, rightly termed, has some tendency or "advantage" to move or excite the mind or Will. That is, Motive is, by its inherent nature, fitted to move or influence the mind. The inference of this statement is that if the Motive is "feeling", then there is an aspect of the mind which can be influenced by feeling. This fits in with the description of the "Understanding" given by Edwards as "including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment."(2) This is important for the following discussion, because Edwards can see no contradiction in the possibility of "feeling" affecting and even "determining" the Understanding, that is, in his use of the term in this large sense. (b) The motive, therefore, must be "extant" to the Understanding, or it must be in the "mind's view". It would be wrong to read into this statement all the implications of a "rationally recognised" Motive, for, the perceiving faculty is much more than the merely "rationa It might be termed also the "sensing" faculty as far as Edwards is concerned. Therefore, Edwards can be interpreted as thinking of "Motive" as Impulse and Intention, and his description of the Understanding is full enough to include the influence and the determination of both.
(c) Edwards is quite sure that there must be a multitude of Motives in the sense in which he has given, but they have one thing in common, that is, if they succeed in exciting, inviting or moving the mind, and that is their pursuance of the apparent Good, or the Agreeable. In another place, Edwards says, man cannot actually desire his Evil,or Misery.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect. 2.
(2) " " " " " " 1. " 2.

However, in this section, Edwards hastens to say what he means by the "Good", that is the "apparent" Good, and it is this which is "Agreeable" or "pleasing to the mind". He is quite incapable of thinking that man pursues the Good in its high "ethical" meaning, and this fact will have important implications in the discussion of "Freedom and Moral Evil" at a later stage of the Kantian Defence of Freedom. (d) Edwards now says that the "Will" can bedescribed as "the apparent Good" or as that which is most agreeable. He hesitates about saying that the Will is determined by the "apparent" Good or agreeable "because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, 'seem scarcely distinct'." This reference to Will in the context of the discussion of Motive is no mere accident; for the whole system of the Determinism of Edwards pivots on the intimate relation of Motive, Mind and Will. Further, it is of the greatest importance to observe that Edwards can see no real distinction between a thing being agreeable to the Mind, and the Mind "preferring" that thing. For Edwards identifies "preference" and "choice" in a most conclusive manner. He complains against his opponents that they are all guilty of creating an artificial "vacancy" between the "preference" of the Mind, and the "determination" of the Will. Further, he can see no meaning in the argument that the Mind is able to "choose" its own Motives, for the Mind is always in possession of a Motive, the pursuance of the "Agreeable". This chain of Motivation is all welded together by his conception of Causation, and the following extract indicates the nature and operation of Causation and Motivation.

> "There is nothing in the world more constantly varying than the ideas of the mind; they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable time ..... The involuntary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water."(1)

As already observed, Edwards will not grant that there can be any real "choice" of Motives. For instance, he says:- "An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view."(2) He then goes on to argue that if the mind, confronted with such a competition, chooses that which it thinks is inferior in the comparison, then, it chooses without a Motive or inducement. There is a certain amount of conviction in such an argument when it is borne in mind that Edwards has already said that the Mind has a "preference" for the pursuance of the Good which is an unalterable tendency of the Mind. Therefore, from his point of view, the Mind simply cannot choose the inferior, or weaker Motive, because, by its very nature, it is constituted only to pursue the Good, or the "most" pleasing to the Mind.

Having drawn attention to this factor in the system of Edwards, the discussion now moves to examine how his system of Determinism challenges the Kantian conception of Motive, and the following points will reveal how these opposing systems interpret the supreme task imposed upon their respective systems, that is, to state what "determines" the Will.

First, from an examination of the contending systems of Kant and Edwards, it is obvious that they are both intensely interested in one supreme question -- "What determines the the Will?" and it is because they both regard this

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.6.
(2) " " " " " " 2. " 10.

question as important that the present section upon Motive becomes vital to their respective systems. Yet, it is also obvious that Kant is much more interested in another question -- "What ought to determine the Will?" and it is Kant's absorbing interest in this question which marks his system as distinct from, and opposed to, that of Edwards. Of course, Edwards is also interested in the question "What ought to determine the Will?" and his great works on Theology and Morals make impressive attempts to answer this question but, here, in his system of Determinism, he claims that the first question is alone important, and must be answered in accordance with the facts available in "empirical" Psychology. In his Theological expositions, Edwards argues that the Sovereignty of God primarily and finally determines the Will of man, but as already observed, this aspect of his Determinism is kept within reasonable bounds while he is discussing its psychological implications. In his work on Morals, he argues that man ought to love that which has the greatest possible "Being in general"; that is, he is commanded by the law of real Morality to love God supremely and fully. However, these are questions of Theology and Morals; and, in the view of Edwards, merit separate treatment from that of Psychology. In a very real sense, Kant would agree with Edwards on this distinction of Morality from Psychology and, it is for this very purpose, he had set out upon the task of finding a "moral" Motive as distinct from a "psychological" Motive. However, Edwards would insist that Kant was involving his system of Morality in a hopeless contradiction. For, although Kant was repudiating the conclusions of "empirical" Psychology as a basis for Morality, he was still involved with "empirical" man; and he would view Kant's distinction of the "noumenal" and "phenomenal" in man as the flutterings of a vain hope to find an escape from the burden of this oppressive "Naturalism". For Edwards, natural man, in spite of all his

supposed rational and moral attributes, is in the "Flesh" and is carnal, stupid and blind. Only one thing can determine his Will and that is the passion of "private" Happiness; and only one thing can redeem him, and that is a New Birth, given by GOD.

Edwards is a competent student of Psychology. In fact, his works, "Surprising Conversions" (1736), "Thoughts on Revival" (1740), and "Religious Affections" (1746) constitute one of the greatest efforts of Christian thought in psycho-analysis; and place Edwards in the first rank of Christian thinkers upon this subject. In other words, Edwards is perhaps the most astute investigator of "human nature" in the whole of Christian thought. This fact is of vital importance in the present discussion because Edwards and Kant appear to stand for two distinct and opposing views of human nature. Both claim to have examined the data available for an Understanding of man, and both provide ample evidence of their diligence and competence in this direction. Yet, both provide conclusions upon the nature of man which are directly opposed; and, upon this major question -- "What determines the Will?" the subject of Motivation, both give radically different answers. An attempt has been made to understand Kant's interpretation of Motive, and now that interpretation must be challenged by the Determinism of Edwards. The following points indicate the depth of this challenge.

Second, Edwards would regard Kant's description of a "moral" Motive in "natural" man as little short of fantastic; and he would be inclined to write it off as a vain attempt to superimpose upon human nature the implications of a totally false Idealism. He would argue that such a view of human nature requires that man shall be a "Saint", whereas in truth and in fact, man is a "Sinner". This objection by Edwards must not be dismissed as theological prejudice. It is far too important to be put

aside as mere dogmatism, because Kant must finally come face to face with this fact of "Radical Evil"; and, when he does, it will be observed that this objection of Edwards is no mere beating the air. Kant puts off this analysis of Radical Evil to the end of his ethical discussions, but there can be little doubt that this concept haunted all he wrote on Morality, and, when it is finally confronted, gives new light upon his moral teaching. Edwards is quite well aware of what is meant by real Morality, and his description of the ethical ideal is very similar to Kant's. The following extract indicates how much they had in common upon this important subject:-

> "It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but, that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good, is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of the mind."(1)

This is the basic teaching of Edwards upon moral values, and, in content, it is identical with that of Kant. In other words, Edwards is saying to Kant -- "I am perfectly aware of what is meant by real morality, and I agree with you completely upon the nature of the moral ideal. Yet, I cannot agree that, because this moral ideal is a fact of general approval, or even a fact of human consciousness, you are justified in saying that such an "Ought" in human nature necessarily implies a "Can" or an "Ability" in human nature to fulfil this Ought." Further, Edwards would agree that the Moral Law "Ought" to determine the Will of man. Man "Ought" to be motivated by a purely moral spring, but, he would argue, the plain, simple, and stubborn facts of life declare that man is motivated by

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(1) Original Sin. Pt.2. Ch. 1.

a very different spring. Edwards confirms this argument by quoting the following extract from Locke:-

> "Were the will determined by the views of the good, as it appears in comtemplation, greater or less to the understanding; it would never get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed, and considered as possible; the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honour, or any other worldly pleasure ....."(1)

This, says Edwards, is what would happen if the Will of man was determined by the Moral Law, or acted upon a true "moral" Motive, and Edwards regrets that it is not so. Rather, he finds that man is motivated in a radically different manner. Here is his description of Motivation in human nature:-

> "The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course, become reigning principles; having no superior principles regulate or control them, they become absolute masters of the heart."(2)

Why all this is so relevant to the present discussion is due to the fact that, when Kant comes to discuss Radical Evil, he appears to agree completely with Edwards in his diagnosis of human nature.

Later, it will be observed how Kant handles "Radical Evil". Here and now, it is sufficient to note that his description of this feature of human nature is equal in depth of "Evil" to anything said by Edwards. (a) It is radical badness and corruption. (b) It is age-long and universal. (c) It makes impossible the establishment of real Morality. (d) It cannot be explained in terms of man's limited, or physical nature. (e) It is freely accepted Evil. (f) It lies in ambush in Reason, the very citadel of human personality. All these elements within Radical Evil make Kant feel that one must turn "away his eye from the conduct of men, lest he should fall into another vice, namely,

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(1) Original Sin. Pt.1. Ch.1. Sect. 6.
(2) " " Pt.4. Ch.2.

misanthropy."(1) Further, he seems to agree with Edwards even in his diagnosis of human nature:-

> "Consequently a man (even the best) is bad only by this, that he reverses the moral order of the springs in adopting them into his maxims; he adopts, indeed, the moral law along with self-love; but perceiving that they cannot subsist together on equal terms, but that one must be subordinate to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the spring of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law ...."(2)

As a possible reply to Edwards upon this important point of Motivation, it might be argued that all Kant is doing in this particular section "Of the motives of Pure Practical Reason" is arguing for an ideal state of Motivation for the truly moral man. In other words, Kant is saying this is how man "Ought" to be Motivated if man wants to be a truly ethical being; and therefore, Edwards and Kant are talking about two very different orbits of human existence. Edwards is dealing with the "facts" of "Empirical" Psychology, and Kant is dealing with the "demands" of the Moral Law. Hence, there can be no real clash or conflict between their differing analyses and conclusions. One is speaking of the actual, and the other is speaking of the ideal. There is an element of truth in such an explanation, but, unfortunately for this difficult question of Motivation, it is not sufficient to ignore the challenge of Determinism. The simple fact is that, in this section, Kant is convinced that he is giving an explanation of how the moral Motive operates in the actual man of every-day experience, and that is why he thinks he is giving a final reply to Empiricism. To deny this, makes havoc of his basic principles of Autonomy, Respect, the Categorical Imperative, and Duty as opposed to "fanaticism"; all of which are stressed in this section. If further confirmation were required on this point that Kant is really describing "natural" man, the following ex-

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(1) Religion. 37.
(2) Religion. 40.

tract would be suitable. Kant has been describing how a Motive evolves into a Maxim by way of an Interest, and insists that all three notions, Motive, Interest and Maxim, can be applied only to finite beings, and goes on to say:-

> "For they all suppose a limitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason; they suppose that the being requires to be impelled to action by something, because an internal obstacle opposes itself."(1)

Edwards would fasten upon the above admission "that the subjective character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason"; and charge Kant with giving too little real emphasis to the nature of this "internal obstacle". In other words, Kant is here attempting to describe the reaction of "natural" man to the Moral Law, and begs the vital question of such a reaction by a very ambiguous reference to "Moral Inability". This is an important point in favour of Edwards and must be looked at in greater detail later. Here and now, it seems quite obvious that Kant, in this particular section on Motivation, intends his analysis of a moral Motive to hold true of "natural" man, and this is important for the criticism of such Motivation by Edwards. The argument of Edwards appears perfectly simple and straightforward, and might be paraphrased in these terms -- "I have done my best to understand the nature of natural man. I have examined him in the world, and in his general conduct in society. I have come to the conclusion that natural man is dominated by the principle of self-love; and all the ornaments of his civilisation are but the working out of this principle of self-love. In this natural state, he is incapable of even feeling a regard or respect for the Moral Law. It is only as he becomes a new creature, by the Grace of God, that he can begin to feel respect for God and His Law. I have noted carefully the reactions of persons who have passed

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(1) K. p. V. 206.

through this "spiritual" experience, and all my evidence convinces me that my estimation of "natural" man is correct. Further, all the data available in Psychology confirm my analysis. Therefore, I do not need to appeal to Theology to expound Determinism; for, the plain facts of Psychology afford a most convincing proof of man's nature, and of his inability to escape from his own character 'which is actually self-centred.'"

Now, has Kant any reply to this criticism by Determinism that his selection of a "moral" Motive discusses, in an artificial manner, the subject of Motivation? The only reply that Kant could give to such a criticism has already been given. It is centred in his particular interpretation of Psychology, and this view of Psychology is maintained in a consistent manner in the Critical Philosophy. In other words, Kant's restriction upon psychological Tenability is not merely a "moral" restriction. That is, he does not disregard Psychology simply on moral grounds; rather his limitation upon psychological Justification goes much deeper. For instance, the following extract taken from "The Critique of Pure Reason" indicates how deeply Kant felt upon this matter of Psychology:-

> "How are we to regard empirical psychology, which has always claimed its place in metaphysics, and from which in our times such great things have been expected for the advancement of metaphysics, the hope of succeeding by a priori methods having been abandoned. I answer that it belongs where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature belongs, namely, by the side of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy; it is therefore so far connected with applied philosophy, though not to be confounded with it. Empirical psychology is thus completely banished from the domain of metaphysics; it is indeed already completely excluded by the very idea of the latter science. In conformity, however, with scholastic usage we must allow it some sort of place (although as an episode only) in metaphysics."(1)

Therefore, the criticism of Determinism against Kant's particular view of Motivation goes much deeper than this particular analysis under discussion. In fact, it is a

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(1) K. r. V. A.848.

a criticism against the whole Critical Philosophy, and Kant would be compelled to abandon the whole of his thesis on Metaphysics if he wished to bring his view of man in line with that of Edwards. As already stated, for Kant, the primary and supreme purpose of man centres in his rational and moral nature. He does not deny the real existence of "psychological facts", but these things can have meaning only as they are viewed against their proper background and within their correct context. Of course, there are Impulses, Desires, and Motives arising from the empirical or sensuous nature of man, but to think of these "psychological phenomena" as capable of determining the "thing-in-itself" is for Kant a metaphysical absurdity. It simply cannot happen. From the moral point of view, Kant is equally emphatic.

The following passage is of particular interest in confirming the present analysis of the "moral" Motive:-

> "The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly detected by the resistance of a practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone."(1)

In other terms, it appears that Kant is quite unable to accept the mere possibility of the "Mind" being moved to action by "Motives" which arise from what he terms the "Empirical" Self. Such a view of "Motive" is metaphysically, morally and even psychologically, impossible. It is metaphysically impossible because Impulses etc. belong to the phenomena of the "empirical" Self. It is morally impossible because the Moral Law acts regardless

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(1) K. p. V. 221.

of the Inclinations; and it is psychologically impossible because such Impulses are quite incapable of belonging to the real, noumenal Self, and when they are recognised by man, they are "conditioned" by the Moral Law, and cease to be real factors in Motivation except through that Moral Law. In a limited way, T.H. Green can be said to be putting Kant's argument on Motivation in other terms when he writes:

> "The sensible event or phenomenon, implied in the motive, is, like every other event, determined by antecedent events according to natural laws. The motive itself, though it too is in its own way definitely determined, is not naturally determined. It is constituted by an act of self-consciousness, which is not a natural event, an act in which the agent presents to himself a certain idea of himself, of himself doing or himself enjoying, as an idea of which the realisation forms for the time his good."(1)

It is upon this insistence of the "moral and rational recognition" of Motive that Kant's teaching is particularly strong. As already observed, Edwards, too, insists upon Motive being extant to the Mind. However, he fails to give this required emphasis, which is found in Kant, that the psychological factors which excite and invite the Mind to Volition are, by the very "recognition" of the Mind, transformed from merely human "determinants" of the Mind to being "determined" by the Mind.

Third, in a further criticism, Edwards would argue that Kant's definition and analysis was far too "rational". That is, Edwards would contend that Kant's interpretation of Motivation was but a new edition of the old thesis that the Will is subject to the last dictate of the Understanding. In the particular section under review, Kant is not very emphatic upon this inherent "rationality" of the Motive, but it is a very deeply rooted feature of his doctrine of morals. For instance, the following extract is typical of large sections of Kant's argument for fulfilling the Moral Law:-

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(1) Prolegomena to Ethics. Page 99.

> "I will allow that no interest urges me to this, for that would not give me a categorical imperative, but I must take an interest in it, and discern how this comes to pass; for this 'I ought' is properly an 'I would' valid for every rational being, provided that reason determines his actions without any hindrance."(1)

In other words, for Kant, there is only one Motive for moral actions, and that is, being subject to the dictate of Reason through Respect for the Moral Law. Edwards argues that those who hold to such a view of Motivation must give up speaking about the Freedom of the "Will". For, in this statement, the Will is determined, not by itself, but by another aspect of the Personality, namely, the Reason or Understanding. Edwards uses this argument in a convincing manner against his particular opponents, but against Kant it is not very impressive because; [illegible], IN Kant, the Will is only another term for the Practical Reason; and therefore Kant escapes the charge of allowing the Will to be determined by a faculty other than itself. However, the argument of Edwards, as already observed in his definition of Motive, insists upon viewing Motivation in a much wider sense than is permitted by Kant. Of course, Kant is speaking of a Motive for Morality, but, again, Edwards would stress that this "rational" Motive is an artificial restriction on a discussion of Motivation. In other words, says Edwards, it is all very well to keep this restriction on Motivation for the purposes of stating how moral and rational actions "ought" to take place, but the vast number of human beings do not react to the Moral Law in this way, and a full analysis of Motive must take into account how men behave as well as how they "ought" to behave.

Further, Edwards is not really concerned about those who would identify the Will with Reason or the Understanding.

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(1) Gd. 82.

As far as he is concerned, they can make such an identification without too much objection from his system.(1) However, his argument goes much deeper than this and probably concerns Kant upon one of the primary doctrines of his Freedom of the Will.

A cardinal feature of all systems of Determinism is that the act of Will is a "necessary" act, or that the Will is "necessitated". As Edwards says, if it is argued that the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding, or is even identified with the Understanding, then, it cannot be denied that the "freedom" of the Will is given up, and, in its place, it is agreed that the act of the Will is a "necessary" act.

> "For if the determination of the Will .... follows the light, conviction/view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the will .... then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this light or view of the Understanding ...."(2)

Now, this is all Edwards requires of any discussion of Will to conclude that such a discussion is really a confirmation of his system of Determinism. There is considerable evidence in the writings of Kant to conclude that he was deeply concerned with this problem of Necessity, both in the physical and moral spheres. Further, much of his teaching is that a moral act is a "necessary" act of Will, and the following extract is typical of such a doctrin

> "Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and inclinations, and on the contrary conceives actions as possible to him, nay, even as necessary, which can only be done by disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations."(3)

Such a statement by Kant would be viewed by Edwards as conclusive that Kant taught a system of Determinism. It might be a "moral" Determinism, or Determinism by the "objective"

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect. 9.
(2) " " " " " Pt.2. Sect. 9.
(3) Gd. 92.

principle, but it would be determinism, and Edwards would view as inconsistent any argument by Kant that his moral system was directed to an exposition or even a "Defence" of Freedom. Yet, on the other hand, Kant seems to give great importance to that part of Freedom which he terms "absolute spontaneity". The following is typical:-

> "For in reference to the supersensible consciousness of its existence, (i.e. Freedom) the life of sense is but a single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral law (i.e. of the character) must be judged not according to the physical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon, but according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom." (1)

Again, this insistence, by Kant, of the absolute spontaneity of Freedom is no mere addendum to his view of Freedom. It is woven into the very texture of his metaphysical structure,(2) and when he speaks of Freedom in "The Critique of Pure Reason" it is this type of Freedom which he has in mind.

> "Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the laws of causality."(3)

Therefore, on the surface, Kant appears to have two distinct conceptions of a free act. (a) It is a necesary act of the Will which has for its motive Respect and is involved in the fulfilment of the Moral Law. (b) It is a free act which springs directly from the absolute spontaneity of Reason, and in which Reason has no antecedent ground or Motive. However, deeper down in Kant's system, there is always a real effort to explain this assumed contradiction, and the following extract is one of the examples of this effort:

> "Reason, from which alone can springa rule involving necessity, does, indeed, give necessity to this precept (else it would not be an imperative), but this is a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot be supposed in the same degree in all subjects." (4)

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(1) K. p. V. 230.
(2) K. r. V. A.50. A.68. A.97.
(3) K. r. V. A.533.
(4) K. p. V. 127.

Kant seems to be saying that an act can be both free and necessary, and he tries to explain that it is free because it springs from Reason which is absolute spontaneity, and it is necessary because it is directed by the "Categorical" Imperative which is made "necessary" by subjective condition This might be an escape for Kant from the charge that he taught two conflicting doctrines of Freedom, but it does not save him from all responsibility for teaching that, in the final analysis, a moral act of Will is a "necessary" act of Will, and it is this aspect which interests Edwards in this particular section on Motivation.

Fourth, this suspicion that Kant is expounding some form of Determinism is not lessened by the fact that, in the analysis of Motivation in this particular section, Kant appears to say that the Moral Law affects the Inclinations in some "automatic" manner. It is important to note that Kant speaks of the Moral Law as "thwarting" the Inclinations, as "checking selfishness and striking down self-conceit". Again, he terms the Moral Law as positive, and as "an intellectual causality"; it is an "activity" of Practical Reason, and he assumes that the Inclinations require to be "impelled" to action by something other than the Inclinations. All these terms tend to present an impression of "compulsion" by the Moral Law as it stands related to the Inclinations; and this impression gains force when Kant goes on to describe the sentiment of Respect The Moral Law "removes the resistance out of the way", that is, the resistance of the Inclinations, and is the "positive source of this humiliation" which is Respect. The following passage indicates the "Causality" of the Moral Law concerning Respect.

> "For by the fact that the conception of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and self-conceit of its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason, and produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to the impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by removing the counterpoise, it gives relatively greater weight to the law in the judgment of reason ...."(1)

Again, when Respect is finally "produced", man only "reluctantly" gives way to it. It is difficult, if not impossible to avoid thinking of the Moral Law as something which presses in upon the Inclinations with almost irresistible compulsion and sweeps them up or aside in some automatic manner. The position of Kant upon such Motivation by the Moral Law is made all the more complicated by the fact that he draws a distinction between the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will; and it is not altogether besides the point to ask -- "What part does the "Elective" Will play in such a system of Motivation? Is it identified with the "Rational" Will, or is it just swept up or aside by the Moral Law which is the "Rational" Will?"
Further, it has been noted that one of the pivots of the Determinism of Edwards is the identification of the Will with the Mind, that is, as it stands related to the "Agreeable" or the "apparent" Good. Edwards will have no talk of a "vacancy" between the Mind's recognition of the Agreeable, or that which suits it, and the act of the Will as Preference or Choice. No man can ever Will different from what the Mind really desires; therefore "Indifference"; volitional deliberation, or noncommitment is ruled out as a figment of the Imagination. Of course, this type of Determinism is different from anything said by Kant because this system of Determinism expounded by Edwards is motivated by the principle of "private" Happiness, or that which is "Agreeable", in a sensible meaning, to the Mind. Edwards' view of Motive is psychological and "sensuous" in

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(1) K. p. V. 201.

this particular exposition of his Determinism. Yet, he would not change his definition of Motive even when it is applied to his "Saved" man. Man would still be motivated in some "automatic" manner, except, of course, his Motive now would be the Law of God. In fact, in a later criticis[illegible] by Edwards, it will be seen that Edwards conceives of the "Spirit of God" affecting the human heart in a manner almost identical with Kant's description of the Moral Law affecting the Inclinations. This is what he means by the "irresistible" Grace of God. Yet, it is still Determinism, and the definition of Motive given by Edwards still holds good. Of course, in the above analysi of a "moral" Motive by Kant, he speaks of "the moral law presented for our obedience"(1), and of a "free submission of the will to the law".(2) Yet, there is something in the following extract which would make Edwards conclude that he and Kant had much in common:-

> "There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the pure moral law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our obedience by the practical reason, the voice of which makes even the boldest sinner tremble, and compels him to hide himself from it."(3)

Fifth, Edwards has a very interesting argument upon the "strength" of Motives which is crucial for his system of Determinism, and which must be stated in relation to the Kantian exposition. On the surface, Kant appears to have evaded this well-worn debate upon the "strength" of Motives, yet, beneath the surface of his exposition of Motive, there is a clear indication that he has very decided views upon this subject. Edwards argues that, although Motives cannot be measured in an exact manner, there are such things as a weak and a strong Motive. Otherwise, there would be no conflict of Motives. Edwards insists that the Will is always moved by the "strongest"

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(1) K. p. V. 205.
(2) K. p. V. 206.
(3) K. p. V. 205.

Motive, and this seems a mere truism until it is understood what Edwards means by the "strength" of a Motive. His argument is that the Mind, or Self, in all its operations, has, what he terms, a "previous tendency", which is the Mind's view of its "apparent" Good. That is, the Self seeks what it believes to be its Good, or what is "agreeable" to it. Now, not all Motives serve this "apparent" Good, but that Motive which suits the previous tendency of the Mind has, in this very "suitability" to the Agreeable, that element which can be termed its "strength". When Edwards is challenged by his opponents to explain how it happens that sometimes a "weak" Motive prevails over what is obviously a very"strong"Motive, he answers that this seeming victory of a "weak" Motive over a "strong" Motive is explained by the fact that the supposed "weak" Motive actually prevailed because it had this "previous tendency" of the Mind, that is, it really contained that factor which was "Agreeable" to the Mind. It fitted in with the Mind's view of the Good. Earlier, in his exposition of Determinism, he had said, "a man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will;"(1) and he follows up this by saying, "it is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." Therefore, he feels justified in saying, "that the will always is, as the greatest apparent good is." Of course, all this means that the act of the Will is a "necessary" act. It is <u>not free to choose</u> its own Motives. In other terms, the Mind is already "necessitated" by its view of its"apparent"Good, and only those Motives which fit into this already established order or urge can possibly prevail.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect. 2.

This view of Motive is essential to his system, and that is why he was so emphatic in his denial of the Liberty of "Indifference". The Mind or Will can never be in such a state of "Indifference", for it is always intent on that which is Agreeable to itself. For the Mind or Will to be at Liberty to choose its own Motives would mean that, in this supreme act of Choice, it would be making such a Choice without a Motive. This subject has already been discussed in the section dealing with the "Indifference" of the Will; the main point here and now is to relate this view of Motive with that expressed by Kant. Again, on the surface, Kant appears to favour the idea that the Self can choose its own Motives:-

> "A man may use as much art as he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act that he remembers, as an unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in which he was carried away by the stream of physical necessity, and thus to make himself out innocent, yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his favour can by no means silence the accuser within, if only he is conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, in possession of his freedom."(1)

Obviously, such a passage illustrates the possibility of the Will choosing to be determined by a "Physical" Motive, or by a "Moral" Motive, and, as already indicated, there is much of such teaching in the Kantian exposition of Freedom. However, this apparent "Indifference" of the Will in Kant has already been balanced by the other aspect of his teaching, that is, that the Will can be Determined only as a "moral" Will, by the Moral Law. Yet, it is perfectly clear that, if this second aspect of Kant's teaching is chosen as really fundamental and essential to his system, Kant seems to be coming near again to teaching some form of Determinism.

Kant does not lessen this agreement with some form of Determinism when he asks how men become conscious of the

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(1) K. p. V. 230.

Moral Law and answers, "by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them."(1)

However, in the section of Motivation now under discussion, there is one passage where Kant seems to meet Edwards face to face, and the crucial aspects of their disagreement are brought into correct focus. Kant is discussing what he terms "comparative freedom", and there can be little doubt that he is coming very near to what Edwards calls "Freedom". The argument is, let it be assumed that a man commits a wrong act, a "theft". Now, says Kant, it can be argued that he did such an act as a "necessary result of the determining causes in preceding time". In fact, according to the understanding of such causes and laws, it was impossible that this act could not have happened. Kant believes that, in spite of all these factors, a moral judgment can be uttered concerning this wrong act. It "ought" to have been (omitted). Kant then goes on to say that some argue that, even faced with these factors of physical Necessity, the man who committed the "theft" had Freedom, at least, he had what is termed "comparative" Freedom. Edwards would add, yes, in that he did what he wanted to do, and what he did was "pleasing" to him to do. Kant says this notion of "comparative" Freedom is based on the argument that there is in the agent what is sometimes called a "free effect, the determining physical cause of which lies <u>within</u> in the acting thing itself." That is, the free effect is like a projectile which continues on its way in "Freedom" because it is urged by nothing, at that moment external to itself. Or, it is like a clock which has Freedom to move its hands "itself". Then, he says something which describes in fairly accurate terms the view of "Freedom" expounded by Edwards.

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(1) K. p. V. 140. 146.

> "So although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which precede in time, we yet call them free, because these causes are ideas produced by our own faculties, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances, and hence actions are wrought according to our own pleasure."(1)

In his exposition of Determinism, it is this view of Liberty which Edwards expounds as a genuine theory of Liberty, in fact, it is the only theory of Liberty which is compatible with all the evidence available. Perhaps, these two extracts, Edwards gives the clearest idea of what he means by such Freedom:-

> "Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (2)

> "When a thing is <u>from</u> a man, in that sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his will is in it, so far as the will is in it, blame is in it, and no further."(3)

This all sounds very reasonable, unless it is borne in mind that, for Edwards, the whole process of Choice is linked together with the previous tendency of the Mind, and this chain of cause and effect is unbreakable and unalterable. Yet, says Edwards, this is the only Liberty possible, that is, "the Liberty of doing as you like". Kant condemns this "<u>comparative</u>" Freedom, and charges its exponents with petty word-jugglery resulting in "a wretched subterfuge". This "comparative" Freedom, says Kant, might be termed "psychological" Freedom, but its fatal weakness is that it stands grounded in "physical Necessity" That is, an endless chain of links of cause and effect. It is against this spurious idea of Freedom that Kant puts his idea of "transcendental" Freedom which is independence of everything Empirical, and he feels that such a Freedom is the only real ground for responsibility. Therefore, it appears quite obvious from the above "clash" of viewpoints

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(1) K. p. V. 226.
(2) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.1. Sect.5.
(3) " " " " " Pt.4. Sect.13.

that Edwards and Kant mean very different things when they speak of Human Freedom, and it appears quite obvious that Kant has said some very devastating things about such a Freedom advocated by Edwards. However, the real trouble always begins when Kant attempts to give a "positive" interpretation to his idea of "transcendental" Freedom:-

> "But the very same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and regards himself as determinable by laws which he gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will ...."(1)

Edwards would reply to such a passage, "every act of the will has a cause...., if it has a cause, then, it is necessary;"(2) and there the struggle must end for the time being.

Sixth, there is an indirect criticism of Edwards concerning Kant's exposition of the "moral" Motive which ought to receive appropriate attention. It is a phase of a more general criticism of Kant, and might be put in the following terms. All Kant's ethical expositions appear to be more than mere moral analyses; many of them are, in fact, passionate preaching of concepts which are inherent in religion. Kant seems to have carried forward a system of transvaluation. That is, he has moralised religion, and spiritualized Morality.(3) In this particular section on "moral" Motive, this tendency is most apparent. Edwards, or any Theological Determinist, would have charged Kant with expounding a definite "religious" experience under the guise of a moral analysis. He would have insisted that the tone and content of this particular section on Motivation are nothing more or less than those which really belong to Religion, and to Religion only. In his theological works, Edwards devotes much time and care to a

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(1) K. p. V. 228.
(2) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.13.
(3) See Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Page 63.

similar type of Motivation, but with this difference. He makes such Motivation religious in content and implication. That is, he thinks of the Law of God exercising upon the human heart this majesty and awe which are so evident in the Kantian analysis. The Causality of the Moral Law as expressed by Kant, is, by Edwards, conceived as the Holy Spirit bringing to the human consciousness the inexorable command of God, and the reaction to such a Causality is the Christian doctrine of the "conviction of Sin". Further, this conviction of Sin, or as Kant terms it, "intellectual self-depreciation", results in "conversion", or what Kant terms -- "Respect". These two expositions have so much in common that it is also impossible to avoid the conclusion that they are describing the one and same experience. As already stated, Kant was perfectly aware of this impressive "theological" system of Determinism set forth by Augustine, Luther and Calvin; and the Pietism in which he was trained was saturated with this theological interpretation. It is difficult to ignore these factors in any appraisal of Kant's exposition of the "moral" Motive, and the question is whether Kant, consciou ly or otherwise, is borrowing a central doctrine of Theological Determinism to give support to a moral doctrine of Freedom. This question is all the more pertinent because of the fact that when Kant really comes to grips with Motive in his analysis of Radical Evil, he takes refuge in the theological doctrine of "Conversion".

In order to indicate the importance of this point of criticism, it is necessary to glance at the manner in whic Edwards conceives the work of the Spirit of God upon the human heart, and the following phases of such a work might be noted in this order:-

(a) Edwards conceives of the Spirit of God operating upon the heart regardless of the Inclinations. As already observed, this is the act of the "irresistible" Grace of God

in providing Salvation; and this means that the Law of God is present to the human consciousness with overwhelming power and majesty. Edwards is speaking of the action of the Spirit of God as it brings before the human mind, the Divine Wrath, the Divine Glory, and the Divine Love, and writes:-

> "Human nature, which is as the grass, a shaking leaf, a weak withering flower, should totter under such a discovery. Such a bubble is too weak to bear a weight so vast. Alas, what is man that he should support himself under a view of the awful wrath, or infinite glory and love of JEHOVAH. No wonder therefore it is said ... 'No man can see me and live'." (1)

Kant speaks of the majesty of the Moral Law which "makes the boldest sinner tremble, and compels him to hide himself from it"; and he also speaks of the Moral Law "before which all the inclinations are dumb."(2)

(b) Edwards, in another work, goes on to describe some of the "practical" results of this presence of the Spirit of God:-

> "So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding. So that the new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise, for the same faculty of will."(3)

Kant's distinction of the "Rational" and "Elective" Will is not original. This dichotomy of Volition is as old as St. Paul; and Augustine, Luther and Calvin make reference to this conflict within the Self. Edwards gives the above explanation of the origin of the "new" Will in man. It is concerning this "new" Will that Edwards could agree with Kant when he says -- "The rational Will, which is directed to nothing but the law only, cannot be called either free or unfree".(4) The only difference being that Edwards is

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(1) Thoughts on Revival. Pt.1. Sect.2.
(2) K. p. V. 215.
(3) Religious Affections. Pt.3. Sect.1.
(4) M. d. S. Intro. 28.

more consistent than Kant in expounding such a system of Determinism.

(c) A further result of the action of the Spirit of God upon the human heart is the fact of "Humiliation":--

> "But the essence of evangelical humiliation consists in such humility as becomes a creature in itself exceedingly sinful, under a dispensation of grace, consisting in a mean esteem of himself, as in himself nothing, and altogether contemptible and odious.." (1)

Yet, this is not the final result of the impact of the Spirit of God upon the human heart. Edwards insists there is another aspect to such an impact:--

> "When persons have been exercised with extreme terrors, and then there is a sudden change to light and joy.... (2)

He also regards as finally contradictory to his view of Religion that persons should be Good out of "a slavish fear of Hell."(3)

In order to appreciate the full force of these similarities in Kant and Edwards two facts must be borne in mind.
(1) Kant never really got away from the theological background in which the Christian doctrines of Conversion, Sanctification and Election lay embedded. It is true that his ethical emphasis was original and passionate, but it is also true that his "Theology" was the traditional type. There is nothing in Kant of "natural" Theology which denies flatly the very basis for such doctrines. Kant is convinced that these Christian doctrines are realities, but that they stand in need of more "rational" justification, and this he attempts in his work "Religion within the limit of mere Reason". In other terms, Kant conceives his work as fulfilling rather than destroying these cardinal feature of the Christian religion; and, as already stated, he does not do this in order to pose as orthodox, but because

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(1) Religious Affections. Pt.3. Sect. 6.
(2) Narrative of Conversions. Sect. 3.
(3) Religious Affections. Pt.3. Sect. 9.

he believes profoundly in their fundamental reality.
(2) Further, it must be borne in mind, that Edwards, in addition to gathering up into his system all the great heritage of Theological Determinism, has welded it all together in the flame of an ardent Mysticism. Edwards is a Pietist, as well as being a Theological Determinist; and his emphasis upon "practical" Christianity is as impressive as Kant's. In fact, he makes the same careful distinction as Kant between "Legal" and "Moral" values, except that Edwards terms "Moral" values as "Evangelical"; and both agree that Goodness must come from a Good principl of Will, and not from supposed "Good" Actions.

If there are reasonable grounds for assuming that Kant was influenced by these crucial doctrines of Theological Determinism, and that this influence resulted in his giving a definite religious experience under the guise of a moral analysis, then, the implications of such an assumption are important. (a) Such an assumption strengthens the argument that Kant's system of Morality and Freedom stands vitally related to some form of Determinism. (b) His central doctrine of the "Autonomy" of the Will, as that doctrine expounds "authorship" of the Moral Law must be received with considerable qualification. (c) His lack of emphasis upon the place and operation of the "Elective" Will in this particular section on Motivation cannot be attributed to mere oversight, but must be viewed as a failure to fit it into a scheme of things which was totally foreign to its content and function. In other words, Kant fails to give the "Elective" Will any real value in this particular analysis of Motivation because this system of Motivation was taken over from an exposition of Theological Determinism in which such a Will could find no possible place and function. The present discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom cannot attempt a dogmatic solution to all these difficulties of Kant's exposition of

Motive as such an exposition stands confronted with Determinism, but there can be no doubt about their existence, and Kant was quite aware of the imperfect character of his analysis. For he closes such an analysis with these words:

> "It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great difficulty in itself, and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid exposition. But is any other solution that has been attempted, or that may be attempted, easier or more intelligible? ..... If science is to be advanced, all difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search for those that are hidden ..... On the other hand, if the difficulties are intentionally concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or later they burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin in an absolute scepticism." (1)

It might well be that the Kantian exposition of a "moral" Motive raises many more difficulties than it solves, yet, such an exposition was needed by serious ethical thought, and it is extremely doubtful whether the whole of ethical thought contains a more praiseworthy attempt then is found in Kant. However, it cannot be said that this exposition has strengthened the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and it might well have revealed some of its most important weaknesses.

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(1) K. p. V. 235.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER SEVEN

FREEDOM and MORAL EVIL

"Moreover, I find it difficult to excite myself very much over right and wrong in practice. I have no clear idea of what people have in mind when they say that they labour under a sense of sin; yet I do not doubt that, in some cases, this is a genuine experience, which seems vitally important to those who have it, and may really be of profound ethical and metaphysical significance.

(Dr. Broad. Five Types of Ethical Theory. Preface.)

"This method of averting one's attention from evil, and living simply in the light of good is splendid as long as it will work. It will work with many persons; it will work far more generally than most of us are ready to suppose; and within the sphere of its successful operation there is nothing to be said against it as a religious solution. But it breaks down impotently as soon as melancholy comes; and even though one be quite free from melancholy one's self, there is no doubt that healthy-mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts which it refuses positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality; and they may after all be the best key to life's significance, and possibly the only openers of our eyes to the deepest levels of truth."

(James. The Varieties of Religious Experience.
Page 163.)

"The new will which I began to have was not yet strong enough to overcome that other will, strengthened by long indulgence. So these two wills, one old, one new, one carnal, the other spiritual, contended with each other and disturbed my soul. I understood by my own experience what I had read, 'flesh lusteth against spirit, and spirit against flesh'. It was myself in both wills, yet more myself in that which I approved in myself than that which I disapproved in myself. Yet it was through myself that habit had attained so fierce a mastery over me, because I had willingly come whither I willed not."

(St. Augustine. Confessions. Book 8. ch. 5.)

"For guilt signifies authorship, and indeed not that of some guiding power above or behind the person, but authorship exclusively on the part of the person himself. ..... Here the person comes forward as a witness against himself, accuses himself, struggles against his own most vital interest. How could he do this, if there were not another reason for it in himself, if in him as a person there were not something of greater import, something distinctive of him, which demanded this negation and violation of life, precisely in order to preserve his integrity?"

(Hartmann. Ethics. Vol.3. Pages 173 and 175.)

It is quite impossible to press forward with the discussion of Kant's Defence of Freedom in the work -- "Religion within the limits of mere Reason" -- without making some attempt to justify Kant's intrusion into the "Theological" sphere. The important question is, why did Kant enter upon this difficult task of analysing Radical Evil? and, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to ask, at least, three subsidiary questions. (a) Was such a discussion necessary? (b) Was Kant sincere in such a discussion? (c) Was Kant competent to carry on such a discussion? The outcome of such questionings must have considerable bearing upon the validity of the Kantian Defence of Freedom in the realm of religion.

(a) Was such a discussion necessary?

To appreciate the importance of this question the following facts must be borne in mind.

(1) Kant had made it very clear that Ethics was a self-contained system.

> "A system of Ethics, therefore, needs no Religion, neither objectively to aid man's will, nor subjectively, as respects his ability, to aid his power; but stands, by force of pure practical reason, self-sufficient and independent."(1)

This statement is important because it sums up the whole of Kant's teaching upon the independence of ethical discussion over against the supposed intrusion of Theology in matters pertaining to Morality. Kant insisted upon Freedom from Theological presuppositions in his analysis of the Moral Law. His contempt for "heteronymous" principles in the Determination of the Will indicates the depth of his opposition to

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(1) Religion. Preface. Trans. by Semple.

what he thought was a type of "theological" tyranny. That this is a real and vital part of the Kantian teaching is confirmed by one of his most serious exponents.(1) Of course, Kant modifies the above statement by saying that Ethics issues into Religion, but the reason he gives for such a modification is not very impressive. That is, such an issue safeguards man's "chief end", the union of goodness with happiness.

Dr. John Cairns does not welcome such an explanation:-

> "... this is the radical defect of Kant's religious scheme, that religion is by him subordinated to morality, as God is only required as an upholder of the connection between the moral law and happiness, and is not directly revealed as a Lawgiver."(2)

No competent Theologian would accept Kant's explanation as adequate because it would be argued that the concept of God, once accepted as an integral factor in any system of Ethics, must condition, rather than be conditioned by, such a system of Ethics. The argument of the "deus ex machina" is too ancient and disreputable to command serious consideration. (2) Another argument for doubting the advisability of Kant's discussion of Radical Evil is contained in the fact that he had already, in his system of Ethics, an interpretation of Evil which was at least consistent with his exposition of phenomena. In his classical reference to the nature and operation of the "Elective" Will, Kant gives a view of Evil which has been mentioned in the discussion of the "Indifference" of the Will. However, the following extract gives the required emphasis at this point:-

> "Freedom in relation to the inner legislation of the reason is alone properly a power; the possibility of deviating from this is an impotence."(3)

Here is a view of Moral Evil as "inability" or "incapacity" which is perfectly consistent with a considerable area of Kant's teaching on Moral Freedom. Further, it would have been consistent with his Platonic leanings in Metaphysics,

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(1) Hartmann. Ethics. Vol.3. Page 263.
(2) Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century, Page 220. see also Fischer. Kant, Page 130.
(3) Intro. to the Metaphysic of Morals. Sect.28.

and his Stoic tendencies in Morality. Moral Evil interpreted as "ignorance" appears to be the logical sequence to Kant's theory of knowledge that the real nature of "the thing-in-itself" is unknowable. Again, his supposed disdain for a serious analysis of the inclinations, and emotional life of man would appear to justify an interpretation of Moral Evil as "impotence".(1) These facts appear to justify the question, why did Kant ignore the logical sequence of his system, and abandon a feasible doctrine of Moral Evil for an interpretation of Radical Evil which involved an intrusion into a realm in which he was ill at ease, and for which he seemed ill-prepared? Some attempt must be made to reply to this question. However, before such an attempt is possible, it is necessary to glance at the second of the subsidiary questions.

(b) Was Kant sincere in such a discussion?

In asking this question, it is not proposed to deal with the rather insipid suggestions that Kant wrote upon the subject of religion to satisfy public opinion that he was truly orthodox, that he was really nostalgic to his Pietistic training, or that he wished to supply Lampe with a God. All such questions can be asked only in an atmosphere which is completely hostile to his intellectual greatness and moral seriousness. The difficulty which prompts the above question is found in Kant's "Religion within the limits of Mere Reason" in which he appears to advocate the view that any exponent of a religious system is justified in having a "private" and an "official" interpretation of any Theological doctrine under discussion.

This "hermeneutical" doctrine is mentioned by Stuckenberg as having caused considerable criticism of Kant's handling of theological matters.(2) Further, Kant gives the impression, in his interpretation of Christian doctrine, that he is

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(1) Caird. The Critical Philosophy. Vol.2. Page 602.

(2) Stuckenberg's Life of Kant. Page 344 .

making a real effort at being tolerant about something which really does not matter in the least to him as a person. This attitude of detachment, even patronage to important aspects of religious dogma is calculated to create the impression that Kant was expounding what might be an "official" interpretation of religion without permitting his private convictions to intrude into the debate. Yet, however strong may be the evidence from this point of view, it is obvious, from a careful survey of Kant's theological discussions, that he was profoundly sincere in his handling of theological questions. His work -- "Religion within the limits of Mere Reason" -- brought upon him more acute criticism than any other of his works. From the State, the Church and the Public he received the most solemn warnings of disapproval. Yet, he declined to withdraw his interpretation of Christian doctrine.(1) There is no doubt about the fact that his reputation suffered by his deliberate intrusion into the theological sphere and his refusal to conform to the point of view which was held by the majority of thinkers on such topics. A contemporary, and rather contemptuous critic, charged Kant with daring to extend his metaphysical and moral theories into the realm of religion.(2)

Kant was pained by such criticism, but was quite unrepentant. His purpose is quite clear, it is to discuss the meaning and purpose of religion from the point of view of "Reason", but the term "Reason" must be kept within its strictly Kantian definition. It is not mere Rationalism or Naturalism that Kant is applying to Religion, rather it is Reason with all its implications of Freedom and Morality. Therefore, it seems reasonable to propose that this particular interpretation of Radical Evil, with which this discussion is mainly concerned, can be accepted, with minor qualifications, as

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(1) James Ward. A Study of Kant. Page 190.

(2) Preface to Second Edition of "Religion".

Kant's most careful and sincere appraisal of that aspect of Theology. As Kant himself says:-

> "Much that I, indeed, think with the clearest conviction and to my great satisfaction, I shall never have the courage to say; but I shall never say anything that I do not think."(1)

Further, his very searching paragraph upon Sincerity contained in the work under discussion could hardly have been written by a man who was saying one thing and meaning another.(2)

(c) Was Kant competent to carry on such a discussion?

Appreciation of Kant's genius in Metaphysics and Morals cannot be the final argument concerning his competency to discuss theological questions. From the evidence which is available, it appears that his knowledge of Theology was very limited, and one of his contemporaries writes:-

> "He (Kant) was, however, entirely ignorant of the new investigations of Semler, Ernesti, Noesselt, and others. His theological knowledge scarcely reached to 1760."(3)

Further, any informed appraisal of Kant's handling of the central doctrines of the Christian Faith must result in deciding that, upon many vital dogmas, Kant was hopelessly inconsistent, if not fatally puerile. For instance, his interpretation of the Deity of Jesus Christ is superficial to the last degree, and makes no advance upon the oldest and most discredited interpretations available in Christology. Dr. J.A. Dorner, probably the greatest Christologist of modern times, and a careful and sympathetic student of Kant, writes:-

> "Whatever relates to the historical Christ, Kant leaves unconsidered, nay more, by reducing the historical element in Him to a dead mass, he makes it altogether questionable, and is unable to give the dogma of the Person of Christ any other than a symbolical meaning."(4)

Dr. Dorner goes on to point out that Kant made Christ the perfect fulfilment of the Moral Law(5), and this as an actual

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(1) Stuckenberg's Life of Kant. Note 133.
(2) Religion. Bk. 4. Conclusion.
(3) Stuckenberg. Page 359.
(4) Person of Christ. Div.2. Vol.3. Page 39.
(5) Religion. Bk. 2. Apotome 2.

historical fact, and then goes on to say that the "historical" person does not really matter. Further, all this is done after Kant has solemnly assured his readers that Radical Evil can never be dealt with effectively unless there is an "actual" replacement of the Evil by the Good in human life. Further, Kant is willing to admit that the birth and departure of Christ were "miracles"; and yet persists in denying any real "historical" importance to such events, and even to such a life which was central to such happenings.

Dr. Emil Brunner puts his finger upon this central defect in Kant's handling of Christian Doctrine when he says:-

> "In the Christian religion 'Salvation' is always indissolubly connected with an historical fact; with the fact of the Incarnation of the Divine Word, with the fact of the Atonement by Jesus Christ. ..... In its essence a revelation which, by its very nature, can only take place once, differs absolutely from a revelation which, also by its very nature, can necessarily be repeated an indefinite number of times."(1)

Kant denies the "finality" of the Revelation in Jesus Christ, and he also denies the positive worth of its historical "facts". There is a further defect in Kant's handling of "Religion". It is quite clear from the work under discussion that Kant is set upon an exposition of nothing less than "A Philosophy of Religion". In other words, he is willing to accept Christianity as an agreed centre for the examination of what is of permanent worth in all religions. This is a most commendable undertaking, and its development in modern thought has been of great importance and benefit. However, Kant set forth upon such a task with very little real knowledge of the territory he was to survey. His knowledge of world religions was practically nil. His attitude to other aspects of religious faith was painfully intolerant, and his dogmatic assumptions concerning Judaism were indicative of a mind that seems never to have progressed beyond the most elementary Christian catechism.

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(1) The Mediator. Page 24 & 25.
See also, H.R. Mackintosh. Person of Jesus Christ, Page 249.

These defects in Kant's handling of religious questions must be granted, yet, they do not constitute the final WORD, nor, perhaps, the most important word which can be said concerning Kant's theological contribution.

Without lessening in the slightest degree the force of the above criticism of Kant, it is perfectly obvious that no exponent of modern Theology, who is aware of the basic principles of Kant's religious and moral teaching, will deny that he did effect a revolution in the realm of Christian apologetics; and the following points might be noted as factors in such a revolution. (a) By his moral seriousness, Kant brought his generation to a more careful and adequate recognition of moral values as they stood related to religion. (b) He began the erection of a bridge between Rationalism and Religion, and he made it possible to believe in what might be termed Rational Mysticism. (c) He brought the "super-sensible" into the midst of actual life, and his emphasis upon the "practical" nature of Reason was, in fact, a type of "incarnation" which helped to save Philosophy from perishing. (d) If modern Christianity is more tolerant of other forms of religious faith, this, to a great degree, is due to Kant who gave the first impetus to research into what was essential to religion. (e) If the many "Lives" of Christ which followed Kant's work in Religion, such as Strauss, Renan, etc., are essentially "Rational", they are also essentially "reverent". This is largely due to Kant who put a very high value upon the "ethical" significance of the Person of Jesus and His teaching. For Kant, Jesus was, at least, the "moral" Lord of Life.

This expression of appreciation of Kant's contribution to Religion provides the background against which can be answered the principal question of this preliminary discussion of Freedom and Radical Evil, that is, why did Kant enter upon this difficult task of analysing Radical Evil? The following reasons might constitute a possible reply.

First. Dr. C.D. Broad complains about what he terms:- "Kant's moral fanaticism".(1) However, Dr. Broad appears to fail to appreciate the fact that, if such a description is correct, the cause of such moral fanaticism is due to Kant having transferred to ethical discussion the fervour of a religious crusade. Kant uses moral concepts such as Duty, Moral Law, Reverence, Freedom and Responsibility with a new quality of meaning and feeling. Not even Butler, who was viewing Morality from a distinctly "religious" point of view, exceeds Kant in this sense.

Further, Dr. Broad indirectly gives the reason for this new quality of moral appreciation in Kant when he writes:-

> "Kant, on the other hand, holds that the fundamental laws of morality are the same for every rational being, whether man, angel or God, since the ultimate criterion of rightness is deducible from the concept of a rational being as such."(2)

In other words, the Kantian system of Morality is, by its very nature, inclusive of God and man. Morality for Kant is not with Hume -- the science of human nature; or with Butler acting according to human nature. Rather, with Kant, Morali includes the Divine and the human, and the result is that it is difficult for any student of Kant to draw a clear line of demarcation between the Religious and the Moral in his teaching. Even Kant is not always aware of this "transvaluation" in which he has involved his teaching; yet, it is this very fact which made him say that Ethics could be independent of Religion. Ethics was his Religion. Now, this elevation of moral analysis, this passionate preaching of ethical principles is important in Kant because it leads directly and inevitably to an analysis of "moral failure". Kant did not nee to go outside his system of Morality to discuss "Moral Evil". This concept haunts his ethical teaching as the inseparable shadow of the moral principle upon which he shed so much ligh Having given centrality and cruciality to the "Good" Will,

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(1) Five Types of Ethical Theory. Page 53.
(2) " " " " " Page 116.

Kant could not have avoided the discussion of its logical and moral opposite; and it is not pedantic to observe that T.K. Abbott has shown rare insight into the real meaning of Kant's ethical teaching by including an important section on Radical Evil as an essential part of Kant's "Ethics". It is obvious that Kant would have saved himself from considerable misunderstanding if he had never left the sphere of Ethics in his discussion of Evil, and if he had entered the sphere of Religious Dogmatics having dealt with Radical Evil as an essential part of his own system of Morality. For Kant makes a distinction between the concepts "Sin" and "Radical Evil". Sin is the "theological" interpretation of "Radical Evil", and Kant never uses the word "Sin" except to point out its right and limited meaning. This is an added reason why he should have dealt with the concept "Radical Evil" within its natural context.

Second. The present discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom is an attempt to indicate the validity of Kant's handling of this concept of Freedom in the thought of the Eighteenth-century. Whether this attempt is successful or not cannot really affect the fact that Kant is one of the most serious students of human Freedom in the history of Philosophy. His patient, sometimes ponderous, analysis of human Freedom has given this concept a new meaning and dignity in human thought. His clear repudiation of false theories of Freedom, his making Freedom the key-stone of his moral and metaphysical systems, his refinement of the concept from all that was gross and sensuous; all this meant that human Freedom was being exalted to a plane never before witnessed in human effort. Yet, all this could not take place without Kant becoming acutely aware of the fact of human "bondage". For it was only as Kant saw the real meaning of human Freedom that he saw the real meaning of human slavery. Kant had made his concept of Freedom too elevated and clear to ignore the chasm which separated the ideal from the actual

The price of human Freedom was too costly and precious, in the eyes of Kant, to allow him to accept superficial and spurious explanations of human "inability". As already observed in the discussion of Kant's interpretation of Motivation, the working of Kant's ethical system demands a quality of character comparable to an Ideal being, and its violation results in nothing less than a being of "Radical Evil". So, in this concept of Freedom, its very refinement demanded in its logical opposite a quality of "defilement" not available in the ordinary theories of human shortcoming. By his doctrine of phenomena and the causal series, Kant had already shut the door upon an explanation of human "inability" as being explicable in terms of the natural and the finite. Further, his doctrine of the practical and dynamic character of human Freedom made it impossible for him to rest in the theory that human failure was mere "impotence". In short, Kant's view of Freedom demanded from man the qualities of a real Saint, and its opposite constituted man a real "Sinner". Therefore, if Kant had not discussed "Radical Evil" he would have left his system lop-sided and incomplete, and it would have evaporated by its own supra-human idealism. For a durable "categorical imperative" is an "awareness" of the ideal and the actual, therefore, its command "thou shalt" must be balanced by the command "thou shalt not", and height and depth must be registered.

Third; the above argument for the inevitability of the Kantian treatment of "Radical Evil" in the presence of a serious view of human Morality and Freedom is strengthened somewhat by the fact that "bare" Determinism, scientific or psychological, has little or nothing to say about such a concept. Collins, Hartley and Hume have no real contribution to make to the appraisal of human failure. This is seen in their tacit refusal to discuss any real doctrine of "Sin"; and their lack of worthwhile emphasis upon punishment.

J.S. Mill puts the case of such Determinists in the following terms:-

> "If we believe we shall be punished for doing wrong, it is because the belief has been taught to us by our parents, and tutors, or by religion, or it is generally held by those who surround us, or because we have ourselves come to the conclusion by reasoning, from the experience of life. This is not Consciousness..... It is not, therefore, the belief that we shall be made accountable which can be deemed to require or presuppose the free-will hypothesis."(1)

Therefore, "psychological" Determinism says that Desert, or Accountability is not a fact of Consciousness, but a belief or "feeling" which is the product of empirical generalisation However, for Kant, desert, accountability, guilt and punishment are all intimately related, and form, what might be termed, the basis for a real and serious conception of Moral Evil. Of course, most psychological or scientific Determinists believe in some form of Evil, but it is usually termed "Social" Evil; it is never "Radical" Evil as outlined by Kant.

The case is different with "theological" Determinism. Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Edwards have very elaborate systems of "Sin" interwoven with their systems of Determinism and they make a very impressive case for its activity in huma affairs. However, it is obvious from a study of these syste of Determinism that the concept of moral Evil does not arise naturally from the implications of their Determinism, but is superimposed upon such Determinism by their theological presuppositions. This rather artificial linkage of moral Evil with theological Determinism must have been clear to the mind of Kant, and it is probable that this knowledge constituted a reason for his emphatic and profound treatment of "Radical Evil." However, it must be observed that, although theological Determinism does relate moral Evil to itself in a somewhat awkward manner, its doctrine of "Sin" is no artifici system in itself. It is believed that the following dis-

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(1) Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy. Page 571.

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cussion of "Radical Evil" will reveal that Kant had a supreme task before him in answering these closely reasoned systems of moral Evil.

If the above arguments assist in answering the principal question of this preliminary enquiry into "Radical Evil", they also tend to clarify an important point which must be made at this stage of the discussion. It is the fact that Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil" is vastly superior to any other section of his "theological" teaching. It is true that Kant ignores considerable areas of the Christian doctri of "Sin", but his sure touch upon this subject of "Radical Evil" compensates for any neglect of dogma. As already stated, this is due to the fact that an analysis of the violation of the Moral Law is an essential development of his ethical system. In dealing with Moral Failure, he is moving within an orbit of which is a supreme master, and he is handling an aspect of truth upon which he has few equals. This is no arbitrary ruling. It is the considered judgment of his theological critics, and the two following extracts are typical of a vast amount of tributes upon this point. Dr. John Cairns, who puts Kant down as one of the "unbeliever of the eighteenth-century, puts Kant in quite a different category with regard to "Radical Evil".

> "He preaches a much more Scriptural doctrine of human depravity than almost any philosopher. ..... This deeper view of Kant, as Julius Muller has said, has given great offence to the defenders of human goodness, as a kind of apostasy of the philosopher from himself."(1)

Further, Emil Brunner, a more modern and much more severe critic of Kant, is compelled to put Kant's treatment of "Radical Evil" upon a much higher level than the rest of his "theological" speculations.

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(1) Unbelief in the Eighteenth-Century. Page 220.

> "A sinner is not a human being who has sinned a certain number of times; he is a human being who sins whatever he is doing. So long as this is not perceived the gravity of sin is ignored, and the point of view remains superficial. Kant, with his doctrine of radical evil, reached this point. It cannot be helped that many people regard this doctrine as a mere speculation. We can only deplore the fact that they are too superficial to realise that this is the truth about themselves."(1)

Kant, says Brunner, is not preaching the "Christian" doctrine of Sin, and he ought to have gone much further than he did in his analysis of "Radical Evil". Yet, Brunner is ready to admit that, upon this particular aspect of Kant's teaching there is cause for a great degree of real satisfaction. It is believed as the analysis of "Radical Evil" proceeds that Kant will be shewn to have grasped its essential features with rare ability and insight.

(1) Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil".

In the present discussion of this subject, it is thought advisable to discuss the doctrine of Sin as held by theological Determinism along side of Kant's "Radical Evil". That is, the Doctrine of Sin as expounded by Edwards. He is the only Determinist of the Eighteenth-century who attempts to deal with this problem in any serious manner. In his "Freedom of the Will" he has clear and emphatic statements to make upon this particular aspect of Theology, but his more careful and crucial treatment is found in another sectio of his works, that is, in his formidable "Doctrine of Sin". Therefore, to allow Edwards the full force of his reply to the arguments of Kant's "Defence" of Freedom, attention must be paid to his more detailed study of the Doctrine of Sin.

(A) Kant begins with a discussion whether the world is becoming better or worse. He remarks that, First, there has always been a considerable body of opinion which is convinced that things are getting so bad that the end of all things is

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(1) The Mediator. Page 142.

at hand. Yet, Second, there have been those who thought things are getting much better, more so, in recent times, influenced no doubt by the teaching of Rousseau etc. Kant observes that there is a tendency to optimism in human affairs and from a purely "physical" point of view, this might be justifiable. However, there is a Third possible point of view, and that is, the inability to pass judgment of Good or Evil upon the facts of experience, because the real springs of Good and Evil are hidden from observation. Kant seems inclined to favour the idea that the world is getting worse, but he accepts this idea with many modifications. Undue optimism about the inevitable progress of human nature is sharply halted by a careful analysis of man in his savage state, his civilised state, and his international state. Here, the picture is very disturbing, and although the end of all things might not be at hand, there are very real grounds for solemn concern. Kant's description of international strife and discord is very modern, and his plan for international Peace, in another section of his writings, is a clear indication how deeply this aspect of "Radical Evil" affected him.

(B) However, Kant's real concern is with human nature in a very personal sense, and this fact ought to have warned a thinker like Brunner from sensing a defect in Kant's treatment of "Radical Evil" as being rather "non-personal".(1) Kant presses on to ask whether Man is essentially Good or Evil, or even whether he is neither these extremes, but just a mixture of Good and Evil. Kant sees quite clearly that he will have to take a decided stand upon such an issue even if it results in his being classified as a "Rigorist", in which title he is quite prepared to rejoice. However, he is careful to give his reasons why man must be either Good or Evil, and never a mere mixture of both; and his reasons are very relevant to his analysis of "Radical Evil".

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(1) The Mediator. Page 142.

> "That freedom of will has the peculiar characteristic that it cannot be determined to action by any spring except only as far as the man has taken it up into his maxim, ... only in this way can a spring whatever it may be, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of the will (freedom)."(1)

This is a very important statement, and Kant's emphasis indicates his recognition of its importance. Here, again, is sighted that very complicated problem of the "Indifference" of the Will before its commitment to Good or Evil. However, Kant avoids such an "Indifference" of the Will in this section by a very strange twist to his argument. It is a very dangerous twist as will become obvious later on. Kant tacitly repudiates the neutrality of the Will "prior" to the act of Choice by insisting that the Will, by its very nature, cannot be empty of content prior to the act of Choice. His words are highly significant for his Defence of Freedom.

> "Now if the law does not determine a man's will in respect of an action which has reference to it, an opposite spring must have influence on his will; and since by hypothesis this can only occur by the man taking it -- into his maxim -- it follows that his disposition in respect of the moral law is never indifferent (is always one of the two, good or bad)." (2)

This extract could be used to indicate that Kant, in this particular context, repudiated the "Indifference" of the Will in most clear and emphatic language. Yet, considerable caution must be observed in reaching such a conclusion. What does Kant mean? If he repudiates any possibility of "Indifference" of the Will "prior" to the act of Choice, he is agreeing with Edwards to a remarkable, but nevertheless, fatal degree. Edwards has very clear notions upon this important point, and his teaching upon human "Inability" is strikingly similar to that found in the above extracts. It is worthy of careful notice.

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(1) Religion. 25.
(2) " 25.

> "Moral inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view to induce and incite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrar (1)

Edwards had been arguing against "vulgar" views of philosophical Necessity, which holds that human nature is compelle by some form of compulsion to act in the manner it does; or to act in a manner other than it really "wills". He contends that this idea of Necessity is false; man has liberty to obey the Law if he "will", but he cannot will to obey the Law because his Will is already determined by another type of Motivation. In other words, moral inability to fulfil the Law is brought about not by some abstract Necessity external or internal to man, but is brought about by his lack of "inability" to have adequate motives for the fulfilling of the command. This is why Edwards rejects the "Indifference" of the Will as a possible explanation of human Freedom. Man is never without some kind of Motivation. He is never a motiveless vacuum. He is always in possession of some inclination, some tendency of the Mind, some prevailing preference. A blank Will is as inconceivable as a blank Mind. Mind or Will always has some content, and the command of the Law always is addressed to a Mind with some content. The very fact that it is a "command" indicates that it is addressed to a person, and such a person is always in possession of some psychological "content"; and is generally in conflict with the command which is addressed to its Will. Is Kant to be assumed as accepting such an explanation as a repudiation of the "Indifference" of the Will? If he is, then, there is very little hope of his being in a position to resist the logical implications of the Determinism of Edwards. The present discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom is convinced that there is a clear distinction betwe

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Part 1. Sect. 4.

the points of view of Kant and Edwards, and it is a distinction which is all important to such a Defence.

The distinction between Kant and Edwards upon this important point might be set forth in the following terms. First, both Kant and Edwards agree that there is a real, positive possibility of the human Will not accepting the command of the Law. Second, both agree that the human Will must be either Good or Bad as the result of its reaction to this command. Man cannot be a mixture of Good and Bad. Kant and Edwards are most clear and emphatic upon their Determination to resist such a compromise upon such a vital matter of morals. The Will is either for the Law, or against it. Both agree that "Indifference", or "Neutrality" at this vital point is quite impossible, and both agree that if such "Neutrality" was assumed, it would be "Immoral".

Kant says repeatedly:-

> "For it is law only that involves the conception of an unconditional and objective necessity ....., and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination."(1)

Edwards agrees:-

> "For the end of laws is to bind to one side, and the end of commands is to turn the will one way ..... So that the will, having a bias, through the influence of the binding law laid upon it, is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence from without."(2)

Vast areas of the teaching of Kant on Morality would agree with every word uttered by Edwards in the above extract, and a very strong case could be made out that this is the central teaching of Kant. Yet due consideration would have to be given to Kant's careful distinction between the "Rational" and the "Elective" Will in man. However, whatever might be the teaching of Kant in other directions, here, in the analys of "Radical Evil", he makes a very important distinction whic saves this particular aspect of his system from being identified with that of Edwards. Third, this distinction is that

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(1) Gd. 41.
(2) The Freedom of the Will. Part 3. Sect. 4.

the man, himself, must deliberately take up into his maxim this opposing motive to the Law. As already observed, Kant is very emphatic upon this point. It is a deliberate act of Will which opposes the Moral Law. It is not merely the presence of opposing Inclination, or the blindness or preoccupation of the sensuous self that prevents the fulfilment of the Law. It is deliberate choice of "opposition".(1) This stand by Kant on the essential "Freedom" of the Will in the doing of Evil will be found to be the consistent theme of his treatment of "Radical Evil". It raises a host of very difficult problems which cannot be discussed at this stage of the analysis. Some have been noted in the discussion of the "Indifference of the Will", but it is very doubtful whether any degree of finality can be reached upon this complicated section of the Kantian Defence of Freedom. The important fact is that Kant makes such a deliberate act of Choice basic to his system of "Radical Evil", and, whatever the consequences for other aspects of his teaching, he maintains it to the end of this particular section. It is here that he differs from Edwards in a very vital and far-reaching manner. Edwards agrees with Kant upon the presence of the positive "opposing" Motive or Inclination to the Comma However, his whole system revolts against any suggestion that this opposing Motive is, itself, the result of a deliberate act of Will. He agrees with Kant upon the general depravity of human nature, but Edwards sees such a state of depravity as a direct result of what he terms "original" Sin. Kant will have much to say upon the value of such a concept, and there are indications that he comes very near to agreeing with Edwards upon this basic bias towards Evil. However, here and now, it must be noted that Kant insists upon a "prio act of Will as the cause of human "Inability" which results i such human depravity. If he can maintain this point of view

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(1) K. r. V. A.555. Gd. 89. K. p. V. 216. Religion. 50.

in a consistent manner, he has done much to strengthen his Defence of Freedom in the face of a very critical encounter with Determinism. Only further investigation into Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil" can decide such an issue.

(C) Kant, now turns his attention to an analysis of human nature, and in clear reference to "Radical Evil". He thinks that man can be viewed under three aspects. (1) Animality; (2) Humanity; (3) Personality. Kant points out that there are instincts, or capacities which accompany each of these divisions. It does not affect the main current of his argument that his analysis of such capacities might be in error. The main point is that Kant teaches that each and all of these capacities in themselves are neither Good nor Evil, but that they can be the ground of Good and Evil by being used or abused by the human Will.

Kant's analysis of human nature is very interesting, but its real importance lies in the following statement:-

> "The idea of the moral law alone with the respect inseparable from it, cannot properly be called a <u>capacity</u> belonging to <u>personality</u>; it is personality itself .... But that we adopt this respect into our maxims as a spring, this seems to have a subjective ground additiona to personality, and so this ground seems therefore to deserve the name of a capacity belonging to personality.

The first part of the above extract appears quite clear. It is Kant's insistence that there is no real "moral" feeling or capacity in man "prior" to his awareness of the Moral Law, and that the real centre of his personality revolves around the Moral Law. However, it is the second part of the above extract which needs to be clarified. That is, man's decision to accept the Moral Law, upon the basis of respect for it, into his maxim. The translation of this passage by Semple is important in that it goes into more detail and reveals a difficulty experienced by Kant.

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(1) Religion. Sect. 30.

> "That we are able to adopt this reverence into our maxims, thereby making it a spring, must rest upon some subjective ground; and this would seem to be somewhat additional, superinduced on our personality, and this surplus is what may be fitly termed a predisposition toward, and for behoof of, our moral personality."

It is not proposed to deal with this difficulty of interpretation at this stage, but it is raised to indicate that Kant is making desperate efforts to see the whole of the truth involved in his analysis of "Radical Evil". Edwards would see in such a passage a real opening for his Doctrine of "Divine Grace", and Hartmann must have had in mind such a problem when he propounded his theory of the "Plus" of Determination.(1) However, later, it is hoped to allow Kant to speak in more decisive terms upon this important point.

(D) Kant takes up the discussion of "Propensity" or what Semple terms "Bias", and this is the "tendency to Evil" found in human nature. Here Kant is diligent to make his meaning clear. By propensity to Evil, he means "the subjective source of possibility of an inclination". He indicates that the order of bias might be propensity, instinct and inclination. Propensity is not exactly "innate" in the sense of a capacity, but it might be acquired for Good or for Evil. When the propensity is Evil, it is "the subjective ground of the possibility of a deviation of the maxims from the moral law."

(E) Kant does not commit himself to a statement that there is a decided propensity in human nature to perform Evil, that is, not at this stage. Yet, he goes on to produce evidence which makes such a verdict truly inevitable. First, he notes the existence of human "frailty", that is, in the presence of the Moral Law. He quotes St. Paul as giving a perfect example of intending one thing and doing another. Second, he notes another fact of human nature, that is, impurity, and by this term, Kant simply means the mixing up of Motives to find sufficient power to perform the commands of the Law.

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 75.

Third, he comes to his most serious defect in human nature, that is, the tendency to "pervert" the very foundations of the Moral Law. It is here that Kant puts his finger upon the real core of "Radical Evil". He will return to it repeatedly, and he always speaks of this tendency with heart-felt disgust. With careful logic and rare psychological insight, Kant has traced the formation of "Radical Evil" from its apparently harmless beginnings in human "frailty" through its deeper strata of human "impurity" down to its roots in human "perversity"; and this last state might also be termed "Hypocrisy". It is here that Kant says that "Radical Evil" reveals its Evil nature, and perhaps there is no more devastating statement in ethical discussion than that uttered by Kant on this root of "Radical Evil".

> "This dishonesty in imposing on ourselves which hinders the establishment of genuine moral principle in us, extends itself then outwardly also to falsehood and deception of others which, if it is not to be called badness, at least deserves to be called worthlessness, and has its root in the radical badness of human nature, which (inasmuch as it perverts the moral judgment in respect of the estimation to be formed of a man, and renders imputation quite uncertain both internally and externally) constitutes the corrupt spot in our nature, which, as long as we do not extirpate it, hinders the source of good developing itself as it otherwise would." (1)

There are two points worthy of emphasis in the above extract.
(1) There is nothing in such an extract which required Kant to go outside his ethical system to discover. His analysis of "Radical Evil" is moral, not theological, and that is why in a great degree it has the backing of his Ethics.
(2) The basic root of "Radical Evil" is deliberate self-deception. It is an act of Will which perverts the moral order and the moral nature of man. It is a clear instance of man's misuse of his Freedom.

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(1) Religion. Sect. 43.

(2) Edwards contrasted with Kant on "Moral Evil".

There are still some important points of Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil" which merit discussion, but it is necessary to keep the discussion in its limited orbit, that is, the relation of Kant's idea of Moral Evil to that identified with the Eighteenth-century Determinism. As already stated, Edwards is the only Determinist of that period who makes a reasonable attempt to deal with this problem which is related so intimately to any "serious" discussion of Liberty and Necessity.

(A) Edwards would agree with Kant upon many of the points which have been already raised. However, his fundamental theme is "Sin", rather than "Moral Evil. That is, he views "Moral Evil" as something directed against God, and therefore it is "Sin", although he is also aware of its corrupting influences in human relations. He would agree with Kant that human experience provides ample evidence of the preponderance of Evil in the world. Further, he would agree that this tendency to "Moral Evil" cannot be explained as mere "impotence"; or due to the limited or finite nature of man. Its roots are much deeper than mere physical circumstances, or "psychological" incapacities. When one of his opponents argues that man performs as many "Good" deeds as Evil, and that a reasonable balance might be struck, making man a mixtur of Good and Evil; Edwards points out that his opponent does not appear to understand the nature of Evil. The Moral Law cannot make any compromise with Evil, and a Good which is contaminated with Evil ceases to be a worthwhile Good. Edwards makes an important point when he says that only the really "Good" person can perceive the depth of Evil. That is why th testimony of "Saints" is most valuable in the appraisal of Evil.

(B) He comes very near to the Kantian conception of the Moral Law when he says:-

> "The sum of what the law of God requires, is doubtless obedience to that law; no law can require more than that it be obeyed. But it is manifest, that obedience is nothing, any otherwise than as a testimony of the respect of our hearts to God; without the heart, man's external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a wooden image."(1)

This "respect" for the law of God, Edwards says, can never end by being even "respect". It must develop and grow into "Love" of God and His Law. In Kant's general ethical teaching such a possibility is admitted,(2) though Kant insists upon such Love to God being "practical" rather than "pathological" ..... "therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that pith of all laws".

However, in the work under discussion, Kant is somewhat more positive when he says:-

> "The highest grade of the moral perfection of Finite creatures, at all times unattainable by man, is the love of the law, conformably to this idea, this would become a principle of religious faith 'God is Love'. In him mankind may revere the loving Father."(3)

(C) Edwards sees in this very Love of God a possibility of a perversion. This is on account of the "radical" nature of Evil in the human heart. It is possible to hide a selfish Love of God under the cloak of some supposed "Gratitude for benefits received". However, such Love is not really Moral, and it is felt that Kant would agree with Edwards when he says

> "If we love not God because He is what He is, but only because He is <u>profitable</u> to us, in truth we love Him not at all .... our love is not to Him, but to something else."(4)

(D) Edwards now makes a statement which again has much in common with Kant, but which really marks the watershed of their systems. He is speaking of the manhood of "Adam", and says:-

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(1) Original Sin. Sect. 5.
(2) K. p. V. 210.
(3) Religion. Bk. 3. General Scholion. (Semple's Trans.)
(4) Original Sin. Sect. 3.

> "Therefore there must have been a regard to God and His duty implanted in him at his first existence; otherwise it is certain, he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty, no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a disposition to right action being first obtained by repeated right action, is grossly inconsistent with itself; for it supposes a course of right action, before there is a disposition to perform any right action."(1)

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in this statement there is enough controversial content to merit a full chapter. As this is not possible, the important points must be noted in rather limited terms.

First, Kant would have agreed heartily with the suggestion that man's original endowment consisted of a regard to God and his duty. This basic "awareness" of the Law and Duty is pivotal to all that Kant wrote on ethical questions. Without this original endowment, Kant would have no real foundation for his system of Ethics.

Second, Kant would have agreed with the statement that "repeated" Good actions cannot make a Good disposition.(2) This will become clear when the present discussion considers Kant's cure for "Radical Evil".

Third, without committing Kant to a literal belief in the existence of the "First Adam", it is obvious that his general teaching upon this subject is that the "original" man was innocent, and that every "fall" into Sin is a fall from such "innocence" into Evil. In other words, he would maintain that the Biblical account of the Fall might be held as "true" not because it happened to Adam, but because it happens to every man, every day. However, it is just here that important points of difference must be noted between Kant and Edwards.

(1) Kant maintains that man falls from a state of "Innocence" into Evil, but his view of Innocence is quite different from that of Edwards. For Kant the term Innocence means what it says; it is a non-moral state of existance in which man can-

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(1) Original Sin. Pt.2. Sect. 1.
(2) Religion. 53.

not be termed Good or Evil. However, Edwards insists that the term "Innocence", be regarded as synonymous with the term "Righteous". The point made by Edwards is very important because it is central to his whole doctrine of Determinism. If he is right, then the way is open for him to insist that essential Morality is not a product of man's Self-Determinatio or man's "moral" Efforts; rather, it is the Gift of God, as it was originally. Edwards is very keen upon pressing this important point because his critics have charged him with making man's Morality artificial and useless as it is conditioned by the power which comes from a source outside man's real Self. Edwards replies that these "theological" critics are inconsistent because they maintain that "Adam" was created by God, and that he was endowed with a disposition which was Good, and this was not a result of his own Self-Determination, but was the sole Gift of God. Therefore, the demand to usethe term "Innocence" as synonymous with Righteousness or Goodness is no mere indication of pedantry. It is vital to the Determinism which Edwards is expounding. Kant saw the far-reaching implications of this dogma, and repudiate any additional meaning to Innocence than that inherent in the term.

As already stated, Kant possessed a penetrating insight into the system and implications of "theological" Determinism, and nowhere is this insight so evident as in this particular refusal to grant to its system this cardinal point. The words of Kant are clear and they are crucial for his Defence of Freedom.

> "When it is said he is created good, that can only mean that he is created for good, and the original constitutio in man is good; but this does not yet make the man himself good, but according as he does or does not adopt into his maxim the springs which this constitution contains (which must be left altogether to his own free choice) he makes himself good or bad."(1)

However, Edwards insists that the "original" man was GOOD, because he was capable of Good or Evil. That is, he was a

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(1) Religion. Sect. 50.

moral being, conscious of moral obligations. He knew his duty to God and the Law, and, Edwards points out rather shrewdly, the original man did not fall "at once" into Sin after his creation. For a time, at least, he was well-pleasing to God, indicating his essential Goodness; and his "Fall" into Evil was "deliberate"; this fact of "Deliberation" is hardly consistent with the bland, almost "blank" moral state supposed to exist in the term "Innocence", which is advocated by Kant. All this may appear remote from the central theme of Kant's Defence of Freedom, but its relevance will become clear in the concluding section of the present discussion.

(2) A second important point of contrast between Kant and Edwards upon this "original" act of Evil is seen in the "Cause" of man's fall. Both would agree that the real "origin" of Evil is unknowable, and, on the surface of their statements, both appear to agree in a most remarkable manner upon the reasons which led to man's downward step.

The statement of Kant is important:-

> "Consequently a man (even the best) is bad only by this, that he reverses the moral order of the springs in adopting them into his maxims; he adopts indeed the moral law along with that of self-love, but perceiving that they cannot subsist together on equal terms, but that one must be subordinate to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the spring of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law. ..... Now if there is in human nature a propensity to this, then there is in man a natural propensity to evil, and since this propensity itself must ultimately be sought in a free will and therefore can be imputed, it is morally bad."(1)

This is Kant's description of the "Fall" of man, and is true for the Biblical and the Empirical analysis. This is what always happens to man, whether at the beginning of history, or in every-day experience of Evil.

Edwards appears to agree with Kant upon this analysis of the Fall in the following terms:-

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(1) Religion. Sect. 40.

> "When God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural -- such as self-love. ..... there were the superior principles -- wherein consisted the image of God, and man's righteousness, and true holiness. ..... Man's love to his own honour, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes him to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honour or law." (1)

However, there is a distinct difference between Kant and Edwards as to the "result" of such a Fall. Both agree that there existed two kinds of principles in man, and both agree that the Fall was caused by a wrong subordination of principle Yet, Kant maintains that, as a result of such a perverse subordination, man still possesses these "superior" principles which only requires an effort of will to have them made supreme once again. Edwards repudiates this explanation, and insists that man lost these "superior" principles in the very act of subordinating them to the natural principles.

> "The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastroph a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. .....As when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues."(2)

This vital difference of the results of the Fall of man is important. For it must be borne in mind that Kant really believes in a "Fall" of man, and this does not mean that he is to be interpreted as holding that he believed in the Biblical doctrine of the Fall, but that the Fall of man was a fact embedded in human experience. Kant accepts such a fall as a moral and rational fact, and his whole system of "Radical Evil" is quite untenable without such a fact. In the concluding section of this analysis, it is hoped to make clear how vital all this is to his "religious" Defence of Freedom.

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(1) Original Sin. Part 2. Ch. 2.
(2) " " " 2. " 2.

(E) Before turning to the more positive aspect of Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil", there is another feature in the systems of Kant and Edwards which must receive attention. This is their conception of human "Depravity". Kant has already given clear indications of what he means by this dogma but there is another statement which ought to be noted as indicative of the serious view Kant held on this question. Further, it is only just to Edwards to give his point of view, because there is a real tendency to exaggerate the "Calvinistic" interpretation of this aspect of "Moral Evil". Edwards is somewhat more analytical than Kant upon this matter, but Kant's conception is very important to the question under discussion. Kant has been making a real effort to distinguish his system of "Radical Evil" from that held by the Stoics, and he indicates the error inherent in their conception by saying:-

> "But those sturdy Sages mistook their enemy, who is not sought in the natural, and, though undisciplined, still openly displayed and undisguised, appetites of the sensory; for the inward Foe is an invisible occult enemy, lurking behind the ambushes of reason, and upon that account just so much the more dangerous and deadly. They called on Wisdom to make a stand against Folly, which allows itself unawares to be inveigled and worsted by the sensory, instead of calling upon her to wage war upon the wickedness of the human heart, which, by soul-destroying principles, secretly saps and undermines the moral fortress of the soul."(1)

This is a passage which should be pondered by all who imagine that the Kantian system of Morality is only a refined form of Stoicism, and by those who charge Kant with providing only a 'one-way' explanation of Freedom.

Edwards is also worthy of consideration in his view of Depravity. His opponent has charged Edwards with teaching that "Sin" is implanted by God as some kind of moral disease:-

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(1) Religion. Bk. 2. (Semple's Trans.)

> "Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature, or of supposing, that man is conceived or born with a fountain of evil in his heart ..... the absence of positive good principles ..... leaving the common natural principles of self-love etc. will certainly be followed with the corruption."(1)

Kant's view of "Depravity" might be viewed as more "positive" than that of Edwards, and this creates very great problems for his theory of Moral Recovery.

(3) Kant's Conception of "Moral Recovery" from "Radical Evil"

In attempting to interpret Kant's formula for Moral Recovery there is real danger of over-simplification of the whole process unless three basic facts are borne in mind in such an interpretation.

First, there is Kant's clear insistence upon "personal" effort He knows too much about the system of "theological" Determinism to fall into the trap of making God the prime mover in human regeneration. He does not deny that God might have some part to play in such a reformation of Morals, but his continuing axiom is "Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to God, is mere false worship of the Deity."(2) He does not deny that God might assist man in his efforts to make himself a new man, but he insists that the first and primary source of man's recovery from "Radical Evil" must be put forth by man. God might reward man's moral efforts, or even assist them, but the whole pivot of man's regeneration must be based upon man's free Will.

Second, the greater part of the work "Religion within the limits of Mere Reason" is devoted to man's moral recovery.

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(1) Original Sin. Part 4. Ch. 2.
(2) Religion. Bk. 4. (Semple's Trans.)

The whole of the Church doctrine and ordinances are brought in to guide and safeguard man's fight for "self-regeneration". Everything, in the Church's creed or conduct, which does not directly assist in such a process is put aside by Kant as idolatry or superstition. The Church, the Sacraments, Prayer, the Clergy, are all formed into one great "Ethical Society" whose sole purpose lies in its ability to help man to find a Self-determined Salvation. Therefore, to enter upon a detailed discussion of Kant's interpretation of these factors can have but one result, and that is, they are all mere "Aids" to man's working out of his own Salvation.

Third, Kant's conception of the range and extent of man's Moral Recovery is set forth in plain terms in all his Ethical works, that is, the duration of man's Moral Recovery. His postulation of Immortality is a direct outcome of his convictions upon this question.

> "Now the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason to assume such a practical progress as the real object of the will. (1)

It is against the permanent background of these three facts that it becomes possible to proceed with an analysis of Kant's formula for Moral Recovery, and such an analysis might be viewe in the following terms.

(1) Kant is firmly convinced that he is confronted with a titanic task in attempting to set forth a way of Moral Salvation for a being who has fallen so deeply into "Radical Evil", and he qualifies all he is about to say with this statement:-

> "Now how it is possible that a man naturally bad should make himself a good man, transcends all our conceptions; for how can a bad tree bring forth good fruit?"(2)

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(1) K. p. V. 262.
(2) Religion. 51.

In other words, as the real origin of Evil is inscrutable, so the real origin of Goodness is in the same category. However, in spite of this obvious limitation, Kant is not prepared to take refuge in Mystery, and throws down the gauntlet to all forms of "theological" Determinism by saying most emphatically ... "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense, he must make or must have made of himself." Kant has earned the right to make such a statement upon human Goodness because he bore the full implications of such a dictum in his analysis of human "Radical Evil". Evil is a self- willed "opposition" to the Moral Law. Goodness must be self- willed "conformity" to the Moral Law.

(2) Yet, how can man find one real spot of ground within the bog of his radically evil nature from which to begin such conformity? Kant insists that, in spite of his apparent hopeless Depravity, he has never lost that inherent "awareness" of the Moral Law. (a) Man is never too degraded to lose the wish to be better. (b) If man was totally empty of this moral "awareness", he would cease to be a man, and become a devil. "For notwithstanding that Fall, the command 'we ought to become better men' resounds with undiminished force in our souls".

This insistence by Kant is vital to his Defence of Freedom, and it is a perfectly logical result of his analysis of "Radical Evil", but it raises problems which the theological determinist could not allow to pass unchallenged. It is hoped to raise such problems in the concluding section of the present discussion, but, here and now, they can be hinted at. Kant assumes that the "pure" practical Reason continues in man with undiminished force and "Purity" in spite of the fact that "Radical Evil" had made such deadly inroads into his soul. As already stated, Kant admits that this "wickedness" lies in ambush in the very Reason of man, and yet he maintains that its original "purity" is unaffected. Even if this is granted, the question concerning the "practical" Reason

the "Rational" Will of man must come up for some discussion. Again, is it possible that the "Elective" Will of man, given over in a deliberate manner to the performance of "Radical Evil", can remain unaffected? Edwards would strongly deny the logic of such a position. However, this matter must receive attention within its proper setting.

(3) Kant presses on to say that man's Moral Recovery cannot be affected in any way by man performing mere moral acts. That is, he denies that man becomes Good by performing Good actions. Rigid conformity to the Moral Law by acts can never produce that quality of Mind which lies at the very foundation of real Morality. In Morality, at least,man never begins to be "moral" by doing "moral" things. The real force of Kant's insistence upon this point is lost if it is not borne in mind that he was repudiating a principle of dogma common in many of the Christian sects of his day. These advocated the performance of good deeds as a basis for good feelings, and the fascination of such a doctrine has continued long beyond the generation of Kant. Its peculiar charm lies in a real perversion of the Kantian formula "Do your Duty, and ignore your Feelings". Kant deals with such a perversion in a most effective manner.(1) He insists that such a performance might result in Legality, but it can never produce Morality. His firm stand upon this issue indicates his refusal to find an easy way out of the difficulties he has created by his serious view of "Radical Evil".

(4) Kant is still haunted by the problem... "If a man is corrupt in the very fundation of his maxims, how is it possibl that he should effect this revolution by his own power and become a good man of himself?" His previous analysis of Motivation provided a way of Salvation for man which was reasonably sound from a "psychological" point of view, but this is a type of Salvation which presupposed that the impact of

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(1) Religion. 53.

the Moral Law upon the sensuous nature was successful. Then, the sensuous nature, truly subordinated to the Moral Law could be "elevated" to being directed to the Good by its rightful reaction in producing the great factor of Reverence for the Law. Now, however, the whole situation is changed. The sensuous nature is no longer in that state of submissive "awareness" of the Moral Law, but has become "radically" Evil in that it has subordinated the superior principles to the sensuous, and has implicated the "Will" itself in such a perversion of man's true nature.

Kant makes a desperate effort in a "Foot-note" to still find some solid, moral ground within this sphere of "moral" Corruption upon which he can begin to build the Moral Recovery of man. He takes as his starting-point the factor of Love, and says it can be divided into two distinct aspects. One is Self-Love, and the other is Complacency, or, what he later terms "Rational" Self-Love. He tries to argue that Self-Love, in its natural form, cannot possibly be that "germ" of Good upon which a moral reformation can be erected, because it, in itself, is the real cause of the beginning of man's moral Corruption. He then turns to "Rational" Self-Love, as the only possible spot in the corrupt nature of man upon which can provide a basis of Self-Reform. However, it is obvious that Kant's heart is not in this argument because it is too much like the system of Butler's "Cool-Self-Love", and that might land his whole system of Ethics back upon a semi-empirical foundation.

This patient, almost passionate probing of Kant for some solitary point of leverage in the moral quagmire of man's nature is one of the indications of his profound desire for an explanation of human Freedom based upon real facts, and, if it appears tedious, it is because Kant saw that he must move with extreme caution along a path which was very near the system of "theological" Determinism.

(5) At last, Kant finds that there is only one final solution for man's Moral Recovery, and that is:- "he must be born agai

> "He can only become a new man by a kind of new birth, as it were by a new creation (John 3.5. compared with Gen: 1.2.) and a change of heart."(1)

This is a statement to which the whole of his system of Ethics and his analysis of "Radical Evil" inevitably lead, and it is a statement which the "theological" determinist would insist undermines the whole idea of Kant "that man can work out his own salvation". Edwards would agree most heartily with such a conclusion, for it fits in perfectly with his ideas of Original Sin, his Determinism and the "Grace" of God. He has put his own convictions in language similar to that of Kan

> "It appears from this, ... that it is most certain with respect to every one of the human race, that he can never have an interest in Christ, or see the Kingdom of God, unless he is subject to that change in the temper and disposition of his heart ....., and unless he has the old heart taken away, and a new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man, and puts on the new man"(2)

This is exactly the conclusion to which Kant has at last come. The very terms are similar, and the whole purpose of the language is almost identical. Has Kant then really given up the struggle for Self-Determination as hopeless? Has his insistence upon the depth and "rottenness" of "Radical Evil" in human nature resulted in bogging down the futile flutterings of human aspirations for Self-Reformation? Has it all resulted in calling in God to create a new life upon the ashes of the old? This is the first impression obtained from the above admissions by Kant, and "theological" Determinism would not hesitate to charge Kant with foolishly prolonging a struggle against stern facts and, at last, capitulating in ambiguous terms. Even modern theologians, who are not rigid determinists, charge Kant with begging the whole question of "Radical Evil" by insisting upon Self-Reformation.(3)

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(1) Religion. 53.
(2) Original Sin. Part 3. Ch. 2.
(3) Emil Brunner. The Mediator, Page 611.

Yet, Kant refuses to submit to what appears to be the inevitable conclusion of his own admissions. He insists that man must be the real author of his Salvation. His words are clear and firm.

> "The only way this difficulty can be got over is, that a revolution is necessary. ..... that is, when a man reverses the ultimate principles of his maxims by which he is a bad man by a single immutable resolution (1)

The task is now to discover whether Kant is justified in such a stand.

(4) A Critical Appraisal of Kant's "Radical Evil" and "Moral Recovery."

In order to keep the concluding sections of this discussion within reasonable limits, it will be necessary to state the salient points in somewhat dogmatic terms. However, it is hoped that enough evidence has been produced in the preceding discussion to permit of such dogmatism.

First, the implied charge of Dr. Dorner that Kant's Defence of Freedom in Religion must be regarded as a type of Pelagianism(2) cannot be sustained, and this for the following reasons. (a) Pelagius moved within the strict limitations of a theological creed. He was an exponent of a type of "theological" Freedom, which was most commendable, but it was a type of Freedom which depended upon the crucial fact that the "Grace" of God was indispensable to man's real Salvation. It is for this reason that Augustine found it comparatively easy to involve Pelagius in charges of "theological" inconsistencies. (b) Pelagius had given little if any thought to the consideration of Ethics. In his teaching, there are traces of ethical Philosophy which belong to the systems of Plato and Aristotle, but there is not the slightest indication of Pelagius being an original and creative worker in such a sphere. On the other hand, Kant comes to the discussion of

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(1) Religion. 53.

(2) Dorner, The Person of Jesus Christ. Vol.3. Div.2. Page

Freedom, within the "theological" setting, by having first given ample evidence of his ability as a creative thinker in Ethics, and of having examined the fact of "Radical Evil" in a manner impossible to Pelagius. In other words, it is quite impossible to silence Kant by the charge of being Pelagian because such an attempt misses the whole point that Kant was a master of ethical Science whereas Pelagius was but an amateur in such matters.

Yet, there are points raised in this debate between Augustine and Pelagius upon the Freedom of the Will which must receive some consideration in this present discussion, because the fundamental facts of the "theological" Determinism of Edwards are taken from the arguments of Augustine, and these facts are far from being totally irrelevant to the position assumed by Kant's Defence of Freedom.

Second, mention has already been made of the fact that almost the greater part of Kant's work "Religion within the limits of Mere Reason" is concerned with man's recovery from "Radical Evil". Further, it has been stated that it is far from necessary to discuss all the points raised by Kant in this more positive aspect of his work. Yet, there are two points upon which ambiguity might be dangerous. These are Kant's theory of Justification and Atonement. (a) Even in his Ethical works, Kant has a strange, if not a strained argument upon the need for God regarding "mankind as Holy",(1) that is when mankind has accepted the authority of the Moral Law. It is difficult to see the point of this argument in his Ethical discussion, and, when it is introduced into his "religious" Defence of Freedom, it appears to have no real purpos The real truth seems to be that Kant is trying to make room for the "theological" dogma of "Justification" which might hav an academic interest, but has no real value for man's Moral Recovery.

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(1) Religion. Bk. 2. C.

(b) His introduction of an explanation of the Atonement is still less fortunate.(1) Kant's argument that the "Good" man suffers, and, in such undeserved suffering, "atones" for his past misconduct is little short of nonsense, that is, from the point of view of being adequate substitutes for these central Christian doctrines. They never have, and never can be accepted as "rational" interpretations of Justification and Atonement, because they miss the important point that these doctrines are centred in the work and person of Jesus Christ which Kant emphatically denies.

Yet, the point Kant wishes to make in such "rational", and totally "untheological", if not "un-Christian" interpretations is that man's primary Moral Recovery must "exclude" any possib help from the "Grace of God". Man, by his act of free submission to the Moral Law is, by that very act, "justified" before God as holy. Man, by his continued submission to the Moral Law in the face of difficulty and suffering, which, by his essential Morality, are no longer linked as cause and effect, now "atones" for his past Evil. Therefore, man "morally" earns Justification and Atonement. They are the direct result of his own un-aided exertions. All this is Kant's way of saying God might reward man's Morality, but He cannot "<u>make</u>" him moral.

<u>Third</u>, the discussion must now return to what might appear a tedious question; "the fall of man into radical evil". This question seems to lie embedded in theological abstractions and appears irrelevant to a rational discussion of ethical principles. Yet, Kant has raised it in a vital and far-reaching manner in his discussion of "Moral Evil" and "Recover and it must receive here the attention of which Kant deemed it worthy.

As already observed, Kant, and the exponents of "theological" Determinism, differed over their respective views concerning

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(1) Religion. Bk. 2. C.

the original constitution of the first Adam. For the purpose in hand, it does not matter whether there was such a first Adam, or whether the Biblical story is fact or fiction. Kant has made such questions unimportant by saying that the "fall of man" is a fact of every-day experience, and, what is more, a fact vital to his interpretation of "Radical Evil". In other words, there is a real point at which man becomes a "sinner". Now, the important question for the present discussion is, what was the "constitution" of that man just before he became a sinner? It is quite conceivable that Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Edwards would have fought to maintain that there was a real "first Adam" who fell into sin according to a strict, literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. However, it is believed that, for the sake of argument, they would have accepted Kant's view of man's "empirical Fall into Sin. So, the exact date, time and place of such a Fall can be ignored in order to secure a discussion upon an "actual" Fall. Now, the position of the above-mentioned exponents of "theological" Determinism is stated by Edwards -- that God made Adam a "perfect" being, that is "GOOD", endowed with all the qualities of such a term. They deny that he was "Innocent" in the sense that he was unconscious of right and wrong. They accept the term "Innocent" in the sense that it means Freedom from Sin or Guilt, but they insist that the term must mean something more, that is, "Righteous". Edwards puts the point in speaking of the first man:

> "In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing, to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be same, because there can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or between right and wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense."(1)

In actual fact, Edwards quotes the text -- "God made man upright", that is, morally straight. Now, although Kant denies what the theological determinists affirm, that the

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(1) Original Sin. Part 2. Sect. 1.

result of Adam's Fall meant that all men were contaminated by original Sin; yet, he everywhere affirms that man is constituted "straight and upright". In other words, it is a fact that Kant teaches that the constitution of "natural" man is Good. Consideration of the following facts will confirm such a statement.

(a) Man is in possession of "pure" practical Reason.(1)

(b) Man's Will has the power to ignore or overcome Inclinatio

(c) Man has a clear consciousness of the Moral Law and his Duty to that Law.(3)

(d) Man has real Freedom from natural forces.(4)

These are only a few of the features of the "original" endowment of man as Kant saw them in men, even after the crisis of a Fall in Biblical terms. Now, the theological determinists ask little more for the "first Adam", than Kant asks for the natural man; and they would be insistent that Kant had involved his argument in a flat contradiction by saying that man always falls from a state of "Innocence" (in his restricted use of the term) into "Radical Evil". They would insist that the very possession of such moral qualities made "natural" man a "moral" being, rather than an "innocent" and a morally "neutral" being. These qualities demand that man, in his "natural" state has a disposition for the Right and the Good, that is, he has a "bias", by the very quality of his original endowment, for Good, and, in the admission of such a"bias,"it is absurd to define "natural" man in terms of "amoral" Innocence or "ethical Indifference".

As already stated, all this might appear remote abstraction, if not puerile speculation, but Kant saw the vital importance of such a discussion; and much of the inadequacy of modern discussions upon Freedom and Necessity arises from the

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(1) K. p. V. 173.
(2) K. p. V. 182.
(3) K. p. V. 144.
(4) K. p. V. 156.

neglect of all the factors which are inherent in this theological conflict.

When the theological determinists insist upon natural man, or the "first" man possessing real moral qualities, they are not insisting upon some abstract tenet of an obsolete theological creed. Rather, this insistence is vital to their Determinism. First, because it concedes that God must play an essential part in man's Morality. Second, because they wish to emphasize the actual existence of what they term -- "necessitated goodness"; that is, Goodness in which the free Will of man plays no part. Kant was perfectly aware of these crucial points in theological Determinism, that is why he cuts off his "natural" man from any possible relation to the "Grace" of God in his Moral Recovery. However, as already observed, Kant's "natural" man has certain moral qualities as an "original" endowment which must be viewed as giving him a character which is moral rather than "amoral", and which Kant himself admits contribute to his performance of the Moral Law. Therefore, when he sins, falls into "Radical Evil", he falls from [redacted] real moral status, rather than that of "Innocence" or "moral Indifference;" and this is all that the theological determinists need to clinch their argument. Has Kant fallen into this well-prepared trap? Before finally deciding such a question, attention must be given to another phase of Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil". However, here and now, it must be admitted that there are obvious weaknesses in Kant's system of Ethics upon this important point. First, when he is discussing his general theory of Ethics, Kant appears to ignore the reality of "Radical Evil". His general descriptio of the Inclinations etc. tends to give the impression that man can do no real Evil. So much so, that Dr. Caird rightly complains that Kant's system of Ethics indicates Freedom to do the "Right", but no Freedom to do the "Wrong". Second, when Kant comes to discuss "Radical Evil", Kant tends to chang the venue of his argument upon the moral qualities of man's

nature. Now, he wants to IMPLY that these very moral qualities which provided the foundation for his doing of the "Right" in Freedom, must be viewed as qualities which are "Innocent", that is,"morally Indifferent". This is Kant's general teaching, but, as will be observed later, it is not the final and decisive teaching of Kant. Yet, it is widespread enough to put Kant's Defence of Freedom in real danger.

Fourth, there is another general difficulty in Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil" upon which the theological determinist would fasten as indicative of Kant's inconsistency. This is the general fact that Kant teaches that man's Will suffers no real degeneracy in his Fall into "Radical Evil". The following extract is important in this context:-

> "Man (even the worst) does not in any maxim, as it were, rebelliously abandon the moral law, (and renounce obedience to it). On the contrary, this forces itself upon him irresistibly by virtue of his moral nature, and if no other spring opposed it he would also adopt it into his ultimate maxim as the adequate determining principle of his will, that is, he would be morally good."(1)

The above quotation raises a host of difficulties and indicates Kant's real struggle to free himself from the problems with which "theological" Determinism, and his own system, had confronted him. If it were to be received as authentic of Kant's teaching on "Radical Evil", then it would contradict large sections of his teaching on the same subject, that is, that man takes up into his maxim principles which are opposed directly and deliberately to the Moral Law. Further, such a quotation confirms the point which has been already made that Kant's "natural" man is "biassed" towards Good, and, therefore, is not "innocent".

Again, it indicates Kant's return to his general theory of the "Rational" Will which seems "irresistible", except when hindered by sensuous principles. Kant involves himself in all these difficulties because he wants to prove that man, by his Fall into "Radical Evil", does not really damage his

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(1) Religion. 39.

natural endowment of "moral" Good or the natural "power" to eradicate himself from "Radical Evil". Edwards insists that "Moral Evil" corrupts the very citadel of man's Personali the Will; and he can conceive of a human being so given over to "Moral Evil" that he loses the power to want, least of all to will the Good. His idea of "Moral Evil" affecting the Will is taken from Augustine who replies to the "ethical" optimism of Pelagius by saying:-

> "Our present inquiry, however, is about the man whom the 'thieves' left half-dead on the road, and who, being disabled and pierced through with heavy wounds, is quite incapable of mounting up to the heights of holiness with the facility wherewith he was able to descend therefrom."(1)

There is a great deal of commonsense in the point of view of the theological determinists when they insist that a serious view of "Moral Evil" must involve the "Will" of man in some quality of degeneration, and Kant appears to be wanting the argument both ways. That is, he wants a serious view of "Radical Evil", without serious consequences.

Perhaps Kant's more fortunate and adequate interpretation on this particular point is found in the following quotation:-

> "The depravity of human nature, then, is not so much to be called **badness**, if this word is taken in its strict sense, namely, as a disposition (subjective principle of maxims) to adopt the bad, as bad, into one's maxims as a spring (for that is devilish); but rather **perversity** of heart, which on account of the result, is also called a bad heart. This may co-exist with a will good in general, and arises from the frailty of human nature."(2)

The translator of the above passage notes that Kant uses "Wille" to stand for "WILL". The word "wille" means the "Rational" Will, which is another term for "Pure" practical Reason; and Kant thinks it is quite conceivable that "Wille", the pure "Rational" Will, might co-exist with an "Elective" Will which has violated the law of the "Rational" Will.

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(1) The Anti-Pelagian Writings. Vol.1. Page 276.

(2) Religion. 41.

However, the argument is concerned with the term the "Elective Will, which Kant terms "Willkuhr". For it is the "Elective" Will which Kant permits to be free, and to be used in this moral "perversion" of principles. The theological determinists would argue that in man's "Fall", he lost the factor of "Wille", but they are not always consistent in such an assertion because they admit that fallen man can be appealed to by the Moral Law. Further, they seem to insist that the "Elective" Will is weakened, tainted and diseased by its repeated acts of "wilful" violations of the Moral Law, and ordinary human experience appears to be on their side, in this latter contention.

However, Kant refuses to agree to both these points. The "pure" practical Reason remains un-affected by man's violatio of its inherent and unalterable "Rightness"; and Kant goes on to imply that the "Elective" Will is also un-affected by "Radical Evil", and this does not seem to carry the same amou of reasonable argument. Yet, this is Kant's teaching, and the explanation offered in the above extract is that human Depravity consists in Perversity, rather than in the "Elective Will seeking Evil for evil's sake. In other words, the "Elective" Will is not "bad" or diseased in the sense that it wills the Bad because it is bad; but the implication is that it wills the Bad because "perversely" it seeks the Good.

Kant is not totally unreasonable in such an insistence, because Edwards admits that man cannot, by his very nature, see that which is finally destructive of his Happiness.

Kant's insistence upon the "incorruptibility" of the "Rationa Will and the Freedom of "Elective" Will in man are vital to his Defence of Freedom, and his insistence is strengthened, if not vindicated by the inconsistencies of Edwards upon thes two major points. First, on this matter of "Wille", "Rationa Will, or "pure" practical Reason, Edwards involves his argume in what seems to be a direct conflict. In his thesis "On Original Sin", he declares that man, in his "un-fallen" state

is in possession of full moral qualities, but that his "Fall" deprived him of these superior principles, and that h essential corruption consists in his being left "alone" with his inferior principles of animal appetite etc. However, when he comes to state the case for man's "Responsibility" in his thesis "The Freedom of the Will", he presents a very different picture of this supposed "fallen" man.

In this context, Edwards is repudiating the charge that his system of Determinism reduces man to the level of a machine, and he replies:-

> "Man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of will, and is capable of volition and choice; and in that his will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding ..... so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and to do what he pleases, and by means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts ..... worthy of praise etc. or punishment."(1)

Here, is a type of "natural" man which seems to have its "pure" practical Reason in all its original force and purity Edwards never resolves this conflict between his Theology and his "psychology", and, therefore, leaves Kant in possession of this particular section of the struggle. Second, when Kant insists that the "Elective" Will is also un-contaminated in that it is "misguided", but never essentially "bad"; he receives a great deal of confirmation from Edward whose system of Determinism can work only upon the assumptio that there is always a "prevailing" preference in the Mind of man. This prevailing preference, says Edwards, is for the "agreeable":-

> "It must be observed in what sense I use the term good, namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the sa as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting or eligible to the mind, or tending to engage the inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable. ..... To say other wise, is little, if anything, short of a direct and plain contradiction."(2)

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Part 4. Sect. 5.
(2) " " " " " Part 1. Sect. 2.

This is not identical with Kant's argument that "Radical Evil" is a perversion of moral values. Yet, Edwards seems to be saying that man cannot seek his misery, or self-destruction, because "natural" man seeks the Agreeable. Therefore, the "Elective" Will is never really Bad and hopelessly corrupt. Kant seems to have won the battle on these two po

Fifth; finally, Kant appears to be right upon another important point in his analysis of "Radical Evil". As alread noted, there was a very strained linkage between the "psycho logical" Determinism of Edwards and his "theological" Presuppositions. On the surface, they appeared to fit into ea other with ease and adaptability, but deeper down there lies a real conflict of which Kant is not slow to take advantage. "Theological" Determinism pivots upon the tenet that God's fore-knowledge implies His fore-ordination, or predestinatio Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Edwards toil at this concept, and, by certain manipulations, make it fit into their "psych logical Determinism. However, there is one great flaw in all their arguments, and that flaw is centred in their explanation of man's moral Responsibility for his "fall" into Moral Evil. In other words, according to their "theologica Presuppositions, Adam's Fall was an event which was foreseen by God, and therefore fore-ordained by God. Yet, if this is a fact, how can they hold Adam really "responsible" for that act which was a real factor in the plan of God? The explanations of this difficulty are very numerous, but they are reducible to one basic principle, that is, God made Adam "Free" to choose the Good or the Evil, and, although He knew Adam would choose the Evil, God left him in complete possession of his Freedom to make this choice.

In spite of all the attempts of the theological determinists to explain away the crucial nature of such "original" Freedo the fact remains that this "Adamic" Freedom undermines, if not destroys, the foundations of their system of Determinism

Dr. Dorner, an informed and acute critic of Kant, is compelled to admit the hopeless position of Determinism on this point when he writes:-

> "Augustine teaches that in Adam the whole human race was morally free, and that in him all have sinned, so that no wrong is done to any one when election passes him over and he is left to condemnation. Here, therefore, determinism takes up into itself an element of indeterminism, a pre-existent act of freedom on the part of all in Adam, whereby of course, the system of purely theological determinism is shattered. ..... If a breach has to be made in the deterministic system by going back to Adam, and the freedom of man as found in him, why should not the distinction between those who become believers, and those who remain un-believers be explained without this reference to Adam at all, by holding that the freedom which he possessed is enjoyed by every individual? Or, again, why should theological pre-determinism not be carried out in earnest? Why should Adam's fall be an exception?"(1)

This is exactly what Kant has done. He has conceived of every man as possessing "real" Freedom, and capable of a "real" Fall, and there is nothing in "theological" Determini to deny him such a position. Kant fastens upon this admission of inalienable, indestructible and "incomprehensible Freedom in man. He makes it the crucial factor in the "Fal of man. Yet, he preserves it right through the real experi ence of "Radical Evil" in man, and, at last, makes it the pivot of man's Moral Recovery. He does not deny the existence of the "Grace" of God.

> "It is not essential and therefore not necessary for every one to know what God does or has done for his salvation, but it is essential to know <u>what he himself has to do</u> in order to be worthy of this assistance."(2)

"Theological" Determinism left man to himself to "Fall". Therefore, Kant demands that man be left to himself to rise. Man must enter upon a real struggle to become well-pleasing to God. Kant's verdict upon the "irresistible" "Grace" of God is as follows. If the "Grace" of God <u>forces</u> itself upon man, (it may be the Power of God) but it is not the "Grace" of God. <u>Morality</u> is not a "real" struggle; and ma cannot be "well-pleasing" to God. Upon this aspect of Kant

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(1) Christian Ethics. Page 267.
(2) Religion. Sect. 60.

Defence of Freedom, there can be no doubt about his having waged a great conflict, and perhaps secured a reasonable victory.

In other terms, Kant has fastened upon an inherent weakness in "theological" Determinism which is the postulation of this "pre-empirical" Freedom in man, that is, in the "First Adam". It is the one "dubious" link in the chain which reaches from the Sovereignty on God, down to the Fall of man, the Determination of man by his "natural" nature, and along the long road of "Election" up to the final purpose of God in all-creation, that is, the fulfilment of His Will in perfect Wisdom, to His perfect Glory. The theological determinists have no doubt concerning the "Necessity" of this chain, except that they also wish to clear God of all "injustice" in forging such a chain, and, to do this, they postulate that "original" Freedom to account for "original" Sin. Therefore, because of the abuse of this real "original" Freedom, the Fall becomes truly disastrous, because man loses this "original" Free Will, and their system of Determinism, as affecting fallen and natural man, becomes consolidated; both upon psychological and theological grounds. However, Kant declines to be put off by such an explanation of the Fall. He insists that Freedom is an indestructible "Gift" from God to man, as man, not merely to the First man. Therefore, the theological determinists would agree that Browning was given a very good description of Adam, and the evidence of "Scripture" proves it, when he wrote:-

> "God, whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away
> As it were a hand-breadth off, to give
> Room for the newly-made to live,
> And look at him from a place apart,
> And use his gifts of brain and heart,
> Given, indeed, but to keep for ever." (1)

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(1) Christmas Eve.

Kant would insist that this is a good description of "Everyman", not only the "First" man, and the evidence of his "rational and moral nature" proves it; and here this part of his Defence of Freedom must rest. Yet, in a very real sense, the discussion of some of the basic elements of Freedom and "Moral Evil" cannot end here, but must be carried forward to what is, perhaps, Kant's most difficult task, the Defence of Freedom as that Freedom stands confronting God; and it is to this problem that the discussion now turns.

THE KANTIAN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER EIGHT

GOD and FREEDOM

"Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter; especially considering, that if God should leave men's volitions, and all moral events, to the determination and disposition of blind unmeaning causes, or they be left to happen perfectly without cause; this would be no more consistent with liberty in any notion of it. ..... But it is evident, that such a providential disposing and determining of men's moral actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those actions; yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind."

(Edwards. The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.9.)

"The deterministic scheme is the natural prelude to the Calvinistic doctrine of absolute sovereignty and irreversible decrees, and is developed into a consistent theology in the work of Jonathan Edwards, but it can never harmonize with a Religion which is in earnest with its moral conceptions, and, in their transcendent application, does not suffer them to be crushed and paralyzed beneath the weight of infinitude and almightiness."

(Martineau. A Study of Religion. Vol.2. Bk.3. Ch.2.)

"To fix and define this idea of a Moral Governor of the world, is a problem proposed to us by the practical reason. What we are concerned about knowing is not what the nature of God may be in itself, but what he is in reference to us as Moral Agents."

(Kant. Religion-(Semple's Translation) - page 186.)

"An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist in material things. And it does not exist in the mind of this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our own moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself."

(Rashdall - quoted by W.R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, p.347.)

"The second antinomy carries the conflict over into the relation between man and Divinity, as the ultimate substratum of values. ..... Ethics is always concerned finally with man, religious thought with God. His power, his action, his will, set the standard, in this world as in the next. Man has only a subordinate place; for him the Good is what God wills ..... That anything whatsoever in heaven or earth, even though it be God himself, should take precedence of Man, would be ethically perverted; it would not be moral; it would be treason to mankind, which must rely upon itself alone."

(Hartmann. Ethics. Vol.3. page, 263.)

The concluding section of this Kantian Defence of Freedom must attempt to deal with what is perhaps the gravest problem yet faced. This chapter has been entitled "GOD and FREEDOM"; it could be termed "Divine Legislation and Human Autonomy", for its problem centres in confronting human Freedom with Divine Government. Kant saw the gravity of this problem quite early in his analysis of Freedom, and, as already stated it was a vital factor in the Determinism of his generation; and there can be little doubt that all his efforts to expound Freedom were shadowed by this supreme problem. Kant puts the problem in these words:-

> "There still remains a difficulty in the combination of freedom with the mechanism of nature in a thing belonging to the world of sense: a difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted threatens freedom with complete destruction."(1)

These are strong terms, but Kant knew that they were not too strong to express the fear which had brooded over his long and patient Defence of Freedom. Even now, with so much territory gained, and so many problems faced and solved, the whole structure of his Defence could fall into complete ruin unless he was able to provide a reasonable solution for this all-important problem. Kant puts this problem of Freedom in the following terms:-

> "The difficulty is as follows -- Even if it be admitted that the supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action; still, as soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause of the existence of substance (a proposition which can never be given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings, and therewith giving up His all-sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends) it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power, namely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself, and on whom his own existence and the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent."(2)

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(1) K. p. V. 232.
(2) K. p. V. 232.

Kant could have expressed this problem of his Defence of Freedom in far clearer terms, and he need not have put the stress of the difficulty upon "the causality of God in the existence of substance". Of course, it is that, but that particular aspect of the problem need not have been given undue prominence. However, the main point is that, for Kant, God now seems to stand over against Human Freedom and threaten its very existence. As already observed, he saw this problem at the very commencement of his Defence of Freedom, and he discussed it under the heading of "Heteronomy" but he knew that such an indirect discussion could not solve the problem, and it must be faced in a direct and positive manner. When Kant has stated the problem, he offers his solution, and his arguments are impressive, but it would be rather futile to discuss such a solution until some attempt has been made to provide even a limited background to the problem which the Kantian Defence of Freedom feared so much. In the analysis of the Determinism of Edwards, it was noted that he made very little use of the "theological" aspect of his system, but that it was always there, clear and certain, and ready to be brought into action if the "psychological" aspect was in danger of refutation. Further, it was noted that Edwards summed up in such "theological" Determinism all the rich heritage of Augustine, Luther and Calvin, and if he used this heritage sparingly it was not because he had the slightest doubt of its tenability. The cardinal doctrine of theological Determinism lies in its "absolute Sovereignty" of God, and Edwards is stating the logical implication of such a doctrine when he says:- "The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him; whereby he doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost thou?"(1) As already state

(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.7.

for Edwards, this feature of his theological Determinism is not an abstract doctrine, or a mere point of dogma, it is the foundation of an all-absorbing mystical experience. Here, then, is the real citadel of his system of Determinism and of all the theological systems of Determinism, and it was the rock upon which Kant feared that his exposition of Freedom would batter itself to complete destruction. Now, there is a fairly widepsread conviction in some sections of philosophical thought that Kant need not have troubled himself too much with this crucial problem because he had really solved it in his repudiation of orthodox theology in his "Critique of Pure Reason".

Concerning Kant's vital influence upon theological doctrine there cannot be the slightest doubt. In fact, one important, modern School of Theology, the "Ritschlian" can be said to have been inaugurated and dominated by Kant's theological challenge. These facts, and many others have succeeded in persuading a host of thinkers that Kant's substitution of the "Moral" arguments for the existence of God has finally and fully justified his destruction of the "metaphysical" arguments for God; and that such "Moral" arguments for God remove completely any fear that the Being of God might threate Human Freedom with destruction. The very least which can be said concerning such a conclusion is that it suffers from an over-simplification of the problem at issue. On the very surface of the question, it is perfectly obvious that the above extract of Kant, stating his final difficulty, would not have been made at all if he was convinced that he had already solved the problem which haunted his Defence of Freedom. For, the above statement was made by Kant after his refutation of the metaphysical arguments, and after he had expounded his moral arguments for the existence of God. Further, in his attempted solution of the supreme difficulty stated in the above extract, Kant does not emphasize, he does not even

mention the solution offered by the "Moral" arguments for God, but takes refuge in the argument, which is the abyss of all reasonable discussion, of the "thing-in-itself". There is a statement in Hartmann's interpretation of Kant which can be taken as typical of this real misunderstanding of Kant's solution of the problem under discussion. Hartmann writes:-

> "This process of detachment was already accomplished in Kant's third antinomy. The all-oppressive concept of God, with its metaphysical weight, was excluded. It was reduced from an ens realissimum to the "ideal of pure reason". By this enfeeblement it ceases to be dangerous. It has itself become highly problematical. Kant has turned the tables. No longer does the moral consciousness need to protect itself against an action of all-powerful Providence; but the reverse is true, if there be at all any certainty as to the existence of such a Providence, it can rest only upon the fact of precisely that moral consciousness itself."(1)

This statement is, in many respects, a correct interpretation of the teaching and claims of Kant, but it is not the only possible interpretation of such teaching, and, even if it were the only possible conclusion from the teaching of Kant, it would still have to be challenged by Determinism. There are reasonable grounds for thinking that Hartmann would welcome such a conclusion as the full and final teaching of Kant upon this central difficulty of his Defence of Freedom, and that it was quite inviolate against the challenge of "theological" Determinism. For he seems to desire to make a complete break between Religion and Ethics, which again is pushing Kant's distinction to an extreme, and to say something with which Kant would have found himself in conflict.

> "It (Ethics) is wholly committed to this life ..... From the ethical point of view, the tendency toward the Beyond is just as contrary to value as, from the religious point of view, is the tendency toward this world. It is a waste of moral energy and a diversion of it away from true values and their actualization, and on that account is not moral. Moral striving regards everything which transcends this life as a deceitful phantom." (2)

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(1) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 33.
(2) Ethics. Vol.3. Page 263.

There can be no doubt about Hartmann's sincere and able interpretation of Kantian teaching, yet, without permitting the present discussion to stray too far from its main current, it must be said that his first quotation must be subjected to considerable modification, and his second repudiated, if the following extract from Kant is received as authentic for his understanding of moral values.

> "Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed object of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action. For they do not fulfil in its completeness that end which is natural to every rational being and which is determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that same pure reason." (1)

However, the main task before the present discussion of God and Freedom is to attempt to sketch, in broad outline, the Kantian view of God which might serve as a background to the statement of his difficulty when God confronts human Freedom, and the following points might assist such a task.

First, from an examination of Kant's "destructive" criticism of the metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, there are reasonable grounds for assuming that he did not think this criticism was as final as many of his interpreters have concluded. The whole tone of such criticism is always tentative, if not slightly hesitant; and when he comes to what he terms the "physico-theological" argument for the existence of God, he is quite emphatic that it must be treated with respect, and that such an argument can have "the force of an irresistible conviction."(2)

Yet, the main and important fact is that, when Kant has said all he has to say concerning the inadequacy of the metaphysical arguments for God, he stands confronted with a difficulty, in this very metaphysical universe of discourse, which cannot be set aside by criticism or explained away on account of some inherent contradiction. It is a difficulty

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(1) K. r. V. A.813.
(2) K. r. V. A.623.

which does, to a degree, impinge upon Kant's "moral" arguments for the existence of God, but Kant sees very clearly that it stands rooted in the very centre of metaphysical thought about God.

> "This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purposive unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason. Such a principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world may be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it."(1)

Kant goes on to say that this "idea" of reason must be qualified by the fact that it must be used as a "regulative" principle, and not as "constitutive". Later, he makes his position upon this point still more emphatic, when he says:- "Even in this theoretical relation (purposive unity) it can be said that I firmly believe in God."(2) The point of this first argument is that Kant never really got away from some amount of "metaphysical" justification for his postulation of the Being of God.

Further, this rather restricted inference of God upon metaphysical grounds would satisfy the requirements of Edwards, that is, for the sake of this particular argument. He uses a similar teleological argument, but does not put too great an emphasis upon its value.(3) However, he would consider Kant's admission in the above extract as indicative of the "metaphysical" inability to think away, in any final and satisfactory manner the existence of God.

Second, when Kant comes to his exposition of the "Moral" arguments for the existence of God, he begins by saying that, whenever he opens a book which purports to "demonstrate away"

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(1) K. r. V. A.686.
(2) K. r. V. A.826.
(3) The Freedom of the Will. Part 2. Sect.3.

Freedom, Immortality and the existence of God, he knows before-hand that such an undertaking is impossible, not because he is in possession of conclusive proofs of these existences, but because "as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less able, to establish any negative conclusion in regard to these questions".(1) His key argument for the "moral" existence of God is, of course, the required linkage of Morality and Happiness, and it is an argument which few Kantian interpreters would agree expressed the real genius of Kant. Yet, involved in this key, "moral" argument for the existence of God, there is a lesser argument the importance of which is often overlooked. Kant states it in these words:-

> "Hence also everyone regards the moral laws as commands; and this the moral laws could not be if they did not connect a priori suitable consequences with their rules, and thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they could not do, if they did not reside in a necessary being, as the supreme good, which alone can make such a purposive unity possible".(2)

In such a statement, Kant makes God not only the reconciler of Morality and Happiness, but the supreme Moral Governor of the universe, and this is no isolated example of Kant's view of God's status. Again, Edwards would agree upon such moral authority being predicated of God, and again, he would wonder how Kant could possibly escape the full significance of such admissions.

When Kant has postulated God upon moral grounds, it might be thought that he would allow the matter to rest just there, that is, leaving in vague outline the moral character of God. However, Kant is not satisfied, and presses forward to describe the "nature" of this Moral Governor of the Universe, and he does so in the following terms:-

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(1) K. r. V. A. 753.
(2) K. r. V. A. 810.

> "This Divine Being must be omnipotent, in order that the whole of nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that He may know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth; omnipresent, that He may be immediately at hand for the satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never fail".(1)

The terms omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and eternal are terms which mean "metaphysical" attributes in God. It is true that Kant has postulated them in God upon purely moral grounds, but he has made them "essential" in God, because, as he says, such attributes are the product of his "moral" theology which requires "a sole, all-perfect and rational primordial being". In other words, without these "metaphysical" attributes in God, Kant's whole ethical system falls into ruins, or, in his own words, "belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is equally little cause for fear that the former can be taken away from m (2

At this point, it is of importance to observe that there is nothing "original" in Kant postulating the existence and nature of God upon "moral" grounds. The "moral" argument for God is very old, and was used by most competent theologians of the Church. However, the "moral" argument was used by them as one among many, and Kant's originality consists in his putting aside all other arguments, and putting the full burden of "proof" on this solitary, "moral" argument. Furthe he is original in the implications of this "moral" argument as will later be seen. Edwards also makes use of this "moral argument in a most original manner in his thesis, "God's chief end in Creation". He isolates what might be termed the "categorical imperative" by saying:

> "That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end; there the aim of the agent stops and rests."(3)

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(1) K. r. V. A. 815.
(2) K. r. V. A. 829.
(3) God's Chief End in Creation. Intro.

He thinks of God having this ultimate end when he created the world, and thus infers his essential "moral" character which he describes in these terms:-

> "As he is every way the first and supreme, and his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good ..... And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend .. so he is fit that he should be regarded by all ..... (1)

In other words, God, for Edwards, is the supreme "moral" being in the Universe, and His "Sovereignty" is founded upon His essential Morality. So that Edwards and Kant would agree that God is an "all-perfect, rational and primordial" Being, and this is very important.

Third, now Kant stands confronted with a very real difficulty which might be stated in these terms. His "moral" theology has led him to postulate a "moral" Being with essential metaphysical attributes, and this Being has taken on all the characteristics of the God of "traditional" or "speculative" theology. Further, Kant is perfectly aware that, by such an all-perfect, rational and primordial Being, he has created, upon "moral" grounds, a possible "heteronomous" centre of opposition to his Human Freedom. In other words, he is back to the problem which he wished to avoid, that is, confronting Human Freedom with an "original" cause of all existence, and, what is more important, confronting Human Freedom with a "moral Ruler and Law-Giver whose will must be supreme. Kant knows that his ethical system cannot work on the supposition that God is a "limited" Being, like man, struggling for "moral" values. Yet, his ethical system seems doomed to failure if God is conceived of in terms of the God of orthodox theology, that is, sole Giver of the Moral Law. So Kant resorts to a rather strained device to keep the logical results of his "mora theology in complete agreement with the logical results of his ethical system, and his argument is important:-

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(1) God's Chief End in Creation. Ch.1.

> "But when practical reason has reached this goal, namely, the concept of a sole primordial being as the supreme good, it must not presume to think that it has raised itself above all empirical conditions of its application, and has attained to an immediate knowledge of new objects, and can therefore start from this concept, and can deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it is these very laws that have led us, in virtue of their inner practical necessity, to the postulate of a self-sufficient cause, or of a wise Ruler of the world, in order that through such agency effect may be given them. We may not, therefore, in reversal of such procedure, regard them as accidental and as derived from the mere will of the Ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with these laws."(1)

In other words, Kant is saying -- I do believe in God, in fact, I believe in an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, and eternal God, and I believe such a God to be the moral Ruler of the Universe who will finally unite Virtue and Happiness, and uphold all the implications of the Moral Law. However, I do not believe that my knowledge of such a God is grounded upon revelation or intuition, but rather upon the necessity of my practical reason. I have "found" God by means of the Moral Law within myself. I cannot, therefore, deny this inner, human, personal "authorship" of the Moral Law, for, without this very "authorship" I would never have known that there was such a Being as God.

Is such an argument valid? Can Kant have the argument both ways? That is, can he have a God to serve, or "save" his ethical system, and then get rid of such a God when the implications of his "moral" existence become too oppressive? There can be no doubt about the fact that both Edwards and Kant believed in the "moral" Sovereignty of God, but the important question is -- which dealt with the concept in the most logical manner? Upon the answering of such a question depends whether Kant's Defence of Freedom is tenable, or whether it must meet with "complete destruction" from the theological Determinism of Edwards; and, of course, no answer to the above question is possible at this stage of the discussion of God and Freedom.

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(1) K. r. V. A. 818.

Here, then, is the background to Kant's great difficulty in Human Freedom, and it might be fitting to allow Fischer to put the case in far clearer and more competent terms than are given above:-

> "The doctrine of freedom and the absolute supremacy of the moral order of the world, or the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, rests with Kant on firm ground. The moral proof for the existence of God stands or falls with this doctrine. Regarding the theoretical demonstrability of God's existence, Kant held different views at different stages of his philosophical inquiry. In his pre-Critical period he sought to restate these proofs and give them new cogency; in the Critique of Pure Reason he not only denied, but refuted them, or demonstrated their impossibility; and in the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as in that of Teleological Judgment, he neither abandons nor modifies this last position, but, in perfect agreement with it, deduces, using the well-known and evident arguments, from the necessity of the moral order of the world, the necessity of the moral ground of the world, or the existence of God. Accordingly, in what concerns the question of the demonstrability of the divine existence, we find no contradiction in the different views of Kant, but a logically consistent advance. But, however differently he may have thought on this point, namely, the knowableness of God, there was not a moment in the course of the development of his philosophical convictions when he denied, or even doubted, the reality of God."(1)

It is with such a background that it becomes possible to appraise Kant's difficulty when he now says, "there still remains a difficulty ..... which threatens freedom with complete destruction." Earlier, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant has put this difficulty in other terms:- "To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures striving after their final end, (Happiness), this is to reduce the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom."(2)

There was much in "traditional" Theology which supported this view of God and human Destiny, and Kant treats such a view with unconcealed contempt. Yet, as already observed, his own doctrine of God is not completely free from such implications. After all, there is in Kant a very clear reference to Divine retribution. It is true, that this retribution is

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(1) Kuno Fischer, A Critique of Kant, page 43.
(2) K. p. V. 151.

"moral"; and does not operate in this world, that is, in any perfect manner; but, when it is laid down that God finally "rewards" Virtue with Happiness, even by some "moral" process, it is hard to see how such a doctrine can fail to influence those who would be "moral". Further, it is almost impossible to think of God "rewarding" any one without thinking of Him as punishing those who have not qualified for such a "reward"; even though such punishment be "negative" in character. However, the main purpose at this stage of the discussion is to attempt to understand how Kant sets about solving this difficulty which now confronts and threatens Human Freedom. As already observed, Kant is not very fortunate in the statement of his difficulty. He attempts to say that God "threatens" Human Freedom because He must be conceived as "the cause of the existence of substance". This is true, but behind this Divine Causality, Kant is really worried about a kind of "moral" despotism in God which is a far more serious type of Divine Causality. However, Kant deals with this "first" cause difficulty by saying, (a) It would reduce man to mere automaton. (b) Self-consciousness would not save him from such a fate, it might make him a "thinking" automaton, but the essential fact of "spontaneity" would be absent, and Self-consciousness is a poor substitute for Freedom. (c) Only comparative Freedom would be possible, for the first and final cause would be in another sphere. (d) Only those who regard things-in-themselves as identical with phenomena could fall into such an error, and if this division between things-in-themselves and phenomena is not kept fatalism is inevitable. (e) This absence of division or distinction of noumenal and phenomenal obscures the essential Causality of God. God cannot be the "Creator" of phenomena, rather, He must be conceive as the Creator of things-in-themselves. If this solution is rejected, then, the idea of God in relation to human affairs must be handed over to Spinozism, which, in Kant's view, is far more reasonable in deduction than "traditional" Theology.

Thus Kant attempts to solve this supreme difficulty, but his solution is hurried and unconvincing because he has declined to face the real core of the problem. Kant could have ignored this particular phase of the problem of God and Human Freedom by the argument used by Hume that, discussion of Divine Causality, in this restricted meaning of Causality, is quite beyond the capacity of the human mind to speculate, and, therefore, un-productive of any real contribution to knowledge. The Causality of God in regard to substance is not the real problem of Kant, nor is it the real difficulty which threatens Human Freedom, and no one knows this better than Kant. He has tried to avoid the real issue, and therefore, his subsequent discussion of Freedom is haunted with the "real" difficulty; and the following discussion must attempt to follow Kant as he moves and weaves among his evasions. The question is, does Kant procede to involve himself in hopeless contradiction because of such evasions? Perhaps the following observations can provide an answer to such a question:-

(1) Later, Kant comes face to face with this problem again, that is, the problem of God's "moral" relationship to man, and he says:-

> "The Infinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which His command inexorably requires, in order to be true to His justice in the share which He assigns to each in the summum bonum is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings."(1)

Here, God is seen, not only as the linkage between Virtue and Happiness, but as the Supreme Custodian of the Moral Law whose Moral Law inexorably commands holiness, and it is difficult to see how Kant can reconcile such a view of God with the previous statement that Moral Laws cannot be conceived as derived from the mere will of the Ruler. Yet, even if

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(1) K. p. V. 263.

this can be explained in a satisfactory manner, it is still more difficult to see what Kant means when he says:-

> "Moreover, it is not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all human obligation in general, (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of the will)"

How does this agree with "without a God, etc., the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval ..... but not springs of purpose and action"?(2) Kant is trying to say something of real value, but his method of expression leaves much to be desired.

(2) As already stated, Kant is haunted by this difficulty which has its roots in "theological" Determinism and which confronts his belief in Human Freedom. He has evaded the real issue in the previous discussion, but he cannot evade its influence upon his mind. He tries to argue that it is possible to postulate God upon strictly "moral" grounds, and thus escape the difficulty of conceiving God as the Giver of the Moral Law, that is, in the manner in which it is held by "traditional" Theology. Now, he tries to find support for this doctrine by a reference to the Christian Faith:-

> "Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences." (3)

At last, Kant is coming within sight of stating the real difficulty in God which confronts Human Freedom. Here, in very ambiguous terms, lies the core of the threatened destruction of all Freedom, but again, Kant has stated it in most unfortunate language. If he had left the statement at the end of the first clause, it would have been vague, but it woul

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(1) K. p. V. 267.
(2) K. r. V. A. 813.
(3) K. p. V. 271.

have been safe. However, when he goes on to say that the Christian Faith "does not make the knowledge of God and His will the foundation of these laws", he is not only mistaken, but he is perverse. There is not a competent exponent of the Christian Faith who could agree with such a statement. In fact, it contradicts all that is central and crucial to the Christian Faith. Surely, the Founder of the Christian Faith is stating the heart of that Faith when He says, "this is eternal life, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent."(1) The "knowledge" of God is essential to Christian Morality, and all that Kant might argue in opposition is pure prejudice. Yet, in the same section, Kant makes reference to the distinction between "Commands" and "Sanctions", and such a distinction may be of assistance in seeing the point of view for which he is so persistently contending. However, consideration of this must come later.

(3) Now, Kant seems to say something which brings him into complete agreement with the Determinism of Edwards. As already observed, Edwards grounded his theological Determinism upon the Sovereignty of God, and he works out the implications of such Sovereignty in a most impressive manner. Further, he supported this theological Determinism by writing a separat thesis, "God's Chief End in Creation" in which he teaches that God can have but one, final, ultimate end in such a creation, and, that is, in the words of Edwards:-

> "Thus, it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was God's last end, that it might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good ..... that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world, and so, that the emanati itself was aimed at by him as a last end in creation."(2)

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(1) The Gospel of St. John, ch.17, v.3.
(2) God's Chief End in Creation. Ch.1. Sect.2.

Such an extract reveals how deeply the roots of Divine Sovereignty in Edwards really went. Kant, in an earlier observation, see the logical implications of such a belief, and dismisses it under the term of Spinozism. However, when Kant is asking a similar question to Edwards -- "When we ask what is God's ultimate end in creating the world?", he can hardly avoid the conclusion of Edwards, and writes:-

> "Therefore those who placed the end of creation in the glory of God (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world, respect for His command, the observance of the holy duty that His law imposes on us, when there is added thereto His glorious plan for crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness."(

Has Kant finally given up the struggle for Human Freedom? From such an extract Edwards would conclude that the battle is over, a battle which Kant has waged with rather pathetic evasions and endless contradictions. At last, Kant appears to have succumbed to the inevitable, and God has become all in all. At the beginning of this analysis of God and Freedom Kant seemed to have created God for the purpose of the "harmony" and "glory" of man. God was something like an appendage to a moral system which found its real centre in man. Now, it appears that Kant has gone over to the other extreme, and man becomes lost in the Glory of God, and all his moral strivings were but ripples on the waters of an infinite consciousness, and had no real purpose but to be lost in the depths of God's own irresistible and final purpose, His own Glory.

If the evidence considered is accepted as an accurate description of Kant's conception of God and Freedom, then, the discussion ought to end at this point, and all that would remain would consist of a careful tying up of the arguments already put forth. If the discussion did end at this point,

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(1) K. p. V. 273.

there can be little doubt about the conclusion being that Kant has failed to expound a reasonable Defence of Freedom against an aggressive Determinism, and it has failed because Kant was unable to reconcile this vital issue of God and Human Freedom. The God who, in Kant's teaching, began as an appendage to Morality has grown out of all proportion to the status of such a role, and He has become the be-all and end-all of all existence. The above reference in Kant to the "metaphysical" attributes of Deity, and the comprehensive grandeur of the "Glory" of God, these things are not accidental to Kant's teaching, for he observes this attitude right to the end of his discussion of "Religion".

> "Cogitated conformably to this practical necessity of our reason, the True Catholic Religious Belief must be explained to be the belief in God, First, as the Omnipotent creator of heaven and earth, i.e. morally as a Holy Lawgiver; Secondly, as the Preserver of the human race, i.e. their Benignant Governor and Moral Guardian; Thirdly, as the Administrator of his own Holy Laws, i.e. as the Righteous Judge."(1)

This is the God of "orthodox" Theology, and the God of "theological" Determinism, and it is useless for Kant to say that this "Sovereignty must be conceived 'morally'", for there never was a teacher of the Church who did not make the "Moral" Nature of God fundamental to all His activities. From such a persistent description of God, Edwards would rightly conclude that he and Kant had nothing to differ about concerning the "moral" and "metaphysical" attributes of God, and he would interpret Kant as supporting the logical conclusion of such teaching by agreeing:-

> "It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works; that as all things are of him, so they would all be to him; and that in the final issue of things, it would appear that he is first, and the last."(2)

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(1) Religion, page 186 (Semple's translation)
(2) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.2. Sect.11.

This is the bed-rock of the Determinism of Edwards, and, from the evidence so far available, there is nothing that Kant is able to say to evade such a conclusion. Yet, in spite of all the facts available, it is felt that Kant is able to say something which escapes this complete destruction of Human Freedom.

First, the discussion must look again at Kant's central principle of Morality and Freedom, that is, the principle of Autonomy. For, whatever Kant says about "moral" and "metaphysical" attributes in God, he never withdraws or modifies this fundamental concept of his teaching. Is it possible that Kant, in this autonomous principle, is saying something which, in spite of all its apparent twistings and evasions, stands upon solid and unmoveable ground? The following extract is, perhaps, one of Kant's best descriptions of what he means by Autonomy:-

> "Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of morality, we need not wonder why they all failed. It was seen that man was bound to the laws of duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are universal."(1)

As already observed, such a statement must be put against the background of at least two other aspects of Kant's teaching. (a) God is conceived as the supreme Lawgiver. (b) God is conceived as the ultimate Judge, that is, of the correct relation of Virtue to Happiness. Yet, when this background is fully appreciated, Kant is still found insisting that these facts do not cancel out the supreme fact that man gives himself the Moral Law to which he is subject. It seems that what Kant is trying to say is -- "I know God is the ultimate foundation of all Moral Laws. Yet, there is a real sense in which I am the author of such Moral Laws for myself. God can legislate, but I only can 'execute' such Moral Laws. Until they find actual and real 'awareness' in me, these Moral Laws are mere abstractions; and, what is more, it is only as

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(1) Gd. 61.

I accept these Moral Laws as real for myself that they possess real "moral" value. Therefore, in the widest and deepest meaning of the term, I am the "author" of these Moral Laws. Of course, there is a sense in which such Moral Laws are "given" by God. In fact, I find them inherent in the very rational and moral constitution of my being, as a man. In that sense, I do not give myself the Moral Law, in fact, the Moral Law is given to me. Yet, on the other hand -- explain it as you will -- I take an "interest" in the Moral Law. I recognise its "Primacy". I know and accept that it really "belongs" to me. This surely is some kind of "authorship" of the Moral Law. Still further, when I "decide" to fulfil this Moral Law, it is "I" who make that decision. I thereby make it my own. Surely this is a very real "authorship" of the Moral Law?"

In very general terms, this paraphrase seems to contain the important features of Kant's principle of Autonomy as regards the Moral Law. Is it a reasonable argument, and does it contribute any durable element to Human Freedom? Before answering such a question, it is necessary to investigate whether Edwards has anything to say about this question of "authorship". As usual, Edwards has not missed this possible argument for Freedom, and he treats it in this way. His opponent has argued that Praise and Blame can be attributed only on the ground that the person involved as "the cause or the author of the deed". Edwards replies that "being a cause or author of a deed" are ambiguous terms. What does his opponent mean? Does he mean that a man is the cause or author of his deed, in this case, "an act of will", by being the voluntary, designing cause of that act of will, or, that the man is the author of his act of will by being the cause by an antecedent choice? If his opponent means by this "authorship" then, says Edwards, it has been proved beyond any shadow of doubt that man can never possess such power. Now, says Edwards, if being the "author" means "being the immediate

agent, or the being that acted, or in the exercise of that act if the phrase of being the author, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or blame, on account of them."(1)

Further, Edwards is quite willing to grant, without any qualification, that men are the "authors" of their "external" actions. Yet, he will have no compromise with this central fact, men are not the authors of their "antecedent" acts of the Will. On the other hand, Kant, in spite of all his unfortunate terminology, means by "authorship" this very "antecedent" act of the Will.

> "Thus the will is not subject simply to the Law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the Law, and on this ground only, subject to the Law (of which it can regard itself as the author)."(2)

Here, Freedom and Determinism stand facing each other in irreconcilable combat.

Second, this irreconcilable conflict between Kant and Determinism is illustrated further by Kant lifting the "autonomous" principle to a still higher level; and indicating the real centre of the difficulty which threatened his Defence of Freedom with complete destruction. It is a common feature of Kant's doctrine of Autonomy, that the Will, to be a truly "moral" Will, cannot be determined by subjective Impulses. In fact, there are ample grounds for concluding that Kant thought such Determination not only wrong morally, but rationally impossible. However, the main point is that, if the Will is determined by the Impulses, then, a state of Heteronomy results. Now, Kant widens this doctrine to include everything that is "external" to the real "moral" and "rational" Self. That is, Autonomy is Self-determination, and Determination by anything else is Heteronomy. Kant feels that this is a real discovery in Ethics.

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(1) The Freedom of the Will. Pt.4. Sect.1.
(2) Gd. 60.

> "It explains at once the occasion of all the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle of morals. For they sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and principle of a law (which consequently could not determine the will directly but by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain); whereas they ought first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a priori and directly, and afterwards determine the object in accordance with the will. Now, whether they place this object of pleasure, which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in happiness, in perfection, in moral (feeling), or in the will of God, their principle in every case implied heteronomy."(1)

It is the latter part of the quotation which is important for the present discussion. For here, Kant states the real danger which threatens Freedom and Morality. It is Heteronomy, and such a Heteronomy can centre in God. Therefore, for Kant, in a very real sense, God can be a danger to Freedom like the subjective Inclinations. As already stated, Kant never modifies the finality of this "autonomous" principle, and he never withdraws his endless opposition to Heteronomy regardless of its particular character. He has already hinted at the destruction of Morality because it is conceived as a system of rewards and penalties in the hand of a "higher power". Later, he offers an explanation of why God can be a source and centre of Heteronomy. It is that even if mankind were possessed of "perfect" Reason or insight into the nature of things, there would always be the danger of the subjective Inclination seeking Happiness, and using Reason to secure such an end. Even if mankind had this "perfect" Reason, Happiness would still be the "perfect" end that man would seek and, further, this "perfect" insight, of itself would not impl the "categorical" Imperative, for the Happiness principle would be in complete control.

> "But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some defects, moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes, (for what we can prove perfectly is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes). (2)

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(1) K. p. V. 184.

(2) K.p. V. 294.

> " Transgression of the law would, no doubt, be avoided; what is commanded would be done; but the mental disposition, from which actions ought to procede, cannot be infused by any command, and in this case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that reasons has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to resist inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of the law; hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends, would cease to exist."(1)

Here, Kant is expressing in more fortunate terms why God can be a danger to Human Freedom. Earlier, he has said the Moral Law commands that the highest good be made the ultimate object of conduct, but that this cannot be possible, in any final sense, "otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good author of the world."(2) Such a statement, left to itself, and without careful attention to what Kant has in mind, could be used to suggest that his point of view on God and Morality was the same as that of Edwards, but Kant means by such a statement something quite different from anything said by Edwards. What Kant is saying is, "I shall never be fully good or happy until my will is in harmony with God's will, but I have to work out this harmony by the process of moral conflict. I have to accept the Moral Law as an essential part of my own "moral" and "rational" Nature. I cannot accept it merely because it is a command of God. I must work out my own salvation with "fear and trembling", but such "fear and trembling" must be my own, inner reaction to the Moral Law which I have given to myself. If my "fear and trembling" come from anything outside my "authorship" of the Moral Law, even if these things come from God, my actions, done on account of such "fear and trembling", cease to be "moral". When I have fought this titanic battle within myself; when I have declined to be "frightened" into Goodness; when I have finally accepted the Moral Law as my law, then, I know I shall be in harmony with God's will."

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(1) K. p. V. 294.
(2) K. p. V. 272.

Third, Kant insists upon, and persists in, these implications of "Autonomy", and his arguments overflow into his work, "Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason". Earlier, it was observed that Kant drew a distinction between "Commands" and "Sanctions". The distinction is fine, even to hair-splitting, but it is a distinction which is all-important to Kant's discussion of God and Freedom. He is willing to recognise all duties as "Divine Commands", but he will not allow that they shall be "Sanctions"; and by this term he means, "arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will and contingent in themselves".(1) To appreciate what Kant is trying to say involves careful appreciation of all that he means by "Autonomy". An attempt has been made to state such Autonomy in as many aspects as possible, but there is still another statement by Kant which contributes to its understanding.

> "A Law (a moral and practical law) is a proposition which contains a categorical imperative (a command). He who gives commands by a law (imperans) is the lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (auctor) of the obligation imposed by the law, but not always the author of the law. If it were so, the law would be positive (contingent) and arbitrary. The law which binds us a priori and unconditionally by our own reason may also be expressed as proceeding from the will of a Supreme Lawgiver, that is of one who has only rights and no duties (namely, from the Divine will). But this only involves the idea of a moral being whose will is law for all, without his being conceived as the author of it."(2)

Kant speaks of the Moral Law being "graven" upon the heart, and although he speaks of man being compelled to "regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if he is to avoid contradiction;"(3) he also identifies this "judge" with the same self as gives the Law.(4) Later, he defines Conscience as "our self-judging moral understanding"(5). All these features indicate how profoundly Kant viewed "Autonomy"; but there is still another extract which assists clarity upon this question.

> "And although statutable divine laws be admitted (which can be recognised as obligatory, not of themselves, but only by dint of a revelation of the divine will) still the pure moral legislation, whereby God's will is

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(1) K. p. V. 271.
(2) M. d. S. Intro. 29.
(3) Preface to Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 294.
(4) Religion, page 251. (Semple's translation)
(5) Religion, page 251.

> originally engraven on our heart, is not only the indefeasible condition precedent of all genuine religion whatsoever, but is just that wherein this last properly consists, and toward which the statutable can only work as containing a mean of its propagation and advancement"(1)

This distinction between "statutable" and "moral" Laws must not be ignored, and it is obvious that Kant places this Moral "autonomous" Law upon a much higher level than the mere "statutable" Law, which might be termed a "divine sanction". Kant presses on with the implications of this principle of Autonomy by attempting to restate one of the cardinal features of "theological" Determinism, namely, that of the doctrine of Election. He admits that there is a sense in which we are "elected" because we are created by God -- "but reason cannot by any means comprehend how any being should be so created as to be endowed with the free use of his powers". In other words, he admits creation by God, but he still clings to Freedom even though these two terms appear to be beyond comprehension. Later, he is more emphatic and says:-

> "We are consequently to be regarded as Free Agents already extant, <u>called</u>, not by any natural dependency arising out of our creation, but <u>called</u>, by a purely moral coaction, agreeable to Laws of Freedom ..... Our vocation is consequently, <u>morally</u> quite clear; but, speculatively the possibility of such a call is an impenetrable mystery." (2)

Here, there is a concealed challenge to "theological" Determinism, especially that of Edwards. Kant is saying, "You agree that the metaphysical attributes of God are subordinated to his "moral" nature. Further, you insist upon your cardinal dogma of election as a primary support of your Determinism; yet, I insist upon taking God's Morality seriously, and can interpret "Election" only upon "Moral" terms. Its speculative interpretation is beyond comprehension, but its "moral" interpretation is capable of reasonable explanation." Finally, Kant sends forth a ringing trumpet blast of defiance to all forms of Heteronomy, and which proclaims in clear tones his claim to Autonomy. At least, here, he had no doubts about his Defence of Freedom.

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(1) Religion, p.132.
(2) Religion, p.190, (Semple's translation)

"The idea virtue, on the contrary, is exsculpted, in most prominent relief, on every human soul. Each man bears it fully about within, however it may for a while be partially submerged; nor does it need like the religious idea, to be arrived at through any chain of ratiocination. In the august magnificence of its purit arousing consciousness forthwith to the discovery of an otherwise quite unsuspected energy, empowering man to smite down and overthrow the greatest possible obstacles within; in the dignity of his nature which mankind has to uphold inviolate; in order to reach that moral destination after which he strives; in this recognition of his excellency and purity, there does, I say, lie something as soul-exalting, yea, heavenwards wafting, placin mankind as it were in the presence of the Deity, who merely by his holiness and legislative guardianship of virtue is an object of adoration, that every man, even though as yet far removed from giving this idea any motive-purchase on his maxims, gladly entertains it in his thoughts, as it then fully reveals to him, and stamps on him, the feeling of the original nobility and state of his rank.

"How different are the inward phenomena when this order is inverted. The idea of a supreme governor, imposing upon us duties by his law, ... godliness is exposed to the risk of sliding into an abject, servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot." (1)

What is Kant saying in this final blast of defiance at the theological implications of Determinism, and in this final stand for Human Freedom? From all which has gone before, he seems to be saying, "I have proved, as carefully and conscientiously as I know how, that the God of 'theological' Determinism stands rooted in metaphysical arguments which are quite incapable of rational demonstration. I admit that my 'moral' proof is not perfect or complete, for reason, itself, seems to demand some ground of purpose and unity in existence. However, I am convinced that no real advance can ever be made along the road of a mere "rational" proof or investigation of God, and I give up the attempt, and I defy any one else to vindicate such an attempt. However, I cannot rest content with 'negative' criticism, for it ends in 'scepticism'. I must try and make sense of the facts of my 'rational' and 'moral' Consciousness. For here, I find a law which is quite different from the law which I observe in the world. It is a law which speaks unfaltering and uncompromisingly of what 'OUGHT' to happen, even though it has

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(1) Religion, page 246, (Semple's translation)

never happened, and might not even happen. This Ought is different from all imperatives, in that it is a 'Categorical' Imperative, and as, in a very real sense, I am behind this 'Categorical' Imperative, I feel justified in saying that I am its 'author', and to a certain degree, 'judge' of its fulfilment. All this constitutes a Law which is in conflict with the Law of 'things', and in conflict with the Law which works in my nature as a mere animal. Therefore, I am at war within myself but I know which is the 'true' Self, for I would not have known a conflict but for the Law given in my 'true' Self. Of course, in a sense, God gave me this Law as an endowment of my manhood, but it is my Law because I have acknowledged its 'priority' for myself. However, if God gave me the Law, He, too, must be 'moral', but not quite in the sense in which I am 'moral', for He does not require to pass through this 'moral' conflict. This 'moral' conflict is the seal of my Morality and Freedom. I believe in God, but not the God of Determinism who threatens or 'manoeuvres' me into obeying His Will. God must stand back from me, and let me use His 'gifts' of Freedom, that I might decide for myself, without fears or bribes, to be Good.(1) For Freedom, in its deepest sense, is 'Independence' of Happiness and even of God. Such 'Independence' gives me a sense of Awe and Reverence, and I feel the 'presence' of God, and this is what I mean by Religion." Is Kant saying something of infinite value?

What is the reply of Edwards to all this? Perhaps the following paraphrase of his arguments will assist in deciding this question -- "I find I can make no sense of existence except that I start from the Sovereignty of God, but to interpret such Sovereignty as mere despotism is irrational. God is a 'moral' Being, and the fount of all Goodness in existence. He brought forth the world and man out of His very goodness.

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(1) See Caird. The Critical Philosophy, Vol.1. Page, 71.

He was the First, and He must be the Last of all existence. God made original man capable of real 'choice', but man chose Evil, and the results of such a 'choice' is the Fall from his original dignity and purity. God 'permitted' not 'willed' that man should Fall, and now man is in ruins. God must again start with a 'New' creation of man, and again, He will create according to His Wisdom and Goodness, that is, He will 'select', with Divine Freedom, the objects of His 'New' creation. Therefore, unless and until, He chooses, no man can be saved. This is not mere 'despotism' but the disposal of Divine Wisdom. Man is in a 'fallen' state. He does not know the 'true' Good, nor can he possibly follow it. All he knows is what is 'agreeable' to his mind, and I have proved, beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt that when he chooses the 'Agreeable' he is Determined by his own nature; but, because it is he, himself, who actually makes the 'choic he has that quality of Liberty which makes him responsible, and worthy of Praise or Blame. There is a very real sense in which God does stand 'apart' from fallen man, and permits him to work out his own destruction. That is why God cannot be held responsible for Man's Sin. This Sin or 'moral' Evil in Man is so deep that its cure lies beyond man's 'natural' capacity. Strive as he will to satisfy his 'perverted' sens of the Good, he only blunders on in hopeless confusion. Of course, he has limited glimmerings of what he 'Ought' to be. After all, there is enough 'moral' example in the world to challenge the worst of men, and even God does not restrict the 'general' operation of His Spirit to the good people alon Man is Determined because he is a Sinner, and he can be saved only by a New Birth, and this New Birth, like the First Birth will be the 'gift' of God. When a man is 'saved', he is still Determined, but now by Divine Goodness, and not by the 'human Agreeable'. Therefore, God must have <u>His Way</u> with His Creation, and to be Determined by God is to be 'godlike'. This is real Freedom and real Morality." Is Edwards saying something of infinite value?

In closing this discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, the major question is not whether Kant and Edwards have said something of great value, rather it is which has treated his respective points of view with greater consistency? Therefore, some attempt must be made to sum up the evidence which is available and to put forth some positive verdict.

First, The Causality of Freedom

Here, it appears, Kant leaves his position open to grave attack from Determinism. He admits that there is such a thing as a "Freedom" Causality, and denies that such Causality is "lawless", but is subject to laws of a special kind. Beyond this he is not prepared to go, but takes refuge in the intelligible world which is really un-intelligible. To explain anything is to bring it under the causal laws of nature, and this would be a fatal price to pay for an adequate explanation of how Freedom works. It is true that Kant sought only to construct a "Defence" of Freedom, but his "Defence" is built up only on one side. The rear aspect of his Freedom-fortress lies wide open to a vast uncharted and, according to Kant, forever unchartable territory. He must not complain if Edwards insists upon filling up this epistemological vacuum with God and law and order. Kant has said -- "Our reason is not like a plane infinitely far-extended, the limits of which we know in a general way only, but must rather be compared to a sphere, the radius of which can be determined from the curvature of the arc of its surface ....."(1) This is the argument of Edwards, but his argument extends beyond mere experience. It includes the whole universe of Universal Being and he tries to make ends meet, and he is convinced that they must meet for, although he perceives only a fragment of Reality he cannot conceive that the whole of Reality will contradict that fragment which is perceived. The whole cosmos is an orderly and united whole, for the God of order pervades the

(1) K. r. V. A. 762.

whole. In the Third Antinomy, Kant admits that this conception of the Universe has rational justification, and he has been unable to say anything which suggests that his own theory of a divided Universe is superior for Reason or for Freedom.

Second, Freedom and Morality

Kant's central theme is that for human Morality to be real it must be imputed. That is, man must hold himself responsible for his acts, Good and Evil. Further, he argues that such responsibility is inconceivable unless it is built upon Freedom. Yet, when he comes to discuss this "citadel" of Freedom, he is hopelessly ambiguous. Evidence has been submitted that he conceives of the human Will as the core of human Personality, but the question arises, what does Kant mean by the human Will? He makes frequent reference to a "Good" Will a "Pure" Will, a "Rational" Will, an "Elective" Will, a "Bad" Will, a "Holy" Will. Even if all these are reduced to the two terms "Willkuhr" Elective Will, and "Wille" Rational Will the question still persists, in which Will does responsibilit really rest? There are times when Kant gives the impression that only the "Elective" Will is really free, yet, his principal teaching centres in making Freedom identical with the noumenal world, the pivot of which is the "Rational" Will. It is not enough to say, as Dr. Paton says, that this difficulty can be explained or overcome by agreeing to look at man from two different points of view.(1) It is this vital question of responsibility which is at stake, and without which the whole ethical teaching of Kant would be in ruins. Is the act of Freedom something which takes place within human experience, that is, the Kantian phenomenal; or is it an act which takes place outside human experience, that is, the Kantian noumenal? From the evidence available, it must be concluded that Kant taught that this act of Freedom takes place in the noumenal world; and Dr. Ewing rightly asks --

(1) The Categorical Imperative, page 274.

"How can a timeless, purely rational self be conceived as acting immorally, and if it never acts immorally, how can we be said to be responsible for immoral action?(1) It is with very great reluctance that this present examination of the Kantian Defence of Freedom agrees with the conclusion arrived at by Dr. W.R. Sorley when he writes -- "Kant speaks of the free Volition as an act out of time, an act which forms the character which functions in time. In this way he cuts it off from our experience, which is in time; his Freedom is a non-temporal act, and little more can be said of it."(2)

Third, Moral Evil and Human Ability

The greatest attack of Edwards upon Kant would centre upon the Kantian dictum, "I ought, therefore I can". Edwards would have agreed that Kant could have claimed consistency in such a dictum if he had never entered upon a discussion of Radical Evil as something positive and personal. Kant puts the question in these words -- "But if a man is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution by his own powers, and of himself become a good man?"(3) Kant replies to this question bysaying that Duty bids us do it, and Duty demands nothing of us which we cannot do. However, Edwards would be far from satisfied with such a reply. He would want to know what Kant meant by the term -- "corrupt in the very ground of his maxim Kant obviously means that the "Elective" Will is corrupt, and Edwards would view the dilemma with which Kant is faced as consisting of the following. (a) If the "Elective" Will is corrupt, then, it is the real centre of human decision and responsibility. Here, too, is the citadel of real Human Freedom. Freedom of the supposed "Rational" Will is but a figment of the imagination. If this corruption of the "Elective" Will is meant in any serious manner, it must mean

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(1) Kant's Treatment of Causality. Page, 220.
(2) Moral Values and the Idea of God. Page. 437.
(3) Religion. (Translated by Greene & Hudson, page 43)

corruption of its inherent Freedom. If this Human Freedom is corrupt, how can it, of itself, inaugurate a new, decisive and original act of Freedom? (b) If Kant means that the "Elective" Will is corrupt, but the decisive, original act of Freedom comes from the "Rational" Will, then, he is involving his argument in some very grave contradictions. First, the Freedom of the "Rational" Will is really a "non-moral" Freedom, for it was never involved in any "moral" conflict. Second, the "Elective" Will, the core of "moral" Responsibility, is "determined" by something external to itself, and this cannot be a basis for Kantian "moral" recovery. Third, for Kant to argue that the "Elective" Will can become corrupted while the "Rational" Will remains uncontaminated is to make a hopeless dualism in human personality, and construct a gulf which nothing can bridge. Finally, if the Will is that "principle of the mind which chooses", then, the "Elective" Will is the only real source of Choice, and this being corrupted, the situation for Self-salvation is hopeless. Yet, after full consideration has been given to the criticism by Edwards, is not Kant, by his deliberate dichotomy of the human Will, saying something which is true of human experience? Is there not clear evidence in human life of an endless conflict between the two selves? Is not the fact of conscience something which demands some such explanation as offered by Kant? Edwards would interpret conscience as the "general" action of the Spirit of God upon human affairs, and he would insist that fundamentally a "split" personality is un-psychological and immoral. Whatever we do, we do with the preponderance of preference. We never really desire one thing and do the opposite. Our better self is but a figment of the imagination, that is, if such a self is conceived as a kind of "Rational" Self which is our "true" personality. The voice of conscience is the voice of God commanding us to fulfil the Law. It is not our voice, or our Law legislated by our own Reason. When we sin, it is because the prevailing preference of our whole personality is behind that act of Sin. We have

violated and offended the command of God in ourselves, and the corruption which follows affects the whole of our personality. We cannot derive the slightest satisfaction from the thought that the "Rational" Will within us remains uncontaminated. Total depravity does not mean that we have sunk to the depths of every possible "moral" Evil. Rather, it means that the whole of the personality has been involved in the act of "moral" Evil. In other words, Edwards would charge Kant with being "half-hearted" in his description of "Radical" Evil and in his analysis of "moral" values and "moral" reformation. One-half of human personality never really enters upon "moral" conflict, knows nothing of "moral" failure, and stands in no need of "moral" reformation. Furthe he would charge Kant with making a parody of the "Fall" of man. For, according to Kant's central teaching of the "Rational" Will, man never really fell, and never can really fall. It is feared that, from a "theological" point of view, Kant has no valid reply to such charges, and that his handling of "moral" Evil and "human" Ability leaves a very serious breach in his Defence of Freedom.

Fourth, God and Human Freedom

An attempt has been made to indicate that Kant was haunted by the traditional conception of God because such a conception contained in it one of the gravest sources of Heteronomy to human FREEDOM. There can be no doubt that Kant made a very great effort to reconstruct the idea of God to fit into his system of Ethics. In fact, he attempted to reconstruct the whole system of Christian doctrine to suit his Ethical philos At first, his new interpretation of Religion was welcomed as another Reformation, but his "theological" system has not endured, and few competent theological thinkers would now be pre pared to accept the teaching of Kant is this realm of thought as new or true. Kant is always protesting against conceiving God in "anthropomorphic" terms. Yet, it is difficult to see

how "man" can ever conceive of anything except in such terms. However, assuming that Kant's protest upon this point is valid it is still more difficult to find anything in the realm of Theology more "anthropomorphic" than Kant's God. Kant's God is "pushed" around in a Universe which He is supposed to have made. He is fenced in by the large ethical claims of man, and is pulled out of his enforced exile from "moral" affairs whenever Kant thinks that man needs to be made permanently happy. He is dressed up with the metaphysical attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, that is, for State occasions when He is required to reward self-determined virtue with Happiness; then, He is relegated to obscurity when He is likely to protest that "moral" Evil was an affront to His person and dignity. Further, Kant is always insisting upon the "moral" worth of Respect; yet, no serious thinker upon Divine things can respect the kind of God Kant has evolved. For He is a God who appears to have no real convictions concerning "moral" Evil, and no real plans concerning its treatment.

The God of Edwards is at least Master in His own house. His Sovereignty might be a little out of date in an age of over-confident democracy but, at least, He will not be ordered around in His Universe, and He has powers and plans to bring the greatest offender to account. Men might hate such a God or they might love Him, but one thing they cannot do, and that is, to ignore Him and the values for which He stands. It might well be that Kant has weakened his ethical system by making his God so little worthy of Reverence.

Therefore, if the above observations have any value, the Kantian Defence of Freedom is one of the greatest efforts ever made by the human mind to construct a durable fortress against an aggressive Determinism; and, in a very real sense it has fulfilled the purpose which Kant had in mind when he said -- "nothing remains but <u>defence</u>, i.e. the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of

things, and thereupon boldly declare Freedom impossible."(1) Kant has forever halted a bold and flippant Determinism. However, against the Determinism of Jonathan Edwards, Kant leaves his Defence open to very grave danger. In the closing pages of his work on "Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason", Kant has a word of contempt for the "Puritan and Independent in Connecticut", but, even in the highest flights of imagination, it cannot be taken to mean a direct reference to Edwards. Yet, it was this Puritan and Independent in Connecticut who provided Kant with his greatest opponent; and the struggle still continues.

Some years ago, Sir William Hamilton wrote:-

> "How the will can possibly be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We cannot conceive absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. But as little can we conceive the alternative on which liberty is denied, on which necessity is affirmed ..... The champions of the opposite doctrines are at once resistless in assault and impotent in defence. Each is hewn down, and appears to die under the thrust of his adversary; but each again recovers life from the very death of his antagonist, and, to borrow a simile, both are like the heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse themselves anew in the same bloodless and interminable conflict."(2)

The above description of the struggle between Freedom and Determinism by Sir William Hamilton suggests an attitude of detachment which is most commendable, but it is not enough; at least, for this particular examination of the Kantian Defence of Freedom. It is submitted that, from the evidence available, Kant has failed to give a decisive and convincing reply to the Determinism of Edwards. Of course, he had made Freedom "thinkable" or "imaginable", but he has not made Freedom rationally "conceivable". On the other hand, Edwards has given ample grounds for assuming that there is no other possible explanation for God, Man, Morality and Freedom, than in the terms of his system of Determinism. The Sovereignty of God is not some Power, or abstract Necessity. In the full

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(1) Gd. 94.

(2) Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, by J.S.Mill, pages 555 and 557.

and final analysis it is the Sovereignty of a supremely Moral Being. In fact, it is the Sovereignty of the LOVE of God for His creatures and creation. God will have His Way; and the words of Francis Thompson express such a Determinism:

"I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him down the arches of the years,
I fled Him down the labyrinthine way
Of my own mind .....
But with unhurrying chase,
And unperturbed pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
They beat: and a Voice beat,
More instant than the Feet.-
All things betray thee, who betrayest Me." (1)

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(1) The Hound of Heaven.